dev to main

.github/workflows/vale-autofix.yml

@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Fix heading anchors
         if: steps.bot-check.outputs.skip != 'true' && steps.changed-files.outputs.count > 0
         run: |
-          bash scripts/vale-autofix.sh --anchors-only origin/dev
+          bash scripts/vale-autofix.sh --anchors-only origin/dev /tmp/changed-files.txt
 
       - name: Check anchor links
         id: anchor-check

.gitignore

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ docs/*/*/kb/**
 # KB copy script lockfile
 .kb-copy.lock
 
+# KB allowlist (generated by copy-kb-to-versions.mjs at build time)
+kb_allowlist.json
+
 # Misc
 .DS_Store
 .env.local

.husky/pre-commit

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
-#!/bin/bash
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
 REPO_ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
-bash "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/check-anchors.sh" --staged
+# check-anchors.sh requires bash 4+ (associative arrays). On macOS the system
+# bash is 3.2; prefer Homebrew bash if present.
+BASH_EXEC="${HOMEBREW_PREFIX:-/opt/homebrew}/bin/bash"
+[ ! -x "$BASH_EXEC" ] && BASH_EXEC=bash
+"$BASH_EXEC" "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/check-anchors.sh" --staged

CLAUDE.md

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ The build requires 16GB heap (`NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=16384`, set aut
 
 ### Knowledge Base
 
-`docs/kb/` is the canonical source for Knowledge Base (KB) articles. The `scripts/copy-kb-to-versions.mjs` script copies KB content into versioned product folders at build time (runs as `prestart`/`prebuild`). Never manually copy KB files — they're gitignored in versioned folders. Use `kb_allowlist.json` to control which products get KB content.
+`docs/kb/` is the canonical source for Knowledge Base (KB) articles. The `scripts/copy-kb-to-versions.mjs` script copies KB content into versioned product folders at build time (runs as `prestart`/`prebuild`). Never manually copy KB files — they're gitignored in versioned folders. `kb_allowlist.json` is a generated artifact (written by the copy script) that records which products received KB content; do not edit it manually.
 
 ### Static assets
 

docs/accessanalyzer/11.6/admin/schema/fsaadc/_category_.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "label": "File System Access Data Collector Schema",
+  "position": 10,
+  "collapsed": true,
+  "collapsible": true,
+  "link": {
+    "type": "doc",
+    "id": "overview"
+  }
+}

docs/accessanalyzer/11.6/admin/schema/fsaadc/coretables/_category_.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "label": "Core Data Collection Tables",
+  "position": 20,
+  "collapsed": true,
+  "collapsible": true,
+  "link": {
+    "type": "doc",
+    "id": "overview"
+  }
+}

docs/accessanalyzer/11.6/admin/schema/fsaadc/enumeration/_category_.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "label": "Enumeration & Lookup Values Reference",
+  "position": 40,
+  "collapsed": true,
+  "collapsible": true,
+  "link": {
+    "type": "doc",
+    "id": "overview"
+  }
+}

