🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command injection in multiple API routes

[bobdivx]

🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Command injection in docker-logs.ts, docker-health.ts, and github-clone.ts due to unsafe usage of execSync and exec with string interpolation.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could inject arbitrary commands into the host shell, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) and system compromise.
🔧 Fix: Refactored execSync and exec to execFileAsync with proper argument arrays. Used -- for git commands to prevent argument injection, and added strict input validation regexes for identifiers. Prevented token leaks in error messages.
✅ Verification: Ensure pnpm run check and pnpm test pass. Manually test API endpoints to ensure normal behavior works and malicious inputs (e.g. id=; echo oops) are safely handled.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 9804105707731073344 started by @bobdivx

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
forge	Ready	Preview, Comment	May 31, 2026 5:38pm

[gemini-code-assist]

Code Review

This pull request mitigates command injection vulnerabilities across several API routes (docker-health.ts, docker-logs.ts, and github-clone.ts) by replacing shell execution with execFile and utilizing explicit argument arrays. It also introduces input validation and sanitizes error messages to prevent credential leaks. The review feedback highlights opportunities to improve these changes: restoring support for the tail=all option in Docker logs, utilizing the robust URL API for parsing and credential injection in the GitHub clone route, and reusing the existing isSafeRepoDirName helper function for repository name validation.

[gemini-code-assist]

The current validation of tail using parseInt breaks the tail=all functionality, which is a valid and common option in Docker logs. Additionally, it does not handle negative numbers gracefully. We can simplify and secure this by validating that tail is either exactly 'all' or a non-negative integer using a regular expression.

Suggested change

	const tailNum = parseInt(tail, 10);
	const validTail = isNaN(tailNum) ? '100' : String(tailNum);
	const validTail = (tail === 'all' || /^\d+$/.test(tail)) ? tail : '100';

[gemini-code-assist]

Using simple string replacement (replace('https://', ...)) and startsWith for URL validation and credential injection can be fragile and prone to parsing discrepancies. Utilizing the built-in URL API is much more robust and secure, ensuring that the protocol is strictly https: and the hostname is strictly github.com, while safely injecting the credentials without manual string manipulation.

    let parsedUrl: URL;
    try {
      parsedUrl = new URL(repoUrl);
      if (parsedUrl.protocol !== 'https:' || parsedUrl.hostname !== 'github.com') {
        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'URL Github invalide' }), { status: 400 });
      }
    } catch {
      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'URL Github invalide' }), { status: 400 });
    }
    parsedUrl.username = 'oauth2';
    parsedUrl.password = githubToken;
    const authUrl = parsedUrl.toString();

[gemini-code-assist]

Instead of writing a custom regex to validate the repository name, you can reuse the existing isSafeRepoDirName helper function from src/lib/forge-repos.ts to ensure consistency and maintainability across the codebase. Note that you will also need to add isSafeRepoDirName to the imports from ../../lib/forge-repos.

Suggested change

	if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/.test(repoName) || repoName.includes('..')) {
	return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Nom de dépôt invalide' }), { status: 400 });
	}
	if (!isSafeRepoDirName(repoName) || repoName === '.' || repoName === '..') {
	return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Nom de dépôt invalide' }), { status: 400 });
	}