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Fix openssl tls concurrent put v26.2.x v2#281

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dotnwat merged 2 commits into
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fix-openssl-tls-concurrent-put-v26.2.x-v2
Jun 11, 2026
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Fix openssl tls concurrent put v26.2.x v2#281
dotnwat merged 2 commits into
v26.2.xfrom
fix-openssl-tls-concurrent-put-v26.2.x-v2

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@dotnwat dotnwat commented Jun 3, 2026

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Fix for https://redpandadata.atlassian.net/browse/CORE-16383

virtual future<> seastar::net::posix_data_sink_impl::put(packet): Assertion `!_p` failed.

The OpenSSL TLS read and write paths use separate semaphores (_in_sem
vs _out_sem) and both can write to the underlying socket: a write
encrypts application data, while a read can emit a TLS
key-update/renegotiation response produced inside SSL_read_ex. When a
read emits output while a write's put() is still in flight, the TLS
layer issues a second, concurrent put() on the same data_sink, which
trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p) in posix_data_sink_impl.

Add test_concurrent_put_with_key_update, which installs an instrumented
data_sink under the client that flags overlapping put()s (what the posix
assert detects) and holds one put to open a deterministic window. It
drives two server key-updates -- OpenSSL only flushes the response to the
first while reading the second -- and that read-path put is held in
flight while a concurrent client write tries to issue the colliding put.

This test fails (overlap detected) against the current OpenSSL backend;
it is fixed by the following commit. GnuTLS re-runs the handshake while
holding both semaphores, so it never issues the concurrent put; the test
is skipped there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Copilot AI review requested due to automatic review settings June 3, 2026 19:05

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Pull request overview

This PR addresses an OpenSSL-specific TLS backend crash caused by concurrent data_sink::put() calls originating from the read path (key-update flush inside SSL_read_ex) racing with an application write, which can violate the one-in-flight-put invariant enforced by posix_data_sink_impl.

Changes:

  • Replace the _output_pending tracking in the OpenSSL TLS session with shared_future<> and update wait_for_output() to avoid prematurely marking output as idle.
  • Ensure the write path drains any in-flight output before entering SSL_write_ex, preventing read/write interleavings from issuing overlapping puts.
  • Add a regression unit test that reproduces the concurrent-put scenario (skipped for GnuTLS).

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 2 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated 3 comments.

File Description
tests/unit/tls_test.cc Adds an OpenSSL-only regression test that detects overlapping put() calls by instrumenting the client socket sink.
src/net/tls_openssl.cc Fixes output serialization by keeping _output_pending truthful via shared_future<> and adjusting the draining/guard logic around BIO writes.

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Comment thread tests/unit/tls_test.cc
Comment on lines +2350 to +2352
auto fR = cin.read();
gate.entered.get_future().get();

Comment thread src/net/tls_openssl.cc
Comment on lines 2381 to +2384
try {
size_t n;

// Skip issuing if a previous put() failed; the failed _output_pending is
Comment thread src/net/tls_openssl.cc
Comment on lines +2372 to +2374
// A put() is still draining (or never started): refuse, ask OpenSSL to
// retry later. This is the mutual-exclusion check -- it is honest only
// because wait_for_output() does not mark _output_pending ready early.
@pgellert pgellert self-requested a review June 4, 2026 09:15
pgellert
pgellert previously approved these changes Jun 4, 2026

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lgtm

Comment thread tests/unit/tls_test.cc
Comment on lines +2267 to +2278
++_gate.outstanding;
future<> hold = make_ready_future<>();
if (_gate.arm) {
_gate.arm = false; // one-shot
_gate.entered.set_value(); // announce the held put()
hold = _gate.release.get_future();
}
return hold.then([this, bufs = std::move(bufs)] () mutable {
return _next.put(std::move(bufs));
}).finally([this] {
--_gate.outstanding;
});

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🔥

Comment thread tests/unit/tls_test.cc
// server key-updates: OpenSSL only flushes the response to the first one while
// reading the second, and that flush is the read-path put() we hold in flight
// while a concurrent client write tries to issue the colliding put().
SEASTAR_THREAD_TEST_CASE(test_concurrent_put_with_key_update) {

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Do we have any proof/indication(e.g. broker logs) showing that this specific scenario (key exchange) is what led to the assertion failure in CORE-16383? It does look like the scenario is a "writing to the socket from session::do_get()", so key exchange seems like a reasonable assumption based on that, but I am just wondering if you have gathered any further context here.

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Hmm, good question. I'll take a look at the incident report and see if there are logs. AFAIK we've never been able to reproduce this ourselves.

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From what I've read the put from the read path can basically happen at anytime and its transparent and either side can initiate it. I guess there are other situations too when it can happen. Anyway, I don't expect that we'd see anything in the logs.

@dotnwat dotnwat requested a review from travisdowns June 4, 2026 15:44
joe-redpanda
joe-redpanda previously approved these changes Jun 4, 2026
Comment thread src/net/tls_openssl.cc
// tears down. Resetting it here would mutate _output_pending from a
// completion continuation, which would have to be shown not to race with a
// put() issued in the meantime and clobber a live one; leaving it failed
// avoids that, and is harmless since an output failure is terminal.

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The LLMs like to write these historical type comments, which explain the logic between of a certain change, i.e., why we dont' use std::exchange, because in this commit we are removing std::exchange, but for a future reader I don't think this makes much sense because they probably never considered std::exchange in the first place, as they are looking at the current code.

I think that's better in the commit message (which is associated with the "diff") than the comment.

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Agree, you should have seen the comment before I asked Claude to chill out haha. I'll move it

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Fixed

Comment thread src/net/tls_openssl.cc Outdated
// inside handle_do_put_ssl_err() before it returns stop_iteration::no).
// Draining up front just avoids that round-trip and keeps the loop's
// "drain before each SSL_write_ex" shape uniform.
co_await wait_for_output();

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If this is only an "optimization" for an extra roundtrip in a particular edge case (like TLS protocols generating its own writes during application reads), then I think we should not do it? Because this function is on the CPU-hot path, invoked once for every small buf. So it would be a pessimization overall. If it's needed for correctness that's another story.

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Yes, removed. Thanks

@joe-redpanda

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Not needed imo for this pr but thoughts on an ssl / network stack chaos test?

travisdowns
travisdowns previously approved these changes Jun 10, 2026
A data_sink permits only one put() in flight at a time
(posix_data_sink_impl asserts !_p). That contract was being violated
because wait_for_output() did

    std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future())

to obtain something to await, which marked _out "idle" while the put()
was still draining. bio_write_ex()'s guard then issued a second,
concurrent put() from the read path while a write-path put() was in
flight, tripping the assert (reproduced by the preceding commit).

This is not a missing lock: the reactor is single-threaded and the
bio_write_ex() guard is already atomic. It was the guard reading
falsified state. Make _output_pending a shared_future so that
wait_for_output() can hand out an awaitable via get_future() without
consuming or replacing the in-flight put; available()/failed() then stay
truthful and both the read and write paths can await the same put.