docs/accessanalyzer/11.6/admin/schema/fsaadc/enumeration/overview.md

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# Enumeration & Lookup Values Reference
+
+This section documents the possible values stored in coded columns used throughout the FSAA DC schema. These values appear in core data tables, and views decode them into human-readable labels.
+
+---
+
+## TrusteeType
+
+Referenced by `SA_FSAA_Trustees.TrusteeType` and `SA_FSAA_LocalTrustees.TrusteeType`.
+
+| Value | Name | Description |
+|---|---|---|
+| 0 | Unknown | Type couldn't be determined |
+| 1 | SecurityPrincipal | Built-in / well-known security principal (for example, `Everyone`) |
+| 2 | LocalUser | Local user account |
+| 3 | LocalGroup | Local group account |
+| 4 | GlobalUser | Domain user account ("Domain User" in views) |
+| 5 | GlobalGroup | Domain group account ("Domain Group" in views) |
+| 6 | SharepointUser | SharePoint user |
+| 7 | SharepointGroup | SharePoint group |
+| 8 | Unsupported | Trustee type not supported |
+| 9 | ServiceAccount | Service account |
+| 10 | Computer | Computer account |
+| 11 | GlobalTrustee | Cross-domain trustee |
+| 20 | UnixUser | POSIX user |
+| 21 | UnixGroup | POSIX group |
+
+:::note
+The descriptive labels emitted by views (`SA_FSAA_PermissionsView.TrusteeTypeDescription`, etc.) cover values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10 only.
+:::
+
+---
+
+## ResourceType
+
+Referenced by `SA_FSAA_Resources.ResourceType`.
+
+| Value | Name | View label | Description |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 0 | Share | Share | SMB / Windows share root |
+| 1 | NFSExport | Share | NFS export root |
+| 2 | NetAppVolume | Folder | NetApp volume root |
+| 3 | WinDir | Folder | Windows directory |
+| 4 | WinFile | File | Windows file |
+| 5 | UnixDir | Folder | Unix directory |
+| 6 | UnixFile | File | Unix file |
+
+Views map these to three labels using `CASE WHEN r.ResourceType IN (0,1) THEN 'Share' WHEN r.ResourceType IN (2,3,5) THEN 'Folder' WHEN r.ResourceType IN (4,6) THEN 'File' END`.
+
+---
+
+## GateType
+
+Referenced by `SA_FSAA_Gates.GateType`.
+
+| Value | Description |
+|---|---|
+| 0 | SMB share gate |
+| 1 | Policy gate (LSA logon-right pseudo-trustee container — `INTERACTIVE`, `BATCH`, `SERVICE`, `TERMINAL SERVER USER`, etc.) |
+| 2 | NFS export gate |
+
+Share gates (`0`/`2`) carry NTFS / share permissions and are reachable via `SA_FSAA_GatesProxy`. Policy gates (`1`) are produced by the local-policy enumerator: they have no `ShareID` or `FolderID`, and their members are stored in `SA_FSAA_Policies` and resolved at query time by `SA_FSAA_GetPolicyMembership`. Views that surface share traversal label any non-zero `GateType` as `'NFS'` for legacy compatibility (`CASE WHEN g.GateType = 0 THEN 'SMB' ELSE 'NFS' END`); policy gates are normally filtered out by the `r.GatesProxyID IS NOT NULL` predicate before reaching that CASE.
+
+---
+
+## Rights Bitmask
+
+The simplified six-bit FSAA rights model. Used in `SA_FSAA_Rights.AllowRights`, `DenyRights`, `DirectAllowRights`, `InheritedAllowRights`, `DirectDenyRights`, `InheritedDenyRights` and surfaced in views as the `AllowRightsDescription` / `DenyRightsDescription` text columns (for example, `LRWDMA`).
+
+| Bit | Hex / Decimal | Letter | Name |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 0 | `0x01` (1) | R | Read |
+| 1 | `0x02` (2) | W | Write |
+| 2 | `0x04` (4) | D | Delete |
+| 3 | `0x08` (8) | M | Manage |
+| 4 | `0x10` (16) | A | Admin |
+| 5 | `0x20` (32) | L | List |
+
+The corresponding Windows mask values are stored separately in the `*Mask` columns. Common mappings used by `SA_FSAA_PermissionsView.AllowMaskDescription`:
+
+| Mask (decimal) | Description |
+|---|---|
+| 0 | None |
+| 2032127 | Full Control (allow) |
+| 1245631 | Modify |
+| 1179817 | Read & Execute (or "List folder contents" when `AllowRights = 32`) |
+| 1179785 | Read |
+| 1179926 | Write |
+| 983551 | Full Control (deny) |
+| 197055 | Modify (deny) |
+| 1310720 | Change Permissions |
+| 1572864 | Take Ownership |
+| 1114112 | Delete |
+| 1179648 | Read Permissions |
+
+:::note
+The `CASE` expression in `SA_FSAA_PermissionsView` / `SA_FSAA_DirectPermissionsView` / `SA_FSAA_InheritedPermissionsView` decodes many additional special-permission decimal values.
+:::

