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Add comprehensive security hardening across server and client: - JWT room tokens (24h) and invite tokens (4h) for authenticated access - WebSocket rate limiting (100 signaling/10s, 500 stream/10s) and per-IP connection cap (10) - HTTP security headers (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy) - CORS origin allowlist via ALLOWED_ORIGINS env var - Role-based access control: streaming/invites/muting restricted to host/ops - ICE credentials (TURN) moved from public API to authenticated WebSocket flow - Icecast proxy path sanitization (traversal + /admin blocked) - Icecast entrypoint credential validation (fail-fast, no insecure defaults) - Docker non-root user, UUID v4 peer ID validation, 256KB maxPayload - Tests updated for UUID v4 validation, memory-bank updated Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ture) Tests were still pointing to localhost:8086 (old Python http.server). Updated all 7 test files to use localhost:6736. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
WebRTC renegotiation takes longer on CI runners. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…mp timeouts The return-feed test depends on WebRTC renegotiation timing which is inherently variable in headless CI. Added retry on failure, increased timeouts, and set fail-fast:false so all matrix jobs run to completion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This was referenced Mar 13, 2026
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Summary
Comprehensive security hardening for the signaling server, client, and deployment infrastructure:
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,X-Frame-Options: DENY,Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-originon all responses.ALLOWED_ORIGINSenv var for production; empty = allow all (dev mode)./api/stationAPI.posix.normalize, block traversal, block/admin), CORS on proxy responses.127.0.0.1.Files changed: 25 files, +767 −187
server/lib/auth.jsserver.js,websocket-server.js,message-validator.js,static-server.js,icecast-listener-proxy.js,icecast-proxy.jsmain.js,signaling-client.js,rtc-manager.js,icecast-streamer.jsDockerfile,docker-compose.yml,docker-compose.prod.yml,entrypoint.sh.env.example,station-manifest.sample.json,station-manifest.production.jsontest-signaling.js,test-rooms.jsmemory-bank/(5 files updated)Test plan
npm test— all 18 tests pass with UUID v4 peer IDs/stream/../adminreturns 403ALLOWED_ORIGINSset, verify CORS blocks other origins🤖 Generated with Claude Code