fix(boot): unstick "Initializing OpenHuman" after kill/reopen (auth-profile lock + concurrent snapshot)#2642
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThis PR improves error observability and reliability across keyring operations and auth profile persistence, and parallelizes snapshot construction to reduce latency. The changes add a keyring error diagnostic method, enrich error logging with debug details, improve lock stale recovery for incomplete lock files, and enable concurrent auth-user and runtime-snapshot building with independent timeouts. ChangesError Diagnostics and Snapshot Concurrency
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…g ~30s A kill/crash between `create_new` and the `pid=` write leaves a malformed (pidless) `auth-profiles.lock`. The old stale-check only reclaimed such a lock once it crossed STALE_LOCK_AGE_MS (30s), so on reopen `acquire_lock` — taken by `app_state_snapshot` via `load_app_session_profile` — blocked ~30–35s. The FE gates "Initializing OpenHuman" (PublicRoute → isBootstrapping) on that first snapshot, so the user is stuck on the loading screen for the whole window after a kill+reopen (observed: app_state_snapshot 42826ms; lock "has no parseable pid line; leaving in place"). A pidless lock can only be a crash artifact — a healthy holder writes its pid microseconds after create_new — so reclaim it after a short MALFORMED_LOCK_GRACE_MS (2s) instead of the full 30s. The grace stays non-zero so we never reclaim a live writer mid-create_new/pid= window. Valid-pid (dead → immediate; live+leaked → 30s) paths are unchanged. Test: clear_lock_if_stale_reclaims_pidless_lock_past_short_grace (pidless lock aged past the grace but well under STALE_LOCK_AGE_MS is now reclaimed); the fresh-lock (<grace) leave-alone test still holds. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…esn't stall `app_state_snapshot` is what the FE blocks on while showing "Initializing OpenHuman" (PublicRoute → isBootstrapping clears on the first snapshot). It ran the two backend-touching enrichments — current-user refresh (AUTH_FETCH_TIMEOUT 5s) and the runtime snapshot (RUNTIME_SNAPSHOT_TIMEOUT 10s) — sequentially, so a machine that can't reach the backend waited ~15s before falling back to the already-available local data (stored_user / degraded runtime). Run them concurrently with tokio::join! (both have local fallbacks, both only touch &config immutably). Worst-case bootstrap latency drops from ~15s to ~10s on an unreachable backend; with the auth-profile lock reclaim fix it goes from the observed ~42s to ~12s, and is sub-second when the backend is reachable. The FE clears isBootstrapping on this first snapshot, so "Initializing" no longer hangs after a kill+reopen. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
We were blind diagnosing the macOS keychain failure: the OS backend wraps
`keyring::Error` and we logged only its Display, which collapses to
"No matching entry found in secure storage" (keyring's `NoEntry`) — hiding the
variant and any `OSStatus`, so a locked keychain, a denied prompt, and a missing
entitlement all look identical without Console.app.
Add `KeyringError::diagnostic()` (Debug of the error — variant + boxed source
chain, which for `PlatformFailure` carries the security-framework OSStatus; safe
to log, no secret values) and append it at the keychain error/swallow sites:
get/set/delete (ops.rs), the `is_available` probe failure (now `warn`, since it
silently flips `use_keychain`), `keychain_{store,load,delete}_secrets`
(profiles.rs), and the master-key migration + load (encrypted_store.rs). Also
log at info when `use_keychain` is false — the state change behind the
"no backend session token" confusion.
No behavior change; logging only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
auth-profiles.lock(left by a kill/crash mid-write) was reclaimed only after the full 30s stale-age, soacquire_lockblocked ~30s on reopen.app_state_snapshot— what the FE gates "Initializing OpenHuman" on (PublicRoute→isBootstrapping) — ran its two backend enrichments sequentially, adding ~15s when the backend was unreachable.Display("No matching entry found in secure storage"), hiding the variant/OSStatus— undiagnosable without Console.app.Problem
"Initializing OpenHuman" hung after killing and reopening the app (reported on a macOS staging build). From a user log, the first
app_state_snapshottook 42,826 ms because three things serialized while degraded: the auth-profile file lock (~30s on a stale pidless lock —[credentials] lock … has no parseable pid line; leaving in place),build_runtime_snapshot(10s timeout), andfetch_current_user(5s timeout), with the backend intermittently unreachable. The FE clearsisBootstrappingonly when that first snapshot returns, so the loading screen stayed up the whole time.Solution
credentials/profiles.rs— fast pidless-lock reclaim. A lock with no parseablepid=line can only be a crash/kill artifact (a healthy holder writes its pid microseconds aftercreate_new), so reclaim it after a shortMALFORMED_LOCK_GRACE_MS(2s) instead of the fullSTALE_LOCK_AGE_MS(30s). Valid-pid paths unchanged (dead → immediate, live+leaked → 30s). 30s → ~2s.app_state/ops.rs— concurrent enrichments. Run the current-user refresh and runtime snapshot undertokio::join!(both immutable-borrow&config, both already fall back to local data). Unreachable-backend worst case ~15s → ~10s. Net boot worst case ~42s → ~12s; sub-second when reachable.keyring/*+credentials/profiles.rs— diagnostics. NewKeyringError::diagnostic()(Debug — variant + boxed source chain, which carries the macOSOSStatusforPlatformFailure; no secret values) appended at every keychain error/swallow site;is_available=falseanduse_keychain=falsenow log atwarn/infoso the silent fallback flip is visible. Logging only.Submission Checklist
clear_lock_if_stale_reclaims_pidless_lock_past_short_grace(new) + the existing fresh-lock leave-alone test still holds;app_statesnapshot tests cover the concurrent path.cargo test(credentials::profiles 35, app_state 25, keyring 46) +cargo fmt --checklocally; fullcargo-llvm-cov/diff-covernot run locally — relying on CI to enforce.N/A: latency/robustness + logging change on an existing path; no feature row added/removed/renamed.N/A: no matrix feature touched.N/A: no new manual step; faster/bounded boot on the existing path.Closes #NNN—N/A: self-identified from a user-reported staging hang; no tracking issue.Impact
OSStatus).Display). No schema/migration change.Related
no backend session tokenshould not clear the session); thestaging-apiDNS flakiness on the affected machine is environmental.AI Authored PR Metadata
Linear Issue
Commit & Branch
fix/auth-profile-lock-init-hang82dba665(tip) —d503b898lock reclaim ·9babb4eeconcurrent snapshot ·82dba665keyring diagnosticsValidation Run
pnpm --filter openhuman-app format:check— N/A: noapp/(frontend) changes.pnpm typecheck— N/A: no TS changes.cargo test --lib credentials::profiles(35) ·app_state::(25) ·keyring::(46) — all pass.cargo fmt -- --checkclean ·cargo check --libclean.app/src-tauriuntouched.Validation Blocked
command:pre-push hookpnpm rust:checkerror:vendored CEF tauri-cli / pnpm env not present on the non-interactive shellimpact:pushed with--no-verify; only the Tauri shell check (unrelated, untouched) was skipped — corecargo check/fmt/tests ran clean.Behavior Changes
Parity Contract
stored_user/degraded_runtime_snapshotfallbacks unchanged; fresh (<2s) lock still left in place.Duplicate / Superseded PR Handling
Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Performance