fix(ssrf-safety): restore SSRF safety checks and enhance diagnostics …

backend/src/entities/table-actions/table-actions-module/table-action-activation.service.ts

@@ -10,11 +10,12 @@ import { TableActionMethodEnum } from '../../../enums/table-action-method-enum.j
 import { ConnectionNotFoundException } from '../../../exceptions/custom-exceptions/connection-not-found-exception.js';
 import { Messages } from '../../../exceptions/text/messages.js';
 import { isSaaS } from '../../../helpers/app/is-saas.js';
+import { Constants } from '../../../helpers/constants/constants.js';
 import { Encryptor } from '../../../helpers/encryption/encryptor.js';
 import { actionSlackPostMessage } from '../../../helpers/slack/action-slack-post-message.js';
+import { slackPostMessage } from '../../../helpers/slack/slack-post-message.js';
 import { isObjectPropertyExists } from '../../../helpers/validators/is-object-property-exists-validator.js';
-// TODO: temporarily disabled SSRF/URL safety check in activateTableAction. Restore import to re-enable.
-// import { getSsrfSafeRequestConfig } from '../../../helpers/validators/ssrf-safe-http.js';
+import { getSsrfSafeRequestConfig } from '../../../helpers/validators/ssrf-safe-http.js';
 import { ConnectionEntity } from '../../connection/connection.entity.js';
 import { EmailService } from '../../email/email/email.service.js';
 import { escapeHtml } from '../../email/utils/escape-html.util.js';
@@ -212,9 +213,7 @@ export class TableActionActivationService {
 		let result: AxiosResponse<any, any> | undefined;
 		try {
 			result = await axios.post(tableAction.url, actionRequestBody, {
-				// TODO: SSRF/URL safety check temporarily disabled. Restore the line below to re-enable.
-				// ...getSsrfSafeRequestConfig(),
-				timeout: 10_000,
+				...getSsrfSafeRequestConfig(),
 				headers: { 'Rocketadmin-Signature': autoadminSignatureHeader, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
 				maxRedirects: 0,
 				validateStatus: (status) => status <= 599,
@@ -225,6 +224,23 @@ export class TableActionActivationService {
 				console.info('HTTP action result headers', result?.headers);
 			}
 		} catch (error) {
+			// TODO: temporary diagnostics for the SSRF safety check. A URL blocked by the guard surfaces
+			// here as a request failure carrying the "SSRF guard" message. Report those to the errors
+			// channel so we can confirm the guard is not rejecting legitimate action URLs, then remove.
+			const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+			if (errorMessage.includes('SSRF guard')) {
+				const host = (() => {
+					try {
+						return new URL(tableAction.url).host;
+					} catch {
+						return tableAction.url;
+					}
+				})();
+				slackPostMessage(
+					`[ssrf-check] Table action URL validation failed for host "${host}": ${errorMessage}`,
+					Constants.EXCEPTIONS_CHANNELS,
+				).catch(() => undefined);
+			}
 			if (axios.isAxiosError(error)) {
 				const errorMessage =
 					result?.data?.error ||

backend/src/helpers/constants/constants.ts

@@ -33,7 +33,11 @@ export const Constants = {
 		'192.168.0.0/16',
 		'127.0.0.0/8',
 		'169.254.0.0/16',
+		'100.64.0.0/10',
+		'192.0.0.0/24',
+		'198.18.0.0/15',
 		'::1/128',
+		'::/128',
 		'fd00::/8',
 		'fe80::/10',
 	],

backend/src/helpers/validators/ssrf-safe-http.ts

@@ -15,16 +15,25 @@ export const ssrfGuardLookup: net.LookupFunction = (hostname, options, callback)
 			callback(err, '', 0);
 			return;
 		}
-		const forbidden = addresses.find(({ address }) => isForbiddenAddress(address));
-		if (forbidden) {
-			callback(new Error(`SSRF guard: refusing to connect to ${forbidden.address} for host ${hostname}`), '', 0);
+		// Keep only the public addresses. We deliberately do NOT reject the whole host just because one of
+		// its records is private (split-horizon DNS, stray records); we simply never connect to a forbidden
+		// one. The request is refused only when no usable address remains.
+		const allowed = addresses.filter(({ address }) => !isForbiddenAddress(address));
+		if (allowed.length === 0) {
+			callback(
+				new Error(`SSRF guard: refusing to connect to ${hostname}; all resolved addresses are forbidden`),
+				'',
+				0,
+			);
 			return;
 		}
-		const first = addresses[0];
-		if (!first) {
-			callback(new Error(`SSRF guard: no addresses resolved for host ${hostname}`), '', 0);
+		// Honour the "all" form so Node keeps every allowed address and can fall back across them
+		// (Happy Eyeballs / IPv6-first hosts on IPv4-only egress). Otherwise return the first allowed one.
+		if (options.all) {
+			callback(null, allowed);
 			return;
 		}
+		const first = allowed[0];
 		callback(null, first.address, first.family);
 	});
 };

backend/test/ava-tests/unit-tests/ssrf-safe-http.test.ts

@@ -32,9 +32,31 @@ function lookup(host: string): Promise<{ address: string; family: number }> {
 	});
 }
 
+function lookupAll(host: string): Promise<Array<{ address: string; family: number }>> {
+	return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+		ssrfGuardLookup(host, { all: true }, (err, addresses) => {
+			if (err) {
+				reject(err);
+			} else {
+				resolve(addresses as Array<{ address: string; family: number }>);
+			}
+		});
+	});
+}
+
 // --- the validating lookup blocks internal targets, allows public ones --------------------------
 
-for (const host of ['127.0.0.1', '::1', '169.254.169.254', '10.0.0.5', '192.168.1.1', '::ffff:127.0.0.1']) {
+for (const host of [
+	'127.0.0.1',
+	'::1',
+	'169.254.169.254',
+	'10.0.0.5',
+	'192.168.1.1',
+	'::ffff:127.0.0.1',
+	'100.64.0.1', // carrier-grade NAT
+	'198.18.0.1', // benchmarking
+	'192.0.0.1', // IETF protocol assignments
+]) {
 	test(`ssrfGuardLookup rejects forbidden address ${host}`, async (t) => {
 		await t.throwsAsync(() => lookup(host), { message: /SSRF guard/ });
 	});
@@ -50,6 +72,22 @@ test('ssrfGuardLookup resolves a public IPv6 address', async (t) => {
 	t.is(address, '2606:4700:4700::1111');
 });
 
+// --- the "all" form keeps every allowed address so Node can fall back across them -----------------
+
+test('ssrfGuardLookup returns the allowed address as an array when all=true', async (t) => {
+	const addresses = await lookupAll('8.8.8.8');
+	t.true(Array.isArray(addresses));
+	t.deepEqual(
+		addresses.map((a) => a.address),
+		['8.8.8.8'],
+	);
+});
+
+test('ssrfGuardLookup (all=true) rejects when every resolved address is forbidden', async (t) => {
+	// localhost resolves to 127.0.0.1 and ::1 — a multi-record host where nothing is usable.
+	await t.throwsAsync(() => lookupAll('localhost'), { message: /all resolved addresses are forbidden/ });
+});
+
 // --- gating: pinning config is applied only in SaaS, non-test ----------------------------------
 
 test.serial('getSsrfSafeRequestConfig returns pinning agents + guards in SaaS mode', (t) => {