The interleaving, with a write fiber W (do_put, holding _out_sem) and a
read fiber R (do_get, holding _in_sem); R reaches bio_write_ex because
SSL_read_ex emits a key-update response while processing an incoming
record ("|" marks a reactor switch between the fibers):

  BEFORE, when wait_for_output() did
      std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future()):
    W  SSL_write_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending idle, so issue put_W;
       the sink sets _p and starts write_all() (put_W now UNRESOLVED).
    W  co_await wait_for_output() evaluates the exchange synchronously: it
       swaps _output_pending to a *ready* future, then parks W on put_W.
    |  put_W's write_all() is still draining, yet _output_pending now
       reads "available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending available, so issue
       put_R -> posix_data_sink_impl::put() trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p),
       because _p still holds put_W's packet.  *** assertion failure ***

  AFTER, with wait_for_output() == _output_pending.get_future() (no swap):
    W  bio_write_ex issues put_W; _output_pending = shared_future(put_W),
       which stays UNRESOLVED while write_all() drains.
    W  co_await wait_for_output() takes a get_future() on put_W and parks
       W on it, leaving _output_pending untouched.
    |  put_W still draining; _output_pending correctly reads "not
       available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending not available, so
       decline (BIO_set_retry_write) -- no second put(). SSL_read_ex
       returns WANT_WRITE; do_get co_awaits wait_for_output(), a SECOND
       get_future() on the SAME put_W, and parks R on it too.
    |  write_all() completes, the sink clears _p, put_W resolves, and the
       shared state resolves BOTH waiters.
    R  resumes, retries SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex now idle -> issues
       put_R into a clear sink. W resumes and continues. One put() at a
       time.

A write can also enter do_put_one() with a put already in flight, for the
same reason R does above: the read path emits a key-update put while the
write holds the disjoint _out_sem. That needs no up-front drain --
bio_write_ex() declines while a put is in flight (BIO_set_retry_write), so
the first SSL_write_ex reports WANT_WRITE and handle_do_put_ssl_err()
drains and retries, exactly as later loop iterations do.

Remove the SEASTAR_ASSERT(_output_pending.available()) preconditions at
the start of the two do_put() overloads and do_put_one(). They asserted
"no put is in flight when a write begins", which is false for the reason
above: _in_sem and _out_sem are disjoint, so a write taking _out_sem does
not exclude a read-path put. The assert only held before because the
std::exchange() swap left _output_pending spuriously available -- the
same falsification behind the bug -- so with the swap gone it would now
fire on exactly the scenario being fixed. The decline/retry path is the
correct handling; the two overloads just delegate to do_put_one(), so
their asserts are simply dropped. The destructor's available() assert is
kept -- it is still true once close() has drained output, and a failed
_output_pending is also available(). (GnuTLS keeps its copies of these
asserts: its read path never emits output, so the precondition still
holds there.)

On an output failure _output_pending is intentionally left failed and
acts as a circuit breaker -- it is not reset. The _output_pending data
member carries a detailed comment covering the locking model, the
serialization protocol, why the future->shared_future change is the
minimal correct fix (rather than adding a lock), how handed-out waiters
still resolve after reassignment, and the failure behavior.

With this change test_concurrent_put_with_key_update passes, and the full
tls_test suite passes under both the OpenSSL and GnuTLS providers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@dotnwat dotnwat dismissed stale reviews from travisdowns, joe-redpanda, and pgellert via 1cc4713 June 10, 2026 20:44
@dotnwat dotnwat force-pushed the fix-openssl-tls-concurrent-put-v26.2.x-v2 branch from 3f8a3d3 to 1cc4713 Compare June 10, 2026 20:44
@dotnwat

dotnwat commented Jun 10, 2026

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Not needed imo for this pr but thoughts on an ssl / network stack chaos test?

Yeh, it would be great. It's unclear how easily this particular issue would surface in a basic chaos test, but maybe if we included OpenSSL configuration tweaking and some kind of timing injections into the harness we could surface some good stuff.

@dotnwat

dotnwat commented Jun 10, 2026

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Thanks for the reviews. @travisdowns I removed that optimization and moved the historical parts of the comments into the commit message. This branch is live in upstream CI here redpanda-data/redpanda#30692.

@dotnwat dotnwat requested review from pgellert and travisdowns June 11, 2026 14:31
@dotnwat dotnwat merged commit e96017b into v26.2.x Jun 11, 2026
36 of 39 checks passed
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 11, 2026
Backport of the reproducer from #281 (merged to
v26.2.x) to v25.3.x.

The OpenSSL TLS read and write paths use separate semaphores (_in_sem
vs _out_sem) and both can write to the underlying socket: a write
encrypts application data, while a read can emit a TLS
key-update/renegotiation response produced inside SSL_read_ex. When a
read emits output while a write's put() is still in flight, the TLS
layer issues a second, concurrent put() on the same data_sink, which
trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p) in posix_data_sink_impl.

Add test_concurrent_put_with_key_update, which installs an instrumented
data_sink under the client that flags overlapping put()s (what the posix
assert detects) and holds one put to open a deterministic window. It
drives two server key-updates -- OpenSSL only flushes the response to the
first while reading the second -- and that read-path put is held in
flight while a concurrent client write tries to issue the colliding put.

This test fails (overlap detected) against the current OpenSSL backend;
it is fixed by the following commit. GnuTLS re-runs the handshake while
holding both semaphores, so it never issues the concurrent put; the test
is compiled out under the GnuTLS backend.

Backport notes: on v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in
src/net/tls_openssl.cc and the reproducer drives key-updates through the
public tls::force_rehandshake(), implemented there via SSL_key_update().
On v25.3.x the backend is src/net/ossl.cc and has no rehandshake /
key-update entry point at all (force_rehandshake() does not exist on this
branch), so rather than add that production API this commit adds a
minimal, test-only hook -- session::trigger_key_update_for_test() plus a
free function tls::trigger_key_update_for_test(connected_socket&), neither
declared in any public header -- that performs just the SSL_key_update()
the test needs. The test also selects the backend at compile time
(SEASTAR_USE_GNUTLS) rather than via the runtime tls::backend_name() used
on v26.2.x, and its instrumented data_sink overrides put(net::packet) to
match this branch's data_sink API.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 11, 2026
Backport of #281 (merged to v26.2.x) to v25.3.x. On
v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in src/net/tls_openssl.cc and splits the
write path into two do_put() overloads plus do_put_one(); on this branch
it is src/net/ossl.cc with a single do_put(net::packet). The buggy pattern
and the fix are otherwise the same.

A data_sink permits only one put() in flight at a time
(posix_data_sink_impl asserts !_p). That contract was being violated
because wait_for_output() did

    std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future())

to obtain something to await, which marked _out "idle" while the put()
was still draining. bio_write_ex()'s guard then issued a second,
concurrent put() from the read path while a write-path put() was in
flight, tripping the assert (reproduced by the preceding commit).

This is not a missing lock: the reactor is single-threaded and the
bio_write_ex() guard is already atomic. It was the guard reading
falsified state. Make _output_pending a shared_future so that
wait_for_output() can hand out an awaitable via get_future() without
consuming or replacing the in-flight put; available()/failed() then stay
truthful and both the read and write paths can await the same put.

The interleaving, with a write fiber W (do_put, holding _out_sem) and a
read fiber R (do_get, holding _in_sem); R reaches bio_write_ex because
SSL_read_ex emits a key-update response while processing an incoming
record ("|" marks a reactor switch between the fibers):

  BEFORE, when wait_for_output() did
      std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future()):
    W  SSL_write_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending idle, so issue put_W;
       the sink sets _p and starts write_all() (put_W now UNRESOLVED).
    W  co_await wait_for_output() evaluates the exchange synchronously: it
       swaps _output_pending to a *ready* future, then parks W on put_W.
    |  put_W's write_all() is still draining, yet _output_pending now
       reads "available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending available, so issue
       put_R -> posix_data_sink_impl::put() trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p),
       because _p still holds put_W's packet.  *** assertion failure ***

  AFTER, with wait_for_output() == _output_pending.get_future() (no swap):
    W  bio_write_ex issues put_W; _output_pending = shared_future(put_W),
       which stays UNRESOLVED while write_all() drains.
    W  co_await wait_for_output() takes a get_future() on put_W and parks
       W on it, leaving _output_pending untouched.
    |  put_W still draining; _output_pending correctly reads "not
       available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending not available, so
       decline (BIO_set_retry_write) -- no second put(). SSL_read_ex
       returns WANT_WRITE; do_get co_awaits wait_for_output(), a SECOND
       get_future() on the SAME put_W, and parks R on it too.
    |  write_all() completes, the sink clears _p, put_W resolves, and the
       shared state resolves BOTH waiters.
    R  resumes, retries SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex now idle -> issues
       put_R into a clear sink. W resumes and continues. One put() at a
       time.

