🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix insecure file permissions on lockfile#5
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🚨 Severity: MEDIUM 💡 Vulnerability: The `ProfileLock` struct creates lock files and their parent directories using default system permissions (`fs::create_dir_all` and `fs::OpenOptions::new()`), which could expose sensitive config paths or metadata on shared systems. 🎯 Impact: Local privilege escalation or info leakage of profile presence/metadata if executed on a shared multi-user machine. 🔧 Fix: Updated `ProfileLock::acquire` to use `crate::paths::create_secure_dir_all` (mode `0o700`) for the parent directory and explicitly set mode `0o600` for the lockfile itself via `OpenOptionsExt` on Unix platforms. Also cleaned up `cargo fmt` errors across codebase. ✅ Verification: `cargo test`, `cargo clippy`, and `cargo fmt` execute successfully. Check `.lock` file permissions after running the CLI. Co-authored-by: bitcoiner-dev <75873427+bitcoiner-dev@users.noreply.github.com>
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🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix insecure file permissions on lockfile
🚨 Severity: MEDIUM
💡 Vulnerability: The
ProfileLockstruct creates lock files and their parent directories using default system permissions (fs::create_dir_allandfs::OpenOptions::new()), which could expose sensitive config paths or metadata on shared systems.🎯 Impact: Local privilege escalation or info leakage of profile presence/metadata if executed on a shared multi-user machine.
🔧 Fix: Updated
ProfileLock::acquireto usecrate::paths::create_secure_dir_all(mode0o700) for the parent directory and explicitly set mode0o600for the lockfile itself viaOpenOptionsExton Unix platforms. Also cleaned upcargo fmterrors across codebase.✅ Verification:
cargo test,cargo clippy, andcargo fmtexecute successfully. Check.lockfile permissions after running the CLI.PR created automatically by Jules for task 10174747013570742451 started by @bitcoiner-dev