docs/accessanalyzer/11.6/admin/schema/fsaadc/erd/_category_.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "label": "Table Relationship Diagrams (ERD)",
+  "position": 10,
+  "collapsed": true,
+  "collapsible": true,
+  "link": {
+    "type": "doc",
+    "id": "overview"
+  }
+}

docs/accessanalyzer/11.6/admin/schema/fsaadc/erd/overview.md

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+# Table Relationship Diagrams (ERD)
+
+The following subsystem-focused sub-diagrams divide the schema. Relationship lines use standard crow's foot notation: a single vertical bar on the parent side and a crow's foot (fork) on the child side means "exactly one parent, zero or more children"; a single bar on each side with an open circle means one-to-zero-or-one (sidecar / extension table).
+
+:::note
+Every core table includes a `HOST INT` column that is a foreign key to `SA_FSAA_Hosts.ID` with `ON DELETE CASCADE`. To keep the sub-diagrams readable, that fan-out is shown only in the **Top-level partitioning** diagram; in the other diagrams `HOST` is implicit on every relationship.
+
+Tables not shown in any diagram (no foreign keys): `SA_FSAA_SchemaVer` (single-row config) and `SA_FSAA_ScanHistory` (audit log).
+:::
+
+---
+
+## Top-level Partitioning
+
+`SA_FSAA_Hosts` is the root of the schema. Every other table includes a `HOST` column whose foreign key cascades on delete, so removing a host atomically purges its entire data set. The following diagrams are **representative, not exhaustive** — they show the parent tables for each subsystem; the per-subsystem diagrams that follow cover the remaining HOST-partitioned tables (for example, `SA_FSAA_Rights`, `SA_FSAA_LocalTrustees`, `SA_FSAA_GatesProxy`, `SA_FSAA_Policies`, the four `SA_FSAA_File*` aggregations, and every `SA_FSAC_*` / `SA_FSDLP_*` / `SA_FSDFS_*` table).
+
+**Core subsystem roots:**
+
+```mermaid
+erDiagram
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAA_ImportHistory : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Trustees : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Resources : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Gates : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAA_ExceptionTypes : "HOST"
+```
+
+**Tag infrastructure and exception/ownership tables:**
+
+```mermaid
+erDiagram
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Tags : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAA_TagKeys : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAA_TagProxies : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Exceptions : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAA_ProbableOwners : "HOST"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Trustees
+
+`SA_FSAA_Trustees` is the canonical trustee table. `SA_FSAA_LocalTrustees` is a 1:0..1 *extension* that adds NT-style domain/name/display fields for principals that are local to the host. `SA_FSAA_TrusteeEquivalence` is the local-group-membership edge table — `TrusteeID` is the member, `EquivalentTrusteeID` is the local-group it belongs to.
+
+```mermaid
+erDiagram
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o| SA_FSAA_LocalTrustees : "ID (extension)"
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAA_TrusteeEquivalence : "TrusteeID (member)"
+    SA_FSAA_LocalTrustees ||--o{ SA_FSAA_TrusteeEquivalence : "EquivalentTrusteeID (group)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Resources & Content Aggregations {#resources--content-aggregations}
+
+`SA_FSAA_Resources` is the file/folder/share tree (note the self-reference for parent-child folder hierarchy and the `OwnerID` FK back to `SA_FSAA_Trustees`). The five sidecar tables on the right hold per-resource aggregations populated by the structural import.
+
+```mermaid
+erDiagram
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Resources : "ParentResourceID (self)"
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Resources : "OwnerID"
+
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAA_FileSizes : "ResourceID"
