Every mif-docs release ships a reproducible source tarball (mif-docs-<version>.tar.gz) carrying a SLSA build-provenance attestation. The attestation is keyless (Sigstore/Fulcio) and its signer identity is this repository's release workflow. Publication is fail-closed: the release job re-verifies the attestation before uploading, so a tag publishes nothing unattested.

To verify a downloaded artifact yourself:

# 1. Download the artifact from the GitHub Release.
gh release download <tag> --repo modeled-information-format/mif-docs-plugin \
  --pattern 'mif-docs-*.tar.gz'

# 2. Verify SLSA build provenance. --repo scopes trust to this repository;
#    --signer-workflow pins the certificate identity to the release workflow,
#    so an attestation from any other workflow would not pass.
gh attestation verify mif-docs-<version>.tar.gz \
  --repo modeled-information-format/mif-docs-plugin \
  --signer-workflow modeled-information-format/mif-docs-plugin/.github/workflows/release.yml

A non-zero exit means the artifact is not the attested bytes — do not use it.

• Every GitHub Action is pinned to a full 40-char commit SHA; the central pin-check reusable enforces this on every push and PR.
• Workflows are linted via the central reusable-actionlint.
• The release artifact is built with git archive (deterministic from the commit tree) and attested with actions/attest-build-provenance.

Open a private security advisory on the repository, or contact the modeled-information-format maintainers.