A write can also enter do_put() with a put already in flight, for the
same reason R does above: the read path emits a key-update put while the
write holds the disjoint _out_sem. That needs no up-front drain --
bio_write_ex() declines while a put is in flight (BIO_set_retry_write), so
the first SSL_write_ex reports WANT_WRITE and handle_do_put_ssl_err()
drains and retries, exactly as later loop iterations do.

Remove the SEASTAR_ASSERT(_output_pending.available()) precondition at the
start of do_put(). It asserted "no put is in flight when a write begins",
which is false for the reason above: _in_sem and _out_sem are disjoint, so
a write taking _out_sem does not exclude a read-path put. The assert only
held before because the std::exchange() swap left _output_pending
spuriously available -- the same falsification behind the bug -- so with
the swap gone it would now fire on exactly the scenario being fixed. The
decline/retry path is the correct handling. The destructor's available()
assert is kept -- it is still true once close() has drained output, and a
failed _output_pending is also available(). The GnuTLS backend
(src/net/tls.cc) is unaffected: its read path never emits output, so the
concurrent put cannot occur there.

On an output failure _output_pending is intentionally left failed and
acts as a circuit breaker -- it is not reset. The _output_pending data
member carries a detailed comment covering the locking model, the
serialization protocol, why the future->shared_future change is the
minimal correct fix (rather than adding a lock), how handed-out waiters
still resolve after reassignment, and the failure behavior.

With this change test_concurrent_put_with_key_update passes, and the full
tls_test suite passes under the OpenSSL backend (the new test is compiled
out under GnuTLS).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 11, 2026
Backport of the reproducer from #281 (merged to
v26.2.x) to v26.1.x.

The OpenSSL TLS read and write paths use separate semaphores (_in_sem
vs _out_sem) and both can write to the underlying socket: a write
encrypts application data, while a read can emit a TLS
key-update/renegotiation response produced inside SSL_read_ex. When a
read emits output while a write's put() is still in flight, the TLS
layer issues a second, concurrent put() on the same data_sink, which
trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p) in posix_data_sink_impl.

Add test_concurrent_put_with_key_update, which installs an instrumented
data_sink under the client that flags overlapping put()s (what the posix
assert detects) and holds one put to open a deterministic window. It
drives two server key-updates -- OpenSSL only flushes the response to the
first while reading the second -- and that read-path put is held in
flight while a concurrent client write tries to issue the colliding put.

This test fails (overlap detected) against the current OpenSSL backend;
it is fixed by the following commit. GnuTLS re-runs the handshake while
holding both semaphores, so it never issues the concurrent put; the test
is compiled out under the GnuTLS backend.

Backport notes: on v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in
src/net/tls_openssl.cc and the reproducer drives key-updates through the
public tls::force_rehandshake(), which is implemented there via
SSL_key_update(). On v26.1.x the backend is src/net/ossl.cc and
force_rehandshake() is unimplemented for OpenSSL, so rather than backport
that production feature this commit adds a minimal, test-only hook --
session::trigger_key_update_for_test() plus a free function
tls::trigger_key_update_for_test(connected_socket&), neither declared in
any public header -- that performs just the SSL_key_update() the test
needs. The test also selects the backend at compile time
(SEASTAR_USE_GNUTLS) rather than via the runtime tls::backend_name()
used on v26.2.x's dual-backend build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 11, 2026
Backport of #281 (merged to v26.2.x) to v26.1.x.
On v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in src/net/tls_openssl.cc; on this
branch it is src/net/ossl.cc, but the buggy pattern and the fix are the
same.

A data_sink permits only one put() in flight at a time
(posix_data_sink_impl asserts !_p). That contract was being violated
because wait_for_output() did

    std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future())

to obtain something to await, which marked _out "idle" while the put()
was still draining. bio_write_ex()'s guard then issued a second,
concurrent put() from the read path while a write-path put() was in
flight, tripping the assert (reproduced by the preceding commit).

This is not a missing lock: the reactor is single-threaded and the
bio_write_ex() guard is already atomic. It was the guard reading
falsified state. Make _output_pending a shared_future so that
wait_for_output() can hand out an awaitable via get_future() without
consuming or replacing the in-flight put; available()/failed() then stay
truthful and both the read and write paths can await the same put.

The interleaving, with a write fiber W (do_put, holding _out_sem) and a
read fiber R (do_get, holding _in_sem); R reaches bio_write_ex because
SSL_read_ex emits a key-update response while processing an incoming
record ("|" marks a reactor switch between the fibers):

  BEFORE, when wait_for_output() did
      std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future()):
    W  SSL_write_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending idle, so issue put_W;
       the sink sets _p and starts write_all() (put_W now UNRESOLVED).
    W  co_await wait_for_output() evaluates the exchange synchronously: it
       swaps _output_pending to a *ready* future, then parks W on put_W.
    |  put_W's write_all() is still draining, yet _output_pending now
       reads "available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending available, so issue
       put_R -> posix_data_sink_impl::put() trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p),
       because _p still holds put_W's packet.  *** assertion failure ***

  AFTER, with wait_for_output() == _output_pending.get_future() (no swap):
    W  bio_write_ex issues put_W; _output_pending = shared_future(put_W),
       which stays UNRESOLVED while write_all() drains.
    W  co_await wait_for_output() takes a get_future() on put_W and parks
       W on it, leaving _output_pending untouched.
    |  put_W still draining; _output_pending correctly reads "not
       available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending not available, so
       decline (BIO_set_retry_write) -- no second put(). SSL_read_ex
       returns WANT_WRITE; do_get co_awaits wait_for_output(), a SECOND
       get_future() on the SAME put_W, and parks R on it too.
    |  write_all() completes, the sink clears _p, put_W resolves, and the
       shared state resolves BOTH waiters.
    R  resumes, retries SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex now idle -> issues
       put_R into a clear sink. W resumes and continues. One put() at a
       time.

A write can also enter do_put_one() with a put already in flight, for the
same reason R does above: the read path emits a key-update put while the
write holds the disjoint _out_sem. That needs no up-front drain --
bio_write_ex() declines while a put is in flight (BIO_set_retry_write), so
the first SSL_write_ex reports WANT_WRITE and handle_do_put_ssl_err()
drains and retries, exactly as later loop iterations do.

Remove the SEASTAR_ASSERT(_output_pending.available()) preconditions at
the start of the two do_put() overloads and do_put_one(). They asserted
"no put is in flight when a write begins", which is false for the reason
above: _in_sem and _out_sem are disjoint, so a write taking _out_sem does
not exclude a read-path put. The assert only held before because the
std::exchange() swap left _output_pending spuriously available -- the
same falsification behind the bug -- so with the swap gone it would now
fire on exactly the scenario being fixed. The decline/retry path is the
correct handling; the two overloads just delegate to do_put_one(), so
their asserts are simply dropped. The destructor's available() assert is
kept -- it is still true once close() has drained output, and a failed
_output_pending is also available(). (The GnuTLS backend in src/net/tls.cc
keeps its copies of these asserts: its read path never emits output, so
the precondition still holds there.)

