feat: 4.0.0 — event-driven provider listening + actp request + Sentinel onboarding#9
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PRD targets @agirails/sdk@4.0.0. Iterated 5× with 3 adversarial review passes. Locks in: - Layer A (transport): wire EventMonitor subscription + bounded catch-up sweep into BlockchainRuntime, replacing the noop getAllTransactions() fallback that left Agent.provide() silently broken on real chains since 3.x. - Layer B (routing): hash-keyed service handlers — Agent.provide(name) computes keccak256(toUtf8Bytes(name)) and matches on-chain tx.serviceHash. Adds serviceHash field to MockTransaction (breaking type-level change). - Layer C (job semantics): new 'actp request' CLI for Level 1 negotiated flow, 'actp pay' stays a Level 0 primitive with --service parsed only to reject. 'actp test' rewritten to hit deployed Sentinel on Base Sepolia. Implementation sequence in §9. This commit tracks the spec on the feature branch before any code lands.
…D §5.1) Required method on IACTPRuntime (BREAKING — see PRD §6 / §7). Custom downstream runtime implementations must add this method on upgrade; TypeScript surfaces the requirement as a compile error. Changes: - IACTPRuntime: add required getTransactionsByProvider(provider, state?, limit?). - MockRuntime: normalize provider comparison to lowercase so callers can pass checksummed or lowercase addresses interchangeably (matches BlockchainRuntime semantics; PRD §5.1 contract). - BlockchainRuntime: ship empty-array placeholder. Full EventMonitor-backed implementation lands with §5.2 in a follow-up commit on this branch. Returning [] (not throwing) keeps Agent.pollForJobs and live Sentinel from regressing between §5.1 and §5.2. - Agent.pollForJobs: drop the duck-type fallback to getAllTransactions — the method is now guaranteed by the interface, the prior else-branch is dead code that TypeScript flagged as unreachable. Tests: +5 MockRuntime cases (filter, case-insensitive match, state filter, limit) + 2 BlockchainRuntime placeholder cases. Full suite: 2191 pass (up from 2184), 0 regressions.
…History (PRD §5.5)
Adds optional `range?: { fromBlock?, toBlock? }` parameter and widens the
return type to TransactionWithLogMeta = Transaction & { blockNumber?, logIndex? }.
Why:
- §5.2 catch-up sweep needs to bound queryFilter to a recent block window
on real chains; querying genesis→latest on every poll exhausts Alchemy
compute units.
- Newest-first selection at the sweep boundary (limit=100 in a busy window)
requires deterministic ordering by blockNumber/logIndex from the source
event log. ACTPKernel state doesn't carry log positions; SDK-local widening.
Backward compatibility:
- Value-level: range === undefined keeps prior genesis→latest scan.
- Type-level: TransactionWithLogMeta is Transaction + two optional fields,
so callers reading only canonical fields compile unchanged.
Tests: +3 EventMonitor cases (range pass-through, no-range backward compat,
log metadata attached). Full suite: 2194 pass (up from 2191), 0 regressions.
…ion.serviceHash (PRD §5.2)
Lands the Layer A (transport) and Layer B (routing) on-chain SDK work so
Agent.provide() can actually see and dispatch INITIATED jobs on Base
Sepolia / Mainnet.
Changes:
- MockTransaction: add required serviceHash: string field (BREAKING type-
level — see PRD §6 and §7). Direct constructors of MockTransaction in
test fixtures must now include this field; TypeScript surfaces it.
- MockRuntime.createTransaction: derive serviceHash from serviceDescription.
Already-bytes32 → pass through; raw string → keccak256(toUtf8Bytes(...));
omitted/empty → ZeroHash (Level 0 pay semantics).
- BlockchainRuntime.getTransaction: populate serviceHash from the kernel's
bytes32 field with a ZeroHash fallback for legacy ABI returns. Layer B
routing key now flows through the runtime contract.
- BlockchainRuntimeConfig: add sweepBlockWindow (default 7200 ≈ 4 h on
Base L2), pollingInterval (default 1000 ms, override ethers' 4 s default),
transport ('http'|'wss', wss reserved for follow-up commit), wssUrl.
Constructor validates wss requires wssUrl and applies polling override.
- BlockchainRuntime.getTransactionsByProvider: replace §5.1 placeholder
with the real bounded EventMonitor sweep. Newest-first selection by
(blockNumber, logIndex) so a busy window doesn't truncate the freshest
jobs at limit; oldest-first return so Agent.pollForJobs ordering matches
MockRuntime. Case-insensitive provider re-check defends against upstream
filter misconfiguration.
