ci: set least-privilege GITHUB_TOKEN permissions in workflow#28
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Add a top-level `permissions: contents: read` block so GITHUB_TOKEN is scoped to read-only instead of the repo/org default. Both jobs only read the repo (checkout, install, lint, typecheck, test, audit), so no job needs write access. Resolves the two open code-scanning alerts (actions/missing-workflow-permissions). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Problem
.github/workflows/ci.ymldeclared nopermissions:block, soGITHUB_TOKENran with the repository/organization default scopes on every job. GitHub code scanning flagged this as two openactions/missing-workflow-permissionsalerts (one per job, atci.yml:16andci.yml:50). An over-privileged token is a needless supply-chain risk: a compromised or malicious action step could use it to write to the repo.Solution
Set a single top-level least-privilege block:
Declaring it once at the workflow level (rather than per-job) is the smallest change that satisfies the scanner and covers both jobs, since neither needs more:
build-and-testandauditonly checkout, install, lint, typecheck, test, and runnpm audit— all read-only operations. Any future job that genuinely needs to write (e.g. publishing, commenting) can opt into a wider scope with its own job-levelpermissions:without loosening the default for everything else. A code comment records that reasoning inline.No behavior change to the build/test pipeline — CI runs identically, just with a tighter token.
Fixes #24
Refs #27
🤖 Generated with Claude Code