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAA_FileTypes : "ResourceID"
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAA_FileAges : "ResourceID"
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAA_UnixRights : "ResourceID"
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAA_ProbableOwners : "ResourceID"
+
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAA_UnixRights : "OwnerID + GroupID"
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAA_ProbableOwners : "OwnerID"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Gates and Permissions
+
+A "gate" is a way to reach a resource — an SMB share, NFS export, or LSA-policy container. `SA_FSAA_Gates` self-references through `PolicyID` (an NFS export gate points at its export-policy gate). `SA_FSAA_GatesProxy` is the dedup bridge between resources and gates (`SA_FSAA_Resources.GatesProxyID` is a logical reference, not an enforced FK). `SA_FSAA_Rights` holds the per-trustee allow/deny ACL entries; `RightsProxyID` is also a logical reference from `SA_FSAA_Resources` rather than an enforced FK.
+
+```mermaid
+erDiagram
+    SA_FSAA_Gates ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Gates : "PolicyID (self)"
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Gates : "ShareID + FolderID"
+
+    SA_FSAA_Gates ||--o{ SA_FSAA_GatesProxy : "GateID"
+    SA_FSAA_Gates ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Policies : "PolicyID"
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Policies : "TrusteeID"
+
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Rights : "TrusteeID"
+```
+
+:::note
+Logical (un-enforced) references not shown: `SA_FSAA_Resources.RightsProxyID → SA_FSAA_Rights.RightsProxyID` and `SA_FSAA_Resources.GatesProxyID → SA_FSAA_GatesProxy.ID`. These are denormalized pointers maintained by the import pipeline; no FK constraint is created on them so that bulk imports can stage rows in any order.
+:::
+
+---
+
+## Tags
+
+Tags use a three-table dedup pattern. `SA_FSAA_Tags` holds each unique tag string. `SA_FSAA_TagKeys` defines a "tag set" identity. `SA_FSAA_TagProxies` is the membership table linking tag sets to their tags. `SA_FSAA_Resources.TagProxyID` and `SA_FSAA_FileTags.TagProxyID` reference the tag-set identity in `TagKeys`.
+
+```mermaid
+erDiagram
+    SA_FSAA_TagKeys ||--o{ SA_FSAA_TagProxies : "TagProxyID"
+    SA_FSAA_Tags ||--o{ SA_FSAA_TagProxies : "TagID"
+    SA_FSAA_TagKeys ||--o{ SA_FSAA_FileTags : "TagProxyID"
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAA_FileTags : "ResourceID"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Exceptions
+
+`SA_FSAA_ExceptionTypes` is the per-host catalog of exception classes. `SA_FSAA_Exceptions` carries one row per detected anomaly and has FKs out to *all four* foundational tables — Hosts, Gates, Resources, and Trustees (twice — `TrusteeID` and `SourceTrusteeID`). Most of these FK columns are nullable because different exception types use different combinations.
+
+```mermaid
+erDiagram
+    SA_FSAA_ExceptionTypes ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Exceptions : "ExceptionType"
+    SA_FSAA_Gates ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Exceptions : "GateID"
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Exceptions : "ResourceID"
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Exceptions : "TrusteeID"
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAA_Exceptions : "SourceTrusteeID"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Activity Collection
+
+`SA_FSAC_ActivityEvents` is the audit-event firehose; each row is one observed file-system operation (read / add / update / delete / permission-change / rename). Every event references the resource (`PathID`), the trustee that performed the operation, and the process (`ProcessID`) that ran it. Three detail tables hang off `ActivityEvents`: `SA_FSAC_PermissionChanges` and `SA_FSAC_OwnerChanges` for permission-change and owner-change details, and `SA_FSAC_RenameTargets` for rename destinations. `SA_FSAC_DailyActivity` is a daily aggregation rolled up by `(folder, trustee, operation)`. `SA_FSAC_Exceptions` records detected anomalies; `SA_FSAC_UserExceptions` is the per-user variant (partitioned by `SID` instead of by host).
