🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command injection in docker logs

[bobdivx]

🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Command injection vulnerability in src/pages/api/docker-logs.ts where unvalidated id and tail query parameters were directly interpolated into an execSync shell command.
🎯 Impact: An attacker could execute arbitrary shell commands on the server running the API by providing crafted id or tail values.
🔧 Fix: Refactored the endpoint to use execFileSync with an array of arguments, entirely bypassing shell execution. Added strict input validation to ensure parameters only contain alphanumeric characters, hyphens, or underscores, and do not start with a hyphen to prevent flag injection.
✅ Verification: Ran pnpm run check and pnpm test to ensure no regressions.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 7391640736258588607 started by @bobdivx

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
forge	Ready	Preview, Comment	May 30, 2026 5:47pm

[gemini-code-assist]

Code Review

This pull request addresses a critical command injection vulnerability in the Docker logs API route by replacing execSync with execFileSync and adding strict input validation for the containerId and tail parameters. It also documents this vulnerability in a new sentinel markdown file. The review feedback recommends refactoring the synchronous process execution (execFileSync) to an asynchronous approach (execFile wrapped in promisify) to prevent blocking the Node.js event loop and degrading API performance under concurrent load.

[gemini-code-assist]

Using synchronous process execution (execFileSync) blocks the single-threaded Node.js event loop. This can severely degrade the performance and responsiveness of the API under concurrent requests. It is highly recommended to use asynchronous execution instead.

import { execFile } from "child_process";
import { promisify } from "util";

const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);

[gemini-code-assist]

Refactor the synchronous execution to use the asynchronous execFileAsync to prevent blocking the event loop.

Suggested change

	const output = execFileSync(
	"docker",
	["logs", "--tail", tail, containerId],
	{ stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] },
	).toString();
	logs = output.trim().split("\n");
	const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(
	"docker",
	["logs", "--tail", tail, containerId]
	);
	logs = stdout.trim().split("\n");