WIP: batched minor cleanups and editorial touchups

bip-0018.mediawiki

@@ -121,10 +121,6 @@ If a majority of hashing power does not support the new validation rules, then r
 The first two bytes of hashScriptCheck specify the hash algorithm and length used to verify scriptCheck.
 This BIP only allows Bitcoin's Hash160 algorithm, but leaves open the possibility of a future BIP implementing others.
 
-==Reference Implementation==
-
-https://github.com/gavinandresen/bitcoin-git/tree/pay_to_script_hash
-
 ==See Also==
 
 * The [[bip-0013.mediawiki|Address format for Pay to Script Hash BIP]]

bip-0052.mediawiki

@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ PoWx will also be publishing the designs of the current optical miner prototypes
 == Changelog ==
 
 * 2026-06-18:
-** Updated to Closed after the proposal has not made progress for several years and [https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/Vrh7oED9b9Q/m/TrCEKRjNAAAJ attempts to contact the authors] did not succeed.
+** Updated to Closed after the proposal had not made progress for several years and [https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/Vrh7oED9b9Q/m/TrCEKRjNAAAJ attempts to contact the authors] did not succeed.
 
 == Acknowledgments ==
 

bip-0098.mediawiki

@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ Second, final entries on an odd-length list are not duplicated and hashed, which
 
 ==Implementation==
 
-An implementation of this BIP for extraction of Merkle branches and fast, log-space Merkle branch validation is available at the following Github repository:
+An implementation of this BIP for extraction of Merkle branches and fast, log-space Merkle branch validation is available at the following GitHub repository:
 
 [https://github.com/maaku/bitcoin/tree/fast-merkle-tree]
 

bip-0099.mediawiki

@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ deployment of changes.
 ;Libbitcoinconsensus
 : the existing implementation is a library that is compiled by default with Bitcoin Core master and exposes a single C function named bitcoinconsensus_verify_script(). Although it has a deterministic build and implements the most complex rules (most of the cryptography, which is itself heavily based on libsecp256k1 after #REPLACE_libsecp256k1_PR), it is still not a complete specification of the consensus rules. Since libconsensus doesn't manage the current state but only the validation of the next block given that state, it is known that this long effort of encapsulation and decoupling will eventually finish, and that the person who moves the last line
 
+[BIP Editors' note: (a) the last sentence was left incomplete by the BIP author, and (b) the libbitcoin-consensus library was deprecated in Bitcoin Core v27.0 and was completely removed in v28.0; see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29189 and https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29648]
+
 ==Taxonomy of consensus forks==
 
 ===Accidental consensus fork===

bip-0116.mediawiki

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ When the honeypot is claimed, the (previous) owner of the coins can tell which s
 
 ==Implementation==
 
-An implementation of this BIP, including both consensus code updates and tests is available at the following Github repository:
+An implementation of this BIP, including both consensus code updates and tests is available at the following GitHub repository:
 
 [https://github.com/maaku/bitcoin/tree/merkle-branch-verify]
 

bip-0117.mediawiki

@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ This removes a potentially significant hurdle to deployment by making this featu
 
 ==Implementation==
 
-An implementation of this BIP, including both consensus code changes and tests are available at the following Github repository:
+An implementation of this BIP, including both consensus code changes and tests are available at the following GitHub repository:
 
 [https://github.com/maaku/bitcoin/tree/tail-call-semantics]
 

bip-0157.mediawiki

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ with little risk of detection, which is unacceptable for some applications
 (such as Lightning Network clients) that must respond to certain on-chain
 events. Finally, honest nodes servicing BIP 37 light clients may incur
 significant I/O and CPU resource usage due to maliciously crafted Bloom filters,
-creating a denial-of-service (DoS) vector and disincentizing node operators from
+creating a denial-of-service (DoS) vector and disincentivizing node operators from
 supporting the
 protocol<ref>https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0111.mediawiki</ref>.
 

bip-0340/reference.py

@@ -79,9 +79,6 @@ def lift_x(x: int) -> Optional[Point]:
 def int_from_bytes(b: bytes) -> int:
     return int.from_bytes(b, byteorder="big")
 
-def hash_sha256(b: bytes) -> bytes:
-    return hashlib.sha256(b).digest()
-
 def has_even_y(P: Point) -> bool:
     assert not is_infinite(P)
     return y(P) % 2 == 0

bip-0361.mediawiki

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ We seek to secure the value of the UTXO set and minimize incentives for quantum
 
 '''Accelerating quantum progress.'''
 