+
+```mermaid
+erDiagram
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAC_ProcessNames : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAC_ActivityEvents : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSAC_DailyActivity : "HOST"
+
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAC_ActivityEvents : "PathID"
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAC_ActivityEvents : "TrusteeID"
+    SA_FSAC_ProcessNames ||--o{ SA_FSAC_ActivityEvents : "ProcessID"
+
+    SA_FSAC_ActivityEvents ||--o{ SA_FSAC_PermissionChanges : "ActivityID"
+    SA_FSAC_ActivityEvents ||--o| SA_FSAC_OwnerChanges : "ActivityID"
+    SA_FSAC_ActivityEvents ||--o| SA_FSAC_RenameTargets : "ActivityID"
+
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAC_PermissionChanges : "TrusteeID"
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAC_OwnerChanges : "PreviousOwnerID + NewOwnerID"
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAC_RenameTargets : "TargetPathID"
+
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSAC_DailyActivity : "FolderID"
+    SA_FSAA_Trustees ||--o{ SA_FSAC_DailyActivity : "TrusteeID"
+
+    SA_FSAC_ExceptionTypes ||--o{ SA_FSAC_Exceptions : "ExceptionType"
+    SA_FSAC_UserExceptionTypes ||--o{ SA_FSAC_UserExceptions : "ExceptionType (by SID)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Sensitive Data
+
+`SA_FSDLP_Criteria` lists the active DLP patterns. `SA_FSDLP_Matches` records, for each `(file, criterion)` pair, how many hits were found. `SA_FSDLP_MatchHits` carries the per-hit excerpt (prefix / data / suffix) and confidence score. `SA_FSDLP_MatchHits_SubjectProfile` links each hit to a subject in the central Subject Profile system (the identity / attribute that the matched data corresponds to). `FileId` on Matches is a logical reference to `SA_FSAA_Resources.ID`.
+
+```mermaid
+erDiagram
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSDLP_ImportHistory : "HOST"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSDLP_Criteria : "HOST"
+
+    SA_FSDLP_Criteria ||--o{ SA_FSDLP_Matches : "CriteriaId"
+    SA_FSDLP_Matches ||--o{ SA_FSDLP_MatchHits : "FileId + CriteriaId"
+    SA_FSDLP_MatchHits ||--o{ SA_FSDLP_MatchHits_SubjectProfile : "FileId + CriteriaId + ID"
+```
+
+:::note
+Logical (un-enforced) reference not shown: `SA_FSDLP_Matches.FileId → SA_FSAA_Resources.ID`. The DLP collector populates `FileId` to match the FSAA resource ID but no SQL FK constraint is created so DLP imports can run independently of structural scans.
+
+`SA_FSDLP_MatchHits_SubjectProfile` has foreign keys into the central Subject Profile tables (`SA_SubjectProfile_Sources`, `SA_SubjectProfile_Identities`, `SA_SubjectProfile_AttributeValues`). Those tables are owned by the Subject Profile module and not shown here.
+:::
+
+---
+
+## DFS Namespaces
+
+`SA_FSDFS_Namespaces` lists the discovered DFS namespaces. `SA_FSDFS_Links` resolves each DFS-side path into the physical target (host / gate / resource) on a real file server. The link table has FKs into both the FSAA host and the FSAA structural tables on the target side.
+
+```mermaid
+erDiagram
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSDFS_Namespaces : "RootHostID"
+    SA_FSAA_Gates ||--o{ SA_FSDFS_Namespaces : "RootGateID"
+
+    SA_FSDFS_Namespaces ||--o{ SA_FSDFS_Links : "NamespaceID"
+    SA_FSAA_Hosts ||--o{ SA_FSDFS_Links : "TargetHostID"
+    SA_FSAA_Gates ||--o{ SA_FSDFS_Links : "TargetGateID"
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSDFS_Links : "TargetResourceID"
+    SA_FSAA_Resources ||--o{ SA_FSDFS_Links : "DfsResourceID"
+```

docs/accessanalyzer/11.6/admin/schema/fsaadc/fkreference/_category_.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "label": "Foreign Key Reference",
+  "position": 70,
+  "collapsed": true,
+  "collapsible": true,
+  "link": {
+    "type": "doc",
+    "id": "overview"
+  }
+}