-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 443
Add Windows TOR Client Execution Detected #3881
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Merged
+106
−0
Merged
Changes from all commits
Commits
Show all changes
4 commits
Select commit
Hold shift + click to select a range
87c1e73
Add Windows TOR Client Execution Detected
vignesh-user a4875af
Update Windows TOR Client Execution Detection
vignesh-user 1dfc762
Revise Windows TOR Client Execution detection details
nasbench 4e2afa6
Merge branch 'develop' into develop
nasbench File filter
Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
There are no files selected for viewing
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ | ||
| name: Windows TOR Client Execution | ||
| id: f164bc6f-ecbe-45e0-aaa6-f5c4d8c84b9a | ||
| version: 1 | ||
| date: '2026-02-02' | ||
| author: Vignesh Subramanian, Splunk | ||
| status: production | ||
| type: Anomaly | ||
| description: | | ||
| The following analytic detects the execution of the TOR Browser and related TOR components on Windows endpoints by monitoring process creation activity. | ||
| Adversaries and insider threats leverage TOR to anonymize command-and-control traffic, facilitate data exfiltration, and evade network monitoring and policy enforcement. | ||
| While TOR can be used for legitimate research and privacy purposes, its presence on enterprise endpoints is often unusual and should be investigated to determine intent, scope, and any associated malicious behavior. | ||
| data_source: | ||
| - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | ||
| - Sysmon EventID 1 | ||
| - Windows Event Log Security 4688 | ||
| search: | | ||
| | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime | ||
| from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where | ||
| ( | ||
| Processes.process_name = "tor.exe" | ||
| OR | ||
| ( | ||
| Processes.process_path = "*\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser*" | ||
| Processes.process_path = "*\\tor-*" | ||
| ) | ||
| ) | ||
| by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | ||
| Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec | ||
| Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id | ||
| Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path | ||
| Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid | ||
| Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level | ||
| Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user | ||
| Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product | ||
| | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | ||
| | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | ||
| | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | ||
| | `windows_tor_client_execution_filter` | ||
| how_to_implement: | | ||
| The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection | ||
| and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related | ||
| telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, | ||
| you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. | ||
| Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must | ||
| be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to | ||
| the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` | ||
| data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field | ||
| names and speed up the data modeling process. | ||
| known_false_positives: | | ||
| This detection focuses on TOR-related processes and may generate benign matches in environments where TOR is intentionally used, such as security testing, research, or lab environments. | ||
| references: | ||
| - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tor-traffic-enterprise-networks/ | ||
| - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183/ | ||
| - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003/ | ||
| drilldown_searches: | ||
| - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$" | ||
| search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"' | ||
| earliest_offset: $info_min_time$ | ||
| latest_offset: $info_max_time$ | ||
| - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$" | ||
| search: | ||
| '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", | ||
| "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) | ||
| as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk | ||
| Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) | ||
| as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" | ||
| by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' | ||
| earliest_offset: $info_min_time$ | ||
| latest_offset: $info_max_time$ | ||
| rba: | ||
| message: TOR client process $process_name$ was launched by parent process $parent_process_name$ on host $dest$ by the user $user$ with command line $process$ | ||
| risk_objects: | ||
| - field: dest | ||
| type: system | ||
| score: 40 | ||
| - field: user | ||
| type: user | ||
| score: 40 | ||
| threat_objects: | ||
| - field: parent_process_name | ||
| type: parent_process_name | ||
| - field: process_name | ||
| type: process_name | ||
| - field: process | ||
| type: process | ||
| tags: | ||
| analytic_story: | ||
| - Compromised Windows Host | ||
| - Windows Post-Exploitation | ||
| - Command And Control | ||
| - Data Exfiltration | ||
| - Data Protection | ||
| asset_type: Endpoint | ||
| mitre_attack_id: | ||
| - T1090.003 | ||
| product: | ||
| - Splunk Enterprise | ||
| - Splunk Enterprise Security | ||
| - Splunk Cloud | ||
| security_domain: endpoint | ||
| tests: | ||
| - name: True Positive Test | ||
| attack_data: | ||
| - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/refs/heads/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1090.003/windows_tor_client_execution/windows-sysmon.log | ||
| sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog | ||
| source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational | ||
Oops, something went wrong.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Just FYI in order to avoid using wildcard inside of strings (which is not a recommended things to do). I split the string like this.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
I understood and thank you for doing the changes.