-NIST ratified three production-grade PQ signature schemes in 2024; academic road-maps now estimate a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer as early as 2027-2030, [https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/mckinsey%20digital/our%20insights/the%20year%20of%20quantum%20from%20concept%20to%20reality%20in%202025/quantum-monitor-2025.pdf?shouldIndex=false per McKinsey].
+NIST ratified three production-grade PQ signature schemes in 2024; academic road-maps now estimate a cryptographically relevant quantum computer as early as 2027-2030, [https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/mckinsey%20digital/our%20insights/the%20year%20of%20quantum%20from%20concept%20to%20reality%20in%202025/quantum-monitor-2025.pdf?shouldIndex=false per McKinsey].
 
 '''Quantum algorithms are rapidly improving'''
 
@@ -51,15 +51,15 @@ Quantum attackers could compute the private key for known public keys then trans
 
 '''Private keys become public.'''
 
-Assuming that quantum computers are able to maintain their current trajectories and overcome existing engineering obstacles, there is a near certain chance that all P2PK (and other outputs with exposed pubkeys) private keys will be found and used to steal the funds.
+Assuming that quantum computers are able to maintain their current trajectories and overcome existing engineering obstacles, there is a near-certain chance that all P2PK (and other outputs with exposed pubkeys) private keys will be found and used to steal the funds.
 
 '''Impossible to know motivations.'''
 
 Prior to a quantum attack, it is impossible to know the motivations of the attacker.  An economically motivated attacker will try to remain undetected for as long as possible, while a malicious attacker will attempt to destroy as much value as possible.
 
 '''Upgrade inertia.'''
 
-Coordinating wallets, exchanges, miners and custodians historically takes years.
+Coordinating wallets, exchanges, miners, and custodians historically takes years.
 
 The longer we postpone migration, the harder it becomes to coordinate wallets, exchanges, miners, and custodians. A clear, time-boxed pathway is the only credible defense.
 
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ Bitcoin's current signatures (ECDSA/Schnorr) will be a tantalizing target: any U
 
 '''Existing Proposals (as of March 2026) are Insufficient. '''
 
-To date, no quantum related proposal provides protection against:
+To date, no quantum-related proposal provides protection against:
 
 1. Short-range attacks.
 
@@ -123,17 +123,17 @@ Any proposal that allows for the quantum theft of "lost" bitcoin is creating a r
 
 '''Minimizes attack surface'''
 
-By disallowing new spends to quantum vulnerable script types, we minimize the attack surface with each new UTXO.
+By disallowing new spends to quantum-vulnerable script types, we minimize the attack surface with each new UTXO.
 
-Upgrades to Bitcoin have historically taken many years; this will hasten and speed up the adoption of new quantum resistant script types.
+Upgrades to Bitcoin have historically taken many years; this will hasten and speed up the adoption of new quantum-resistant script types.
 
 With a clear deadline, industry stakeholders will more readily upgrade existing infrastructure to ensure continuity of services.
 
 '''Minimizes loss of access to funds '''
 
 The new tighter verification conditions for using ECDSA and Schnorr to spend coins will be designed to rule out quantum attackers, but to permit spends from the authentic coin-holders. Such rescue protocols rely on asymmetry of knowledge between a quantum attacker and the authentic coin-holder. Any context where an asymmetry exists in favor of the authentic holder can theoretically be turned into a rescue protocol.
 
-For instance, most wallets built since its introduction in 2012 have used [[bip-0032.mediawiki|BIP-32]] to construct deterministic HD wallets which derive Bitcoin keypairs from a seed. Any BIP-32 wallet which uses a hardened derivation step in its key-paths can thus satisfy a rescue protocol which uses BIP-32 hardened key derivation to prove knowledge of a parent XPriv which a quantum attacker would be very unlikely to know. [https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/Q06piCEJhkI Current research on ZK-STARK-based rescue protocols] suggest proofs could be efficiently scaled, and [https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/uUK6py0Yjq0/m/57bQJ3VSCQAJ commit/reveal protocols can likely do so even more efficiently] at the expense of a more challenging multi-step security model.
+For instance, most wallets built since its introduction in 2012 have used [[bip-0032.mediawiki|BIP-32]] to construct deterministic HD wallets which derive Bitcoin keypairs from a seed. Any BIP-32 wallet which uses a hardened derivation step in its key-paths can thus satisfy a rescue protocol which uses BIP-32 hardened key derivation to prove knowledge of a parent XPriv, which a quantum attacker would be very unlikely to know. [https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/Q06piCEJhkI Current research on ZK-STARK-based rescue protocols] suggest proofs could be efficiently scaled, and [https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/uUK6py0Yjq0/m/57bQJ3VSCQAJ commit/reveal protocols can likely do so even more efficiently] at the expense of a more challenging multi-step security model.
 
