🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix predictable temp file symlink vulnerability#81
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix predictable temp file symlink vulnerability#81
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Co-authored-by: himattm <6266621+himattm@users.noreply.github.com>
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Code Review
This pull request addresses a security vulnerability involving predictable temporary file names by replacing insecure file creation patterns with os.CreateTemp in internal/burnrate/burnrate.go and internal/sparkline/sparkline.go. A new sentinel document is also added to document this vulnerability and its prevention. Feedback was provided regarding the cleanup logic in internal/sparkline/sparkline.go, suggesting the use of a defer block to handle file closure and removal more idiomatically and reduce code duplication.
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| if _, err := f.Write(data); err != nil { | ||
| f.Close() | ||
| os.Remove(tmp) | ||
| return | ||
| } | ||
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| if err := f.Chmod(0644); err != nil { | ||
| f.Close() | ||
| os.Remove(tmp) | ||
| return | ||
| } | ||
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| if err := f.Close(); err != nil { | ||
| os.Remove(tmp) | ||
| return | ||
| } | ||
| os.Rename(tmp, path) | ||
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| if err := os.Rename(tmp, path); err != nil { | ||
| os.Remove(tmp) | ||
| } |
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The cleanup logic for the temporary file is repeated multiple times. Using a defer block with a success flag is a more idiomatic Go pattern that improves maintainability and ensures the file is always cleaned up on error.
defer func() {
if tmp != "" {
f.Close()
os.Remove(tmp)
}
}()
if _, err := f.Write(data); err != nil {
return
}
if err := f.Chmod(0644); err != nil {
return
}
if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
return
}
if err := os.Rename(tmp, path); err != nil {
return
}
tmp = ""
Understood. Acknowledging that this work is now obsolete and stopping work on this task. |
1 participant
internal/burnrate/burnrate.goandinternal/sparkline/sparkline.go(path + ".tmp")./tmp), causing the application to inadvertently overwrite critical system files or escalate privileges when performing file operations.os.CreateTempto generate unpredictable, uniquely named files. Ensures the temporary file is created in the same directory as the target to prevent cross-device rename errors, explicitly restores0644permissions, and properly closes/cleans up the temporary file on errors.go test ./...andgo fmt ./.... Confirmed the vulnerability is resolved and tests pass. Documented the learning in.jules/sentinel.md.PR created automatically by Jules for task 6941788476515099900 started by @himattm