fix: Prevent shell injection in GitHub Actions workflow#2110
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fix-it-felix-sentry[bot] wants to merge 2 commits into
Open
fix: Prevent shell injection in GitHub Actions workflow#2110fix-it-felix-sentry[bot] wants to merge 2 commits into
fix-it-felix-sentry[bot] wants to merge 2 commits into
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Use environment variables instead of direct interpolation of GitHub context variables in run steps to prevent potential shell injection attacks. This addresses the security finding by: - Storing github.sha, github.ref, github.actor, matrix.arch, and github.event_name in environment variables - Using quoted environment variables in shell commands instead of direct interpolation - Following GitHub Actions security best practices for script injection prevention Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1618 Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/DI-1912 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| env: | ||
| GITHUB_ACTOR: ${{ github.actor }} | ||
| GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} | ||
| run: docker login --username "$GITHUB_ACTOR" --password-stdin ghcr.io <<< "$GITHUB_TOKEN" |
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Bug: Assignments to reserved environment variables GITHUB_ACTOR and GITHUB_TOKEN are silently ignored, making the intended security hardening ineffective.
Severity: MEDIUM
Suggested Fix
Use non-reserved names for the environment variables to ensure they are set correctly. For example, rename GITHUB_ACTOR to DOCKER_USERNAME and GITHUB_TOKEN to DOCKER_PASSWORD within the env block and update the run command to use these new variables.
Prompt for AI Agent
Review the code at the location below. A potential bug has been identified by an AI
agent. Verify if this is a real issue. If it is, propose a fix; if not, explain why it's
not valid.
Location: .github/workflows/image.yml#L24-L27
Potential issue: In the GitHub Actions workflow, the code attempts to set `GITHUB_ACTOR`
and `GITHUB_TOKEN` as environment variables for the `login` step. However, these are
reserved variable names in GitHub Actions, and any assignments to them are silently
ignored. Consequently, the intended security hardening—using intermediate variables to
prevent shell injection—is not applied. The `docker login` command still succeeds by
coincidence, as it falls back to using the globally available `GITHUB_ACTOR` and
`GITHUB_TOKEN` variables. This means the code does not achieve its security goal and
provides a false sense of security.
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Summary
This PR fixes a security finding by preventing potential shell injection in the GitHub Actions workflow.
Changes
github.sha,github.ref,github.actor,github.event_name) with environment variables${{ }}interpolationloginandbuildstepsThis follows GitHub Actions security best practices for preventing script injection attacks by treating all GitHub context data as potentially untrusted and using intermediate environment variables.
References