 It remains to be seen how much of the legacy Bitcoin supply can be theoretically covered by such rescue protocols. If one or more rescue protocols can be designed to cover the majority of the Bitcoin supply, then restricting ECDSA/Schnorr verification will be at most mildly confiscatory, and will come at little expense to the overall integrity of the Bitcoin network.
 
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ It remains to be seen how much of the legacy Bitcoin supply can be theoretically
 ! Incentive to Upgrade
 |-
 | Miners
-| • Larger size PQ signatures along with incentive for users to migrate will create more demand for block space and thus higher fees collected by miners.<br /><br />• Post-Phase B, non-upgraded miners produce invalid blocks.<br /><br />• A quantum attack on Bitcoin will significantly devalue both their hardware and Bitcoin as a whole.
+| • Larger-size PQ signatures along with incentive for users to migrate will create more demand for block space and thus higher fees collected by miners.<br /><br />• Post-Phase B, non-upgraded miners produce invalid blocks.<br /><br />• A quantum attack on Bitcoin will significantly devalue both their hardware and Bitcoin as a whole.
 |-
 | Institutional Holders
 | • Fiduciary duty: failing to act to prevent a quantum attack on Bitcoin would violate the fiduciary duty to shareholders.  <br /><br />• Demonstrating Bitcoin's ability to effectively mitigate emerging threats will prove Bitcoin to be an investment grade asset.
@@ -160,13 +160,13 @@ It remains to be seen how much of the legacy Bitcoin supply can be theoretically
 
 '''Key Insight''': As mentioned earlier, the proposal turns quantum security into a private incentive to upgrade.
 
-This is not an offensive attack, rather, it is defensive: our thesis is that the Bitcoin ecosystem wishes to defend itself and its interests against those who would prefer to do nothing and allow a malicious actor to destroy both value and trust.
+This is not an offensive attack; rather, it is defensive: our thesis is that the Bitcoin ecosystem wishes to defend itself and its interests against those who would prefer to do nothing and allow a malicious actor to destroy both value and trust.
 
 "Lost coins only make everyone else's coins worth slightly more. Think of it as a donation to everyone." - Satoshi Nakamoto
 
 If true, the corollary is:
 
-"Quantum recovered coins only make everyone else's coins worth less. Think of it as a theft from everyone."
+"Quantum-recovered coins only make everyone else's coins worth less. Think of it as a theft from everyone."
 
 The timelines that we are proposing are meant to find the best balance between giving ample ability for account owners to migrate while maintaining the integrity of the overall ecosystem to avoid catastrophic attacks.
 
@@ -176,4 +176,4 @@ As a series of soft forks, older nodes will continue to operate without modifica
 
 Non-upgraded wallets can receive and send bitcoin from non-upgraded and upgraded wallets until Phase A. After Phase A, they can no longer receive from any other wallets and can only send to upgraded wallets.  After Phase B, both senders and receivers will require upgraded wallets.
 
-This BIP is also compatible with an "Hourglass" style BIP for spending P2PK encumbered funds, provided such a BIP has activated by the time Phase B activates. BIP-361 authors support Hourglass for P2PK because it's not currently believed possible to construct a rescue protocol for P2PK UTXOs, as no knowledge asymmetry is known.
+This BIP is also compatible with an "Hourglass" style BIP for spending P2PK-encumbered funds, provided such a BIP has activated by the time Phase B activates. BIP-361 authors support Hourglass for P2PK because it's not currently believed possible to construct a rescue protocol for P2PK UTXOs, as no knowledge asymmetry is known.

bip-0433.mediawiki

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
   Type: Informational
   Assigned: 2025-12-08
   License: BSD-3-Clause
-  Discussion: 2024-06-27: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/30352 Github PR
+  Discussion: 2024-06-27: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/30352 GitHub PR
               2024-10-10: https://bitcoinops.org/en/bitcoin-core-28-wallet-integration-guide/ wallet integration guide
 </pre>
 

scripts/link-format-chk.sh

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ while IFS= read -r fname; do
     GRES=$(grep -nE '\]\((https?://|\.\./bip-|/bip-)' "$fname")
     if [ "$GRES" != "" ]; then
         if [ $ECODE -eq 0 ]; then
-            >&2 echo "Github Mediawiki format writes links as [URL text], not as [text](URL):"
+            >&2 echo "GitHub Mediawiki format writes links as [URL text], not as [text](URL):"
         fi
         ECODE=1
         while IFS= read -r line; do