On an output failure _output_pending is intentionally left failed and
acts as a circuit breaker -- it is not reset. The _output_pending data
member carries a detailed comment covering the locking model, the
serialization protocol, why the future->shared_future change is the
minimal correct fix (rather than adding a lock), how handed-out waiters
still resolve after reassignment, and the failure behavior.

With this change test_concurrent_put_with_key_update passes, and the full
tls_test suite passes under the OpenSSL backend (the new test is compiled
out under GnuTLS).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 11, 2026
test_concurrent_put_with_key_update (added in #281) keeps its gate_state
(the overlap-detection counter and the arm/release promises) on the test
fiber's stack and decrements gate.outstanding from the instrumented sink's
put() .finally(). That finally can run on the reactor AFTER the
SEASTAR_THREAD_TEST_CASE fiber has returned and freed its stack, so the
reference into the dead frame is a use-after-return. ASan (debug builds,
detect_stack_use_after_return=1) traps it as a SEGV. Whether it fires is
timing-dependent, so the original merge passed CI; the same latent bug
then failed the debug+OpenSSL job on the v25.3.x backport of #281 while
passing on v26.1.x.

Why the finally outlives the test body (and why a drain cannot fix it)

  openssl_session::close() does not close synchronously and hands the
  caller no future. It runs the TLS bye-handshake plus _in.close()/
  _out.close() as a DETACHED reactor task (src/net/tls_openssl.cc):

      void close() noexcept override {
          ...
          auto me = shared_from_this();
          engine().run_in_background(std::move(f)
              .finally([this]{ _eof = true; return _in.close(); })
              .finally([this]{ return _out.close(); })   // closes the sink
              ...
              .handle_exception([me = std::move(me)](std::exception_ptr){})
              .discard_result());
      }

  The session keeps itself (and therefore this sink) alive via
  shared_from_this() and discards the future, so the task can run for up to
  bye_timeout (~10s) after close() returns, with no handle for anyone to
  await. Tearing the sink down (_out.close()) can complete an in-flight
  put() whose .finally then runs on the reactor -- after the test fiber is
  long gone.

  This is safe for seastar's own state: the session self-owns for the whole
  detached teardown and the reactor drains run_in_background tasks before it
  stops, so the session, sink and socket are freed only once the work
  finishes. It is unsafe only for state the test reached into that teardown
  by raw reference -- here, gate_state on the fiber stack, whose lifetime
  ends when the test body returns. Because there is deliberately no future
  to await and no "fully torn down" signal, a poll such as
  `while (gate.outstanding) yield()` cannot close the race: the detached
  task may issue a sink put() at any point in its window, including after a
  poll has observed zero. shutdown_input()/shutdown_output() are likewise
  void, so they cannot be awaited either.

The fix is lifetime-matching -- the idiomatic seastar rule that state shared
with a reactor continuation must be owned (shared_ptr), not referenced from
a stack frame. Heap-allocate gate_state via lw_shared_ptr, have the sink
co-own it, and capture the shared_ptr in the .finally(). Its lifetime then
extends to match the sink's, i.e. as long as anything can still touch it.
Test-only change; no production code is touched.

The mechanism was confirmed deterministically (not just reasoned): an
instrumented build shows the sink destroyed after the test body returns,
and forcing a put() to be in flight at body-end reproduces the exact CI
SEGV in the .finally with the stack gate, while the shared_ptr gate runs
that same late finally safely.

Verified under debug + ASan (detect_stack_use_after_return=1) with the
OpenSSL backend (--tls-mode=openssl): test_concurrent_put_with_key_update
and the full tls_test suite pass with no SEGV.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2026
Backport of the reproducer from #281 (merged to
v26.2.x) to v25.3.x.

The OpenSSL TLS read and write paths use separate semaphores (_in_sem
vs _out_sem) and both can write to the underlying socket: a write
encrypts application data, while a read can emit a TLS
key-update/renegotiation response produced inside SSL_read_ex. When a
read emits output while a write's put() is still in flight, the TLS
layer issues a second, concurrent put() on the same data_sink, which
trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p) in posix_data_sink_impl.

Add test_concurrent_put_with_key_update, which installs an instrumented
data_sink under the client that flags overlapping put()s (what the posix
assert detects) and holds one put to open a deterministic window. It
drives two server key-updates -- OpenSSL only flushes the response to the
first while reading the second -- and that read-path put is held in
flight while a concurrent client write tries to issue the colliding put.

This test fails (overlap detected) against the current OpenSSL backend;
it is fixed by the following commit. GnuTLS re-runs the handshake while
holding both semaphores, so it never issues the concurrent put; the test
is compiled out under the GnuTLS backend.

Backport notes: on v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in
src/net/tls_openssl.cc and the reproducer drives key-updates through the
public tls::force_rehandshake(), implemented there via SSL_key_update().
On v25.3.x the backend is src/net/ossl.cc and has no rehandshake /
key-update entry point at all (force_rehandshake() does not exist on this
branch), so rather than add that production API this commit adds a
minimal, test-only hook -- session::trigger_key_update_for_test() plus a
free function tls::trigger_key_update_for_test(connected_socket&), neither
declared in any public header -- that performs just the SSL_key_update()
the test needs. The test also selects the backend at compile time
(SEASTAR_USE_GNUTLS) rather than via the runtime tls::backend_name() used
on v26.2.x, and its instrumented data_sink overrides put(net::packet) to
match this branch's data_sink API.

Gate lifetime (why gate_state is shared, not on the stack): the
instrumented sink decrements gate_state.outstanding from a put()
.finally(), and that finally can run on the reactor AFTER this
SEASTAR_THREAD_TEST_CASE fiber has returned and freed its stack -- so a
gate referenced from the fiber stack would be a use-after-return (an
intermittent SEGV under ASan, which is exactly what failed the debug+
OpenSSL CI job for this backport). The reason the finally outlives the
body is that session::close() (src/net/ossl.cc) does not close
synchronously and returns no future: it runs the bye-handshake plus
_in.close()/_out.close() as a DETACHED reactor task via
engine().run_in_background(...), keeps the session (and this sink) alive
with shared_from_this(), and discards the future. So the caller has
nothing to await, the task can run for up to bye_timeout (~10s) after
close() returns, and tearing the sink down can complete a put() whose
finally then runs once the test fiber is gone. This is safe for seastar's
own state (the session self-owns for the whole teardown and the reactor
drains run_in_background tasks before it stops); it is unsafe only for
state the test reached into that teardown by raw reference. Because there
is no awaitable handle and no "fully torn down" signal, a drain/poll such
as `while (gate.outstanding) yield()` cannot fix it (the detached task may
issue a put after the poll observes zero). The fix is lifetime-matching:
gate_state is held by lw_shared_ptr, the sink co-owns it, and the
.finally() captures the shared_ptr, so its lifetime extends to match the
sink's. Confirmed deterministically -- forcing a put in flight at body-end
reproduces the SEGV in the finally with a stack gate and runs safely with
the shared_ptr gate. (Same lifetime fix as #287,
which applies it to the already-merged v26.2.x reproducer.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2026
Backport of #281 (merged to v26.2.x) to v25.3.x. On
v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in src/net/tls_openssl.cc and splits the
write path into two do_put() overloads plus do_put_one(); on this branch
it is src/net/ossl.cc with a single do_put(net::packet). The buggy pattern
and the fix are otherwise the same.

