Fix server cert chain validation for HTTP/3 clients#145
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The QUIC client's topmost-only anchor lookup rejected valid chains that include an extra or cross-signed cert above the cert that actually anchors. With trust stores like Mozilla NSS, certifi and FreeBSD ca_root_nss this failed against real servers (notably cloudflare.com over Google Trust Services) with unknown_ca, while Debian/macOS bundles happened to pass.
The fix walks the served chain for the highest cert whose issuer is in the trust store and validates the sub-path from there, dropping any extra certs above. The QUIC owner also gets a synchronous {closed, {certificate_invalid, _}} event on verification failure so HTTP/3 callers fail fast instead of timing out.
Ships as 1.4.5.