- BlockchainRuntime.subscribeProviderJobs (public on the class, NOT on
IACTPRuntime): wraps EventMonitor.onTransactionCreated({provider}, …),
hydrates the txId, re-validates state === 'INITIATED' (absorbs the
INITIATED→CANCELLED race), and surfaces hydration errors as warnings
rather than crashing. Public so Agent.subscribeIfBlockchain() can
detect support via 'in runtime' structural check.
Test fixtures: 6 MockTransaction fixtures in BlockchainRuntime.test.ts +
8 fixtures in MockStateManager.test.ts updated with serviceHash:ZeroHash
(per PRD §7 migration guidance).
Tests: replaced the 2 §5.1 placeholder cases with 8 §5.2 cases —
empty-history, bounded fromBlock, hydration + state filter + oldest-first,
case-insensitive provider match, limit truncation, null/mismatch skip,
subscription cleanup, and state-guard filter on incoming events.
Full suite: 2200 pass (up from 2194), 0 regressions.
Branch state after this commit: real-chain Agent.provide() transport +
routing now functional; Agent.subscribeIfBlockchain wiring, hash-routing
on the Agent side, pause/resume cleanup, and the actp request/test CLIs
land in §5.3, §5.4, §5.6, §5.7.
…state migration (§5.2.1) Three follow-ups on the §5.2 commit, surfaced during review before stacking §5.3/§5.4 Agent-side wiring on top: 1. BlockchainRuntime.getTransactionsByProvider — re-check hydrated.state against the requested filter after the contract read. The event-log filter establishes the initial state at emission time; the TX can move (INITIATED → CANCELLED / QUOTED) between the EventMonitor scan and the per-tx getTransaction() hydration. Returning a stale-state job to Agent.pollForJobs would cause the next linkEscrow to revert. Mirrors the guard already in subscribeProviderJobs. 2. BlockchainRuntime constructor — replace the silent wssUrl-only check with a hard throw for transport==='wss', and update the JSDoc on both the field and BlockchainRuntimeConfig. The config shape is locked so downstream code can pin against it, but the WebsocketProvider swap is not implemented yet; quietly continuing to use HTTP polling is API-dishonest. When real WSS lands the throw goes away. 3. MockStateManager.loadState — backfill serviceHash in-place for transactions persisted by SDK ≤ 3.5.3 (no serviceHash field). Uses the same derivation as MockRuntime.createTransaction (bytes32 passthrough → keccak256(toUtf8Bytes(name)) → ZeroHash). Operators don't have to delete .actp/mock-state.json on upgrade; already-populated serviceHash values are left untouched. Tests: +4 cases (state-change-during-hydration drop, WSS rejection, legacy state backfill for two shapes, no-op for already-present hash). Full suite: 2204 pass (up from 2200), 0 regressions.
…PRD §5.4 + §5.11)
Closes the Agent-side half of Layer B: jobs arriving via BlockchainRuntime
carry only a bytes32 `serviceHash` (no string `serviceDescription`), and the
existing 5-step string dispatch in findServiceHandler explicitly bailed out on
that path — `return undefined` with a 'cannot extract service name' log. As a
result, on-chain INITIATED jobs would be seen but never dispatched.
§5.4 changes (src/level1/Agent.ts):
- New private handlersByHash map, populated alongside the existing services
map inside provide(). Key is keccak256(toUtf8Bytes(name)).toLowerCase() —
same formula used by AgentRegistry.computeServiceTypeHash and by the
forthcoming `actp request --service <name>` CLI path, so a single
provide('translate', handler) is reachable from both runtimes without
any consumer-side change.
- findServiceHandler is now hash-first:
PRIMARY: tx.serviceHash → handlersByHash (skip ZeroHash for L0 pay).
FALLBACK: the existing 5-step string dispatch, refactored out as
findServiceHandlerByString and reached only when the hash
branch misses or is absent (MockRuntime fixtures).
- Duplicate-name throw is unchanged on the API surface; the hash map
follows the same lifecycle, so duplicates are caught by the string check
first.
§5.11 changes (src/types/agent.ts):
- ServiceDescriptor.serviceTypeHash doc-comment corrected from
`keccak256(lowercase(serviceType))` to `keccak256(toUtf8Bytes(serviceType))`
— case-sensitive, no normalization. Mixed-case service names were a
latent footgun: a consumer reading the stale comment and calling
toLowerCase() before publish would produce a hash that never matched
what `actp request --service <name>` puts on chain.
Tests (+7 cases): hash routing happy path; case-insensitive hash match;
ZeroHash skip; unknown-hash undefined; string fallback (MockRuntime
fixtures); hash-miss + string-match cross-runtime safety; internal
consistency between the hash and string maps.
Full suite: 2211 pass (up from 2204), 0 regressions.
What's left for §5.3: subscription wiring on Agent.start/resume,
pause/resume cleanup, idempotent start, try/finally on processingLocks,
and the case-insensitive provider check at line 816 the user flagged
during §5.1 review.