A data_sink permits only one put() in flight at a time
(posix_data_sink_impl asserts !_p). That contract was being violated
because wait_for_output() did

    std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future())

to obtain something to await, which marked _out "idle" while the put()
was still draining. bio_write_ex()'s guard then issued a second,
concurrent put() from the read path while a write-path put() was in
flight, tripping the assert (reproduced by the preceding commit).

This is not a missing lock: the reactor is single-threaded and the
bio_write_ex() guard is already atomic. It was the guard reading
falsified state. Make _output_pending a shared_future so that
wait_for_output() can hand out an awaitable via get_future() without
consuming or replacing the in-flight put; available()/failed() then stay
truthful and both the read and write paths can await the same put.

The interleaving, with a write fiber W (do_put, holding _out_sem) and a
read fiber R (do_get, holding _in_sem); R reaches bio_write_ex because
SSL_read_ex emits a key-update response while processing an incoming
record ("|" marks a reactor switch between the fibers):

  BEFORE, when wait_for_output() did
      std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future()):
    W  SSL_write_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending idle, so issue put_W;
       the sink sets _p and starts write_all() (put_W now UNRESOLVED).
    W  co_await wait_for_output() evaluates the exchange synchronously: it
       swaps _output_pending to a *ready* future, then parks W on put_W.
    |  put_W's write_all() is still draining, yet _output_pending now
       reads "available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending available, so issue
       put_R -> posix_data_sink_impl::put() trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p),
       because _p still holds put_W's packet.  *** assertion failure ***

  AFTER, with wait_for_output() == _output_pending.get_future() (no swap):
    W  bio_write_ex issues put_W; _output_pending = shared_future(put_W),
       which stays UNRESOLVED while write_all() drains.
    W  co_await wait_for_output() takes a get_future() on put_W and parks
       W on it, leaving _output_pending untouched.
    |  put_W still draining; _output_pending correctly reads "not
       available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending not available, so
       decline (BIO_set_retry_write) -- no second put(). SSL_read_ex
       returns WANT_WRITE; do_get co_awaits wait_for_output(), a SECOND
       get_future() on the SAME put_W, and parks R on it too.
    |  write_all() completes, the sink clears _p, put_W resolves, and the
       shared state resolves BOTH waiters.
    R  resumes, retries SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex now idle -> issues
       put_R into a clear sink. W resumes and continues. One put() at a
       time.

A write can also enter do_put() with a put already in flight, for the
same reason R does above: the read path emits a key-update put while the
write holds the disjoint _out_sem. That needs no up-front drain --
bio_write_ex() declines while a put is in flight (BIO_set_retry_write), so
the first SSL_write_ex reports WANT_WRITE and handle_do_put_ssl_err()
drains and retries, exactly as later loop iterations do.

Remove the SEASTAR_ASSERT(_output_pending.available()) precondition at the
start of do_put(). It asserted "no put is in flight when a write begins",
which is false for the reason above: _in_sem and _out_sem are disjoint, so
a write taking _out_sem does not exclude a read-path put. The assert only
held before because the std::exchange() swap left _output_pending
spuriously available -- the same falsification behind the bug -- so with
the swap gone it would now fire on exactly the scenario being fixed. The
decline/retry path is the correct handling. The destructor's available()
assert is kept -- it is still true once close() has drained output, and a
failed _output_pending is also available(). The GnuTLS backend
(src/net/tls.cc) is unaffected: its read path never emits output, so the
concurrent put cannot occur there.

On an output failure _output_pending is intentionally left failed and
acts as a circuit breaker -- it is not reset. The _output_pending data
member carries a detailed comment covering the locking model, the
serialization protocol, why the future->shared_future change is the
minimal correct fix (rather than adding a lock), how handed-out waiters
still resolve after reassignment, and the failure behavior.

With this change test_concurrent_put_with_key_update passes, and the full
tls_test suite passes under the OpenSSL backend (the new test is compiled
out under GnuTLS).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2026
Backport of the reproducer from #281 (merged to
v26.2.x) to v26.1.x.

The OpenSSL TLS read and write paths use separate semaphores (_in_sem
vs _out_sem) and both can write to the underlying socket: a write
encrypts application data, while a read can emit a TLS
key-update/renegotiation response produced inside SSL_read_ex. When a
read emits output while a write's put() is still in flight, the TLS
layer issues a second, concurrent put() on the same data_sink, which
trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p) in posix_data_sink_impl.

Add test_concurrent_put_with_key_update, which installs an instrumented
data_sink under the client that flags overlapping put()s (what the posix
assert detects) and holds one put to open a deterministic window. It
drives two server key-updates -- OpenSSL only flushes the response to the
first while reading the second -- and that read-path put is held in
flight while a concurrent client write tries to issue the colliding put.

This test fails (overlap detected) against the current OpenSSL backend;
it is fixed by the following commit. GnuTLS re-runs the handshake while
holding both semaphores, so it never issues the concurrent put; the test
is compiled out under the GnuTLS backend.

Backport notes: on v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in
src/net/tls_openssl.cc and the reproducer drives key-updates through the
public tls::force_rehandshake(), which is implemented there via
SSL_key_update(). On v26.1.x the backend is src/net/ossl.cc and
force_rehandshake() is unimplemented for OpenSSL, so rather than backport
that production feature this commit adds a minimal, test-only hook --
session::trigger_key_update_for_test() plus a free function
tls::trigger_key_update_for_test(connected_socket&), neither declared in
any public header -- that performs just the SSL_key_update() the test
needs. The test also selects the backend at compile time
(SEASTAR_USE_GNUTLS) rather than via the runtime tls::backend_name()
used on v26.2.x's dual-backend build.

Gate lifetime (why gate_state is shared, not on the stack): the
instrumented sink decrements gate_state.outstanding from a put()
.finally(), and that finally can run on the reactor AFTER this
SEASTAR_THREAD_TEST_CASE fiber has returned and freed its stack -- so a
gate referenced from the fiber stack would be a use-after-return (an
intermittent SEGV under ASan; this is the same class of bug that failed
the debug+OpenSSL CI job on the v25.3.x backport). The reason the finally
outlives the body is that session::close() (src/net/ossl.cc) does not
close synchronously and returns no future: it runs the bye-handshake plus
_in.close()/_out.close() as a DETACHED reactor task via
engine().run_in_background(...), keeps the session (and this sink) alive
with shared_from_this(), and discards the future. So the caller has
nothing to await, the task can run for up to bye_timeout (~10s) after
close() returns, and tearing the sink down can complete a put() whose
finally then runs once the test fiber is gone. This is safe for seastar's
own state (the session self-owns for the whole teardown and the reactor
drains run_in_background tasks before it stops); it is unsafe only for
state the test reached into that teardown by raw reference. Because there
is no awaitable handle and no "fully torn down" signal, a drain/poll such
as `while (gate.outstanding) yield()` cannot fix it (the detached task may
issue a put after the poll observes zero). The fix is lifetime-matching:
gate_state is held by lw_shared_ptr, the sink co-owns it, and the
.finally() captures the shared_ptr, so its lifetime extends to match the
sink's. Confirmed deterministically -- forcing a put in flight at body-end
reproduces the SEGV in the finally with a stack gate and runs safely with
the shared_ptr gate. (Same lifetime fix as #287,
which applies it to the already-merged v26.2.x reproducer.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2026
Backport of #281 (merged to v26.2.x) to v26.1.x.
On v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in src/net/tls_openssl.cc; on this
branch it is src/net/ossl.cc, but the buggy pattern and the fix are the
same.

