π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Path Traversal in File Upload/Delete Handlers#128
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Path Traversal in File Upload/Delete Handlers#128
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β¦lers Replaces `strings.Contains(name, string(os.PathSeparator))` with `strings.ContainsAny(name, "/\\")` in `UploadAuthFile` and `DeleteAuthFile` to ensure comprehensive, cross-platform path traversal protection, particularly on Unix systems where `\` is not interpreted as a directory separator. Co-authored-by: rschumann <360788+rschumann@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability:
UploadAuthFileandDeleteAuthFilechecked for path traversal in the user-suppliednamequery parameter using onlyos.PathSeparator. On a Linux server,os.PathSeparatoris/, meaning Windows-style path traversal payloads (e.g.,..\..\secrets.json) could bypass the validation. When combined with the subsequentfilepath.Join(), this could allow attackers to write or delete files outside the intendedAuthDir.π― Impact: Remote, unauthenticated attackers (if management endpoints are exposed) could upload arbitrary files to the server's filesystem, or delete critical configuration/auth files, leading to remote code execution (RCE) or denial of service (DoS).
π§ Fix: Updated the validation to explicitly check for both forward and backward slashes using
strings.ContainsAny(name, "/\\"). Moved the check to the very top of the handlers so malicious requests fail immediately (Fast Fail), even before backendauthManagerchecks.β Verification: Unit tests for path traversal have been successfully added to
auth_files_security_test.goand verified runninggo test ./internal/api/handlers/management -run Test.*AuthFile_PathTraversal.PR created automatically by Jules for task 6700445860179158313 started by @rschumann