… TXs carry the registered service name (§5.4.1)
§5.4 wired hash routing into findServiceHandler, but the matched
config.name didn't reach Job construction. createJobFromTransaction(tx)
called extractServiceName(tx) which returns 'unknown' for hash-only TXs
(empty or bytes32 serviceDescription). Practical impact:
- handler lookup succeeds (correct hash match)
- handler receives job.service === 'unknown'
- filter.custom + legacy filter functions see 'unknown'
- behavior.autoAccept callback path sees 'unknown'
- 'job:received' event emits 'unknown'
This contradicts the Layer B intent: hash routing should yield the
originally-registered service name (e.g. provide('onboarding', ...))
regardless of whether serviceDescription is empty, bytes32, or a string.
Fix:
- createJobFromTransaction(tx, matched?): when matched is supplied,
job.service is matched.config.name. Otherwise fall back to
extractServiceName(tx) for legacy/back-compat callers.
- shouldAutoAccept(tx, matched?): prefer the caller-supplied handler so
the redundant findServiceHandler call goes away and every internal
createJobFromTransaction (filter.custom, legacy filter fn, pricing
calculator, autoAccept callback) gets the matched name.
- pollForJobs: pass the already-found serviceHandler into both
shouldAutoAccept and createJobFromTransaction. The shared handler
threads through the entire accept→escrow→job:received flow.
Tests: +4 cases (empty serviceDescription, bytes32 serviceDescription,
back-compat with no matched, autoAccept callback sees resolved name).
Full suite: 2215 pass (up from 2211), 0 regressions.
Carry-forward for §5.3: case-insensitive provider check at the
pollForJobs/handleIncomingTransaction boundary, plus subscription
wiring, pause/resume cleanup, idempotent start, try/finally on
processingLocks.
…y dedup (PRD §5.3) Final Agent-side change to make Agent.provide() functional on real chains. Joins the BlockchainRuntime transport (§5.2) and hash routing (§5.4) with proper lifecycle management. Subscription wiring: - New jobSubscriptionCleanup field tracks live subscription state. - subscribeIfBlockchain() duck-type detects runtime.subscribeProviderJobs and wires the callback into handleIncomingTransaction. MockRuntime deliberately omits the method, so mock providers stay on the polling path only. - start(), resume() call subscribeIfBlockchain. pause(), stop() call unsubscribe(). Both helpers are idempotent — double-subscribe is a logged noop, double-unsubscribe is a no-op. - Partial start failure (ACTPClient.create rejects, subscription throws after polling started, etc.) now tears down both polling and subscription before propagating, instead of leaking the timer. Lifecycle BREAKING changes (see §6 + MIGRATION-4.0): - Agent.start(): idempotent. Calling on an already-running or paused agent is a logged noop instead of throwing AgentLifecycleError. Two existing tests rewritten to assert the new semantic. - Agent.pause(): now also unsubscribes from on-chain events. Previously pause() left the subscription firing in the background — a silent bug. - Agent.resume(): re-establishes the subscription pause() tore down. handleIncomingTransaction (shared acceptance pipeline): - Extracts the per-tx body from pollForJobs into a private async method so both the polling sweep and the live subscription converge on identical semantics (dedup, provider auth, routing, auto-accept, linkEscrow, job:received emission). - Single try/finally around processingLocks. Six scattered manual .delete() calls collapse to one finally clause. Poison TXs (handler throw, malformed payload, linkEscrow revert) release the slot and become retryable on the next sweep — was a known leak. - Case-insensitive provider check (§5.3 carry-forward from the §5.1 review): tx.provider.toLowerCase() !== this.address.toLowerCase(). Closes the last case-sensitivity gap after §5.1 + §5.2.1 normalized the runtime-side comparisons. Tests (+10 cases): - handleIncomingTransaction pipeline: lock released on success, on unknown handler, on linkEscrow throw; case-insensitive provider match; idempotent on duplicate TX. - subscribeIfBlockchain: wires + stores cleanup, refuses double-subscribe, unsubscribe invokes + clears, idempotent on no-op, skipped for MockRuntime. - Two existing tests rewritten: start-already-running and start-while- paused now assert idempotent noop instead of throw. Full suite: 2225 pass (up from 2215), 0 regressions, 92 suites green.