A data_sink permits only one put() in flight at a time
(posix_data_sink_impl asserts !_p). That contract was being violated
because wait_for_output() did

    std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future())

to obtain something to await, which marked _out "idle" while the put()
was still draining. bio_write_ex()'s guard then issued a second,
concurrent put() from the read path while a write-path put() was in
flight, tripping the assert (reproduced by the preceding commit).

This is not a missing lock: the reactor is single-threaded and the
bio_write_ex() guard is already atomic. It was the guard reading
falsified state. Make _output_pending a shared_future so that
wait_for_output() can hand out an awaitable via get_future() without
consuming or replacing the in-flight put; available()/failed() then stay
truthful and both the read and write paths can await the same put.

The interleaving, with a write fiber W (do_put, holding _out_sem) and a
read fiber R (do_get, holding _in_sem); R reaches bio_write_ex because
SSL_read_ex emits a key-update response while processing an incoming
record ("|" marks a reactor switch between the fibers):

  BEFORE, when wait_for_output() did
      std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future()):
    W  SSL_write_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending idle, so issue put_W;
       the sink sets _p and starts write_all() (put_W now UNRESOLVED).
    W  co_await wait_for_output() evaluates the exchange synchronously: it
       swaps _output_pending to a *ready* future, then parks W on put_W.
    |  put_W's write_all() is still draining, yet _output_pending now
       reads "available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending available, so issue
       put_R -> posix_data_sink_impl::put() trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p),
       because _p still holds put_W's packet.  *** assertion failure ***

  AFTER, with wait_for_output() == _output_pending.get_future() (no swap):
    W  bio_write_ex issues put_W; _output_pending = shared_future(put_W),
       which stays UNRESOLVED while write_all() drains.
    W  co_await wait_for_output() takes a get_future() on put_W and parks
       W on it, leaving _output_pending untouched.
    |  put_W still draining; _output_pending correctly reads "not
       available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending not available, so
       decline (BIO_set_retry_write) -- no second put(). SSL_read_ex
       returns WANT_WRITE; do_get co_awaits wait_for_output(), a SECOND
       get_future() on the SAME put_W, and parks R on it too.
    |  write_all() completes, the sink clears _p, put_W resolves, and the
       shared state resolves BOTH waiters.
    R  resumes, retries SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex now idle -> issues
       put_R into a clear sink. W resumes and continues. One put() at a
       time.

A write can also enter do_put_one() with a put already in flight, for the
same reason R does above: the read path emits a key-update put while the
write holds the disjoint _out_sem. That needs no up-front drain --
bio_write_ex() declines while a put is in flight (BIO_set_retry_write), so
the first SSL_write_ex reports WANT_WRITE and handle_do_put_ssl_err()
drains and retries, exactly as later loop iterations do.

Remove the SEASTAR_ASSERT(_output_pending.available()) preconditions at
the start of the two do_put() overloads and do_put_one(). They asserted
"no put is in flight when a write begins", which is false for the reason
above: _in_sem and _out_sem are disjoint, so a write taking _out_sem does
not exclude a read-path put. The assert only held before because the
std::exchange() swap left _output_pending spuriously available -- the
same falsification behind the bug -- so with the swap gone it would now
fire on exactly the scenario being fixed. The decline/retry path is the
correct handling; the two overloads just delegate to do_put_one(), so
their asserts are simply dropped. The destructor's available() assert is
kept -- it is still true once close() has drained output, and a failed
_output_pending is also available(). (The GnuTLS backend in src/net/tls.cc
keeps its copies of these asserts: its read path never emits output, so
the precondition still holds there.)

On an output failure _output_pending is intentionally left failed and
acts as a circuit breaker -- it is not reset. The _output_pending data
member carries a detailed comment covering the locking model, the
serialization protocol, why the future->shared_future change is the
minimal correct fix (rather than adding a lock), how handed-out waiters
still resolve after reassignment, and the failure behavior.

With this change test_concurrent_put_with_key_update passes, and the full
tls_test suite passes under the OpenSSL backend (the new test is compiled
out under GnuTLS).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2026
test_concurrent_put_with_key_update (added in #281) keeps its gate_state
(the overlap-detection counter and the arm/release promises) on the test
fiber's stack and decrements gate.outstanding from the instrumented sink's
put() .finally(). That finally can run on the reactor AFTER the
SEASTAR_THREAD_TEST_CASE fiber has returned and freed its stack, so the
reference into the dead frame is a use-after-return. ASan (debug builds,
detect_stack_use_after_return=1) traps it as a SEGV. Whether it fires is
timing-dependent, so the original merge passed CI; the same latent bug
then failed the debug+OpenSSL job on the v25.3.x backport of #281 while
passing on v26.1.x.

Why the finally outlives the test body (and why a drain cannot fix it)

  openssl_session::close() does not close synchronously and hands the
  caller no future. It runs the TLS bye-handshake plus _in.close()/
  _out.close() as a DETACHED reactor task (src/net/tls_openssl.cc):

      void close() noexcept override {
          ...
          auto me = shared_from_this();
          engine().run_in_background(std::move(f)
              .finally([this]{ _eof = true; return _in.close(); })
              .finally([this]{ return _out.close(); })   // closes the sink
              ...
              .handle_exception([me = std::move(me)](std::exception_ptr){})
              .discard_result());
      }

  The session keeps itself (and therefore this sink) alive via
  shared_from_this() and discards the future, so the task can run for up to
  bye_timeout (~10s) after close() returns, with no handle for anyone to
  await. Tearing the sink down (_out.close()) can complete an in-flight
  put() whose .finally then runs on the reactor -- after the test fiber is
  long gone.

  This is safe for seastar's own state: the session self-owns for the whole
  detached teardown and the reactor drains run_in_background tasks before it
  stops, so the session, sink and socket are freed only once the work
  finishes. It is unsafe only for state the test reached into that teardown
  by raw reference -- here, gate_state on the fiber stack, whose lifetime
  ends when the test body returns. Because there is deliberately no future
  to await and no "fully torn down" signal, a poll such as
  `while (gate.outstanding) yield()` cannot close the race: the detached
  task may issue a sink put() at any point in its window, including after a
  poll has observed zero. shutdown_input()/shutdown_output() are likewise
  void, so they cannot be awaited either.

The fix is lifetime-matching -- the idiomatic seastar rule that state shared
with a reactor continuation must be owned (shared_ptr), not referenced from
a stack frame. Heap-allocate gate_state via lw_shared_ptr, have the sink
co-own it, and capture the shared_ptr in the .finally(). Its lifetime then
extends to match the sink's, i.e. as long as anything can still touch it.
Test-only change; no production code is touched.

The mechanism was confirmed deterministically (not just reasoned): an
instrumented build shows the sink destroyed after the test body returns,
and forcing a put() to be in flight at body-end reproduces the exact CI
SEGV in the .finally with the stack gate, while the shared_ptr gate runs
that same late finally safely.

Verified under debug + ASan (detect_stack_use_after_return=1) with the
OpenSSL backend (--tls-mode=openssl): test_concurrent_put_with_key_update
and the full tls_test suite pass with no SEGV.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 24, 2026
Backport of the reproducer from #281 (merged to
v26.2.x) to v26.1.x.

The OpenSSL TLS read and write paths use separate semaphores (_in_sem
vs _out_sem) and both can write to the underlying socket: a write
encrypts application data, while a read can emit a TLS
key-update/renegotiation response produced inside SSL_read_ex. When a
read emits output while a write's put() is still in flight, the TLS
layer issues a second, concurrent put() on the same data_sink, which
trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p) in posix_data_sink_impl.

