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[MINOR] Record PMC answers to the security THREAT_MODEL.md open questions#5275

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[MINOR] Record PMC answers to the security THREAT_MODEL.md open questions#5275
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Follow-up to #5268, which added the security THREAT_MODEL.md as a v0 draft for the PMC to review.

This folds the Apache Zeppelin PMC review answers into the document so it reflects maintainer positions rather than the draft (inferred) guesses:

  • Records the PMC answer for each open question in §14 (waves 1–3) inline.
  • Re-tags the corresponding (inferred) claims as (maintainer) across §2/§3/§5a/§6/§8/§9/§11a.
  • §5a: records the insecure-default ruling — anonymous-by-default, public notebooks, impersonation-off, and the shared binding mode are dev-conveniences / by-design, so reports against them are OUT-OF-MODEL: non-default-build.
  • §8: confirms authentication, notebook authorization (server-side), URL ACL (operator-configured), credential isolation, and impersonation confinement as committed properties; clarifies that resource/availability is not a committed property today (treated as VALID-HARDENING).
  • Keeps the core framing: RBAC is the trust boundary, not a sandbox.

Documentation only; no code changes.

…ions

Follow-up to apache#5268, which added THREAT_MODEL.md as a v0 draft for the PMC to review. This folds the Apache Zeppelin PMC review answers into the document: records the PMC answer for each open question in §14, and re-tags the corresponding (inferred) claims as (maintainer) across §2/§3/§5a/§6/§8/§9/§11a. Documentation only.
@jongyoul jongyoul marked this pull request as ready for review June 23, 2026 03:27
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Pull request overview

This PR updates Zeppelin’s security threat model document (THREAT_MODEL.md) to incorporate Apache Zeppelin PMC responses to previously open questions, converting prior (inferred) statements into (maintainer)-confirmed positions and clarifying triage guidance for automated/security reviews.

Changes:

  • Updates the document status and confidence framing to reflect PMC review and recorded answers.
  • Re-tags multiple previously (inferred) claims as (maintainer) and folds §14 answers back into earlier sections (scope, defaults, properties, hardening).
  • Expands §14 with the recorded PMC answers (waves 1–3), including rulings on defaults and hardening expectations.
Comments suppressed due to low confidence (1)

THREAT_MODEL.md:94

  • This section still says the auth/anonymous posture is "pending" a §5a/§14 ruling, but §14 now records the PMC decision. Leaving "pending" here makes the model internally inconsistent after the PMC-reviewed updates.
  untrusted network.** The docs direct operators to enable Shiro *or* deploy
  only in a secured/trusted environment *(documented)*; an unauthenticated,
  internet-exposed instance is an operator misconfiguration, not a Zeppelin
  defect (pending the §5a/§14 ruling on whether anonymous is a supported
  posture).

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Comment thread THREAT_MODEL.md
Comment on lines +161 to +167
**Insecure-default ruling (recorded).** The PMC has ruled that every insecure
§5a default above is a *dev-convenience / by-design* choice, not the supported
production posture: Zeppelin's stance is "open by default, secure by
configuration" (enable Shiro, or deploy only in a secured/trusted network). A
report that only manifests under one of these defaults is therefore
`OUT-OF-MODEL: non-default-build` (or `BY-DESIGN`), with the requirement living
in §10. See §14 wave 1 for the per-knob answers.
Comment thread THREAT_MODEL.md
@@ -334,47 +342,66 @@ The highest-leverage section for keeping scan output signal-heavy:

## §14 Open questions for the maintainers
Comment thread THREAT_MODEL.md
Comment on lines +268 to +271
the notebook web UI — *(maintainer — §14.10)* there is **no Content-Security-
Policy** and CSRF protection is **Origin-header-based only**, so strengthening
these (CSP, stronger CSRF) is welcome `VALID-HARDENING`; websocket cross-origin.
The point is to put integrators on notice.
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