Add test_concurrent_put_with_key_update, which installs an instrumented
data_sink under the client that flags overlapping put()s (what the posix
assert detects) and holds one put to open a deterministic window. It
drives two server key-updates -- OpenSSL only flushes the response to the
first while reading the second -- and that read-path put is held in
flight while a concurrent client write tries to issue the colliding put.

This test fails (overlap detected) against the current OpenSSL backend;
it is fixed by the following commit. GnuTLS re-runs the handshake while
holding both semaphores, so it never issues the concurrent put; the test
is compiled out under the GnuTLS backend.

Backport notes: on v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in
src/net/tls_openssl.cc and the reproducer drives key-updates through the
public tls::force_rehandshake(), which is implemented there via
SSL_key_update(). On v26.1.x the backend is src/net/ossl.cc and
force_rehandshake() is unimplemented for OpenSSL, so rather than backport
that production feature this commit adds a minimal, test-only hook --
session::trigger_key_update_for_test() plus a free function
tls::trigger_key_update_for_test(connected_socket&), neither declared in
any public header -- that performs just the SSL_key_update() the test
needs. The test also selects the backend at compile time
(SEASTAR_USE_GNUTLS) rather than via the runtime tls::backend_name()
used on v26.2.x's dual-backend build.

Gate lifetime (why gate_state is shared, not on the stack): the
instrumented sink decrements gate_state.outstanding from a put()
.finally(), and that finally can run on the reactor AFTER this
SEASTAR_THREAD_TEST_CASE fiber has returned and freed its stack -- so a
gate referenced from the fiber stack would be a use-after-return (an
intermittent SEGV under ASan; this is the same class of bug that failed
the debug+OpenSSL CI job on the v25.3.x backport). The reason the finally
outlives the body is that session::close() (src/net/ossl.cc) does not
close synchronously and returns no future: it runs the bye-handshake plus
_in.close()/_out.close() as a DETACHED reactor task via
engine().run_in_background(...), keeps the session (and this sink) alive
with shared_from_this(), and discards the future. So the caller has
nothing to await, the task can run for up to bye_timeout (~10s) after
close() returns, and tearing the sink down can complete a put() whose
finally then runs once the test fiber is gone. This is safe for seastar's
own state (the session self-owns for the whole teardown and the reactor
drains run_in_background tasks before it stops); it is unsafe only for
state the test reached into that teardown by raw reference. Because there
is no awaitable handle and no "fully torn down" signal, a drain/poll such
as `while (gate.outstanding) yield()` cannot fix it (the detached task may
issue a put after the poll observes zero). The fix is lifetime-matching:
gate_state is held by lw_shared_ptr, the sink co-owns it, and the
.finally() captures the shared_ptr, so its lifetime extends to match the
sink's. Confirmed deterministically -- forcing a put in flight at body-end
reproduces the SEGV in the finally with a stack gate and runs safely with
the shared_ptr gate. (Same lifetime fix as #287,
which applies it to the already-merged v26.2.x reproducer.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 24, 2026
Backport of #281 (merged to v26.2.x) to v26.1.x.
On v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in src/net/tls_openssl.cc; on this
branch it is src/net/ossl.cc, but the buggy pattern and the fix are the
same.

A data_sink permits only one put() in flight at a time
(posix_data_sink_impl asserts !_p). That contract was being violated
because wait_for_output() did

    std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future())

to obtain something to await, which marked _out "idle" while the put()
was still draining. bio_write_ex()'s guard then issued a second,
concurrent put() from the read path while a write-path put() was in
flight, tripping the assert (reproduced by the preceding commit).

This is not a missing lock: the reactor is single-threaded and the
bio_write_ex() guard is already atomic. It was the guard reading
falsified state. Make _output_pending a shared_future so that
wait_for_output() can hand out an awaitable via get_future() without
consuming or replacing the in-flight put; available()/failed() then stay
truthful and both the read and write paths can await the same put.

The interleaving, with a write fiber W (do_put, holding _out_sem) and a
read fiber R (do_get, holding _in_sem); R reaches bio_write_ex because
SSL_read_ex emits a key-update response while processing an incoming
record ("|" marks a reactor switch between the fibers):

  BEFORE, when wait_for_output() did
      std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future()):
    W  SSL_write_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending idle, so issue put_W;
       the sink sets _p and starts write_all() (put_W now UNRESOLVED).
    W  co_await wait_for_output() evaluates the exchange synchronously: it
       swaps _output_pending to a *ready* future, then parks W on put_W.
    |  put_W's write_all() is still draining, yet _output_pending now
       reads "available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending available, so issue
       put_R -> posix_data_sink_impl::put() trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p),
       because _p still holds put_W's packet.  *** assertion failure ***

  AFTER, with wait_for_output() == _output_pending.get_future() (no swap):
    W  bio_write_ex issues put_W; _output_pending = shared_future(put_W),
       which stays UNRESOLVED while write_all() drains.
    W  co_await wait_for_output() takes a get_future() on put_W and parks
       W on it, leaving _output_pending untouched.
    |  put_W still draining; _output_pending correctly reads "not
       available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending not available, so
       decline (BIO_set_retry_write) -- no second put(). SSL_read_ex
       returns WANT_WRITE; do_get co_awaits wait_for_output(), a SECOND
       get_future() on the SAME put_W, and parks R on it too.
    |  write_all() completes, the sink clears _p, put_W resolves, and the
       shared state resolves BOTH waiters.
    R  resumes, retries SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex now idle -> issues
       put_R into a clear sink. W resumes and continues. One put() at a
       time.

A write can also enter do_put_one() with a put already in flight, for the
same reason R does above: the read path emits a key-update put while the
write holds the disjoint _out_sem. That needs no up-front drain --
bio_write_ex() declines while a put is in flight (BIO_set_retry_write), so
the first SSL_write_ex reports WANT_WRITE and handle_do_put_ssl_err()
drains and retries, exactly as later loop iterations do.

Remove the SEASTAR_ASSERT(_output_pending.available()) preconditions at
the start of the two do_put() overloads and do_put_one(). They asserted
"no put is in flight when a write begins", which is false for the reason
above: _in_sem and _out_sem are disjoint, so a write taking _out_sem does
not exclude a read-path put. The assert only held before because the
std::exchange() swap left _output_pending spuriously available -- the
same falsification behind the bug -- so with the swap gone it would now
fire on exactly the scenario being fixed. The decline/retry path is the
correct handling; the two overloads just delegate to do_put_one(), so
their asserts are simply dropped. The destructor's available() assert is
kept -- it is still true once close() has drained output, and a failed
_output_pending is also available(). (The GnuTLS backend in src/net/tls.cc
keeps its copies of these asserts: its read path never emits output, so
the precondition still holds there.)

On an output failure _output_pending is intentionally left failed and
acts as a circuit breaker -- it is not reset. The _output_pending data
member carries a detailed comment covering the locking model, the
serialization protocol, why the future->shared_future change is the
minimal correct fix (rather than adding a lock), how handed-out waiters
still resolve after reassignment, and the failure behavior.

With this change test_concurrent_put_with_key_update passes, and the full
tls_test suite passes under the OpenSSL backend (the new test is compiled
out under GnuTLS).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2026
Backport of the reproducer from #281 (merged to
v26.2.x) to v25.3.x.

The OpenSSL TLS read and write paths use separate semaphores (_in_sem
vs _out_sem) and both can write to the underlying socket: a write
encrypts application data, while a read can emit a TLS
key-update/renegotiation response produced inside SSL_read_ex. When a
read emits output while a write's put() is still in flight, the TLS
layer issues a second, concurrent put() on the same data_sink, which
trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p) in posix_data_sink_impl.

Add test_concurrent_put_with_key_update, which installs an instrumented
data_sink under the client that flags overlapping put()s (what the posix
assert detects) and holds one put to open a deterministic window. It
drives two server key-updates -- OpenSSL only flushes the response to the
first while reading the second -- and that read-path put is held in
flight while a concurrent client write tries to issue the colliding put.

This test fails (overlap detected) against the current OpenSSL backend;
it is fixed by the following commit. GnuTLS re-runs the handshake while
holding both semaphores, so it never issues the concurrent put; the test
is compiled out under the GnuTLS backend.

Backport notes: on v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in
src/net/tls_openssl.cc and the reproducer drives key-updates through the
public tls::force_rehandshake(), implemented there via SSL_key_update().
On v25.3.x the backend is src/net/ossl.cc and has no rehandshake /
key-update entry point at all (force_rehandshake() does not exist on this
branch), so rather than add that production API this commit adds a
minimal, test-only hook -- session::trigger_key_update_for_test() plus a
free function tls::trigger_key_update_for_test(connected_socket&), neither
declared in any public header -- that performs just the SSL_key_update()
the test needs. The test also selects the backend at compile time
(SEASTAR_USE_GNUTLS) rather than via the runtime tls::backend_name() used
on v26.2.x, and its instrumented data_sink overrides put(net::packet) to
match this branch's data_sink API.

Gate lifetime (why gate_state is shared, not on the stack): the
instrumented sink decrements gate_state.outstanding from a put()
.finally(), and that finally can run on the reactor AFTER this
SEASTAR_THREAD_TEST_CASE fiber has returned and freed its stack -- so a
gate referenced from the fiber stack would be a use-after-return (an
intermittent SEGV under ASan, which is exactly what failed the debug+
OpenSSL CI job for this backport). The reason the finally outlives the
body is that session::close() (src/net/ossl.cc) does not close
synchronously and returns no future: it runs the bye-handshake plus
_in.close()/_out.close() as a DETACHED reactor task via
engine().run_in_background(...), keeps the session (and this sink) alive
with shared_from_this(), and discards the future. So the caller has
nothing to await, the task can run for up to bye_timeout (~10s) after
close() returns, and tearing the sink down can complete a put() whose
finally then runs once the test fiber is gone. This is safe for seastar's
own state (the session self-owns for the whole teardown and the reactor
drains run_in_background tasks before it stops); it is unsafe only for
state the test reached into that teardown by raw reference. Because there
is no awaitable handle and no "fully torn down" signal, a drain/poll such
as `while (gate.outstanding) yield()` cannot fix it (the detached task may
issue a put after the poll observes zero). The fix is lifetime-matching:
gate_state is held by lw_shared_ptr, the sink co-owns it, and the
.finally() captures the shared_ptr, so its lifetime extends to match the
sink's. Confirmed deterministically -- forcing a put in flight at body-end
reproduces the SEGV in the finally with a stack gate and runs safely with
the shared_ptr gate. (Same lifetime fix as #287,
which applies it to the already-merged v26.2.x reproducer.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dotnwat added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2026
Backport of #281 (merged to v26.2.x) to v25.3.x. On
v26.2.x the OpenSSL backend lives in src/net/tls_openssl.cc and splits the
write path into two do_put() overloads plus do_put_one(); on this branch
it is src/net/ossl.cc with a single do_put(net::packet). The buggy pattern
and the fix are otherwise the same.

A data_sink permits only one put() in flight at a time
(posix_data_sink_impl asserts !_p). That contract was being violated
because wait_for_output() did

    std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future())

to obtain something to await, which marked _out "idle" while the put()
was still draining. bio_write_ex()'s guard then issued a second,
concurrent put() from the read path while a write-path put() was in
flight, tripping the assert (reproduced by the preceding commit).

This is not a missing lock: the reactor is single-threaded and the
bio_write_ex() guard is already atomic. It was the guard reading
falsified state. Make _output_pending a shared_future so that
wait_for_output() can hand out an awaitable via get_future() without
consuming or replacing the in-flight put; available()/failed() then stay
truthful and both the read and write paths can await the same put.

The interleaving, with a write fiber W (do_put, holding _out_sem) and a
read fiber R (do_get, holding _in_sem); R reaches bio_write_ex because
SSL_read_ex emits a key-update response while processing an incoming
record ("|" marks a reactor switch between the fibers):

  BEFORE, when wait_for_output() did
      std::exchange(_output_pending, make_ready_future()):
    W  SSL_write_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending idle, so issue put_W;
       the sink sets _p and starts write_all() (put_W now UNRESOLVED).
    W  co_await wait_for_output() evaluates the exchange synchronously: it
       swaps _output_pending to a *ready* future, then parks W on put_W.
    |  put_W's write_all() is still draining, yet _output_pending now
       reads "available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending available, so issue
       put_R -> posix_data_sink_impl::put() trips SEASTAR_ASSERT(!_p),
       because _p still holds put_W's packet.  *** assertion failure ***

  AFTER, with wait_for_output() == _output_pending.get_future() (no swap):
    W  bio_write_ex issues put_W; _output_pending = shared_future(put_W),
       which stays UNRESOLVED while write_all() drains.
    W  co_await wait_for_output() takes a get_future() on put_W and parks
       W on it, leaving _output_pending untouched.
    |  put_W still draining; _output_pending correctly reads "not
       available".
    R  SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex: _output_pending not available, so
       decline (BIO_set_retry_write) -- no second put(). SSL_read_ex
       returns WANT_WRITE; do_get co_awaits wait_for_output(), a SECOND
       get_future() on the SAME put_W, and parks R on it too.
    |  write_all() completes, the sink clears _p, put_W resolves, and the
       shared state resolves BOTH waiters.
    R  resumes, retries SSL_read_ex -> bio_write_ex now idle -> issues
       put_R into a clear sink. W resumes and continues. One put() at a
       time.

A write can also enter do_put() with a put already in flight, for the
same reason R does above: the read path emits a key-update put while the
write holds the disjoint _out_sem. That needs no up-front drain --
bio_write_ex() declines while a put is in flight (BIO_set_retry_write), so
the first SSL_write_ex reports WANT_WRITE and handle_do_put_ssl_err()
drains and retries, exactly as later loop iterations do.

Remove the SEASTAR_ASSERT(_output_pending.available()) precondition at the
start of do_put(). It asserted "no put is in flight when a write begins",
which is false for the reason above: _in_sem and _out_sem are disjoint, so
a write taking _out_sem does not exclude a read-path put. The assert only
held before because the std::exchange() swap left _output_pending
spuriously available -- the same falsification behind the bug -- so with
the swap gone it would now fire on exactly the scenario being fixed. The
decline/retry path is the correct handling. The destructor's available()
assert is kept -- it is still true once close() has drained output, and a
failed _output_pending is also available(). The GnuTLS backend
(src/net/tls.cc) is unaffected: its read path never emits output, so the
concurrent put cannot occur there.

On an output failure _output_pending is intentionally left failed and
acts as a circuit breaker -- it is not reset. The _output_pending data
member carries a detailed comment covering the locking model, the
serialization protocol, why the future->shared_future change is the
minimal correct fix (rather than adding a lock), how handed-out waiters
still resolve after reassignment, and the failure behavior.

With this change test_concurrent_put_with_key_update passes, and the full
tls_test suite passes under the OpenSSL backend (the new test is compiled
out under GnuTLS).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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5 participants