…ion status guard + test hygiene (§5.3.1) Three follow-ups on §5.3 surfaced during review before stacking the CLI commits on top. 1. resume() partial-failure cleanup. Same shape as start()'s catch path: if subscribeIfBlockchain throws after startPolling already armed the timer, stopPolling() + unsubscribe() fire before the error propagates. Without this, status stays 'paused' but the polling interval keeps firing — orphaned timer survives. Caller can now safely retry resume() once the underlying transport recovers. 2. handleIncomingTransaction status guard. Async polls and queued subscription callbacks can race with pause()/stop(); the existing stopPolling + unsubscribe in those methods doesn't unwind in-flight work. Drop the TX with a debug log when _status is paused, stopping, stopped, or idle. 'starting' is intentionally allowed — start() wires the subscription before flipping _status to 'running', and a fast on-chain event in that window must still be accepted (would otherwise lose work). Closes the pause/stop side of PRD's pause-stops-events guarantee (e2e test plan §8.2 #10). 3. Test hygiene. The §5.3 pipeline tests stubbed only linkEscrow; the async processJob() then reached for transitionState and logged 'transitionState is not a function' noise. Tests still passed but the noise masked real async failures. New stubRuntime() helper stubs both linkEscrow and transitionState so the async work either succeeds or fails for the reason under test. Tests (+6 cases): - resume() partial failure: subscribeIfBlockchain throws → polling timer cleared, status reverts to 'paused', error surfaces to caller. - status guard: dropped when paused. - status guard: dropped for stopping / stopped / idle (parameterized). - status guard: accepted during 'starting' (subscribe-before-status race). Full suite: 2231 pass (up from 2225), 0 regressions, 92 suites green.
…PRD §5.6)
Adds the requester-side CLI surface that closes Layer C of PRD-event-driven-
provider-listening. Provider-side (transport + routing) was completed in
§5.2 + §5.4; this commit gives buyers a way to drive that pipeline from
the command line.
Routing-key fix (Layer B requester side):
- src/level0/request.ts: was passing JSON.stringify({service, input,
timestamp}) as serviceDescription. BlockchainRuntime.validateServiceHash
then hashed the whole JSON, so the on-chain serviceHash equaled
keccak256(JSON) — which could never match a provider's
Agent.provide(name) hash. Routing silently failed on real chains.
- src/negotiation/BuyerOrchestrator.ts: same bug at line 417, with
JSON.stringify({service, session}). The session_id no longer travels
on-chain (subscription correlation still uses txId), but routing now
matches the hash registered by Agent.provide().
- Both sites now pass keccak256(toUtf8Bytes(serviceName)) as
serviceDescription. BlockchainRuntime.validateServiceHash passthrough
branch (already-bytes32) leaves it untouched.
options.input deferral:
- level0/request() logs a warning the first time options.input is set in
4.0.0 and drops it. Provider handlers see job.input = {} until the
forthcoming agirails.request.v1 envelope on NegotiationChannel restores
the transport (PRD §11).
New CLI surface — actp request:
- src/cli/commands/request.ts: thin commander wrapper around runRequest.
Resolves agirails.app slug URLs the same way actp pay does; maps
QuoteTimeoutError → exit code 2 (PRD §5.6 step 4 canonical no-quote
signal) and DeliveryTimeoutError → standard ERROR exit.
- src/cli/index.ts: registers the new command alongside actp pay.
New shared helper — src/cli/lib/runRequest.ts:
- Phase-aware lifecycle separate from level0/request's monolithic
timeout: quote phase (default 30s, PRD §5.6) → delivery phase
(default 5min). Each transition surfaces through an optional
onTransition callback so callers (actp request, future actp test)
can stream state changes to the user.
- Requester-immediate settle after DELIVERED (ACTPKernel.sol:700-704
allows requester to settle without waiting for the dispute window).
- 4.0.0 ships with --auto-accept effectively on; PRD §5.6 step 5
interactive confirm is deferred until a UX pass.
Tests (+3 cases in new suite src/cli/lib/runRequest.test.ts):
- Routing-key invariant: explicit check that on-chain serviceHash is
keccak256(toUtf8Bytes('onboarding')), not keccak256(JSON).
- QuoteTimeoutError shape + actionable cancel hint when no provider
picks up the INITIATED TX.
- End-to-end happy path on MockRuntime: spin up a real Agent provider,
fire runRequest from the same state dir, assert the reflection
payload flows back unchanged.
Full suite: 93 suites pass (up from 92, +1 new file), 2234 pass (up
from 2231, +3 new), 0 regressions across BuyerOrchestrator and
level0/request consumers.
What's left for §5.7-§5.9: actp test rewrite to hit deployed Sentinel
via runRequest + resolveAgent + ACTP_SENTINEL_ADDRESS; actp agent watch
loop fix; actp pay --service rejection.
….6.1)
Audit pass after §5.6 surfaced six HIGH-severity items. This commit
closes them before stacking §5.7 on top.
1. parsePositiveInt silently truncated decimals (Number.parseInt('30.5')
= 30) and accepted '30_000' / '30,000' / '1e6'. Callers passing
--quote-timeout 30.5 got 30ms with no error. Strict digits-only
regex now throws a directive error.
File: src/cli/commands/request.ts:179.
2. --auto-accept Commander config had no working off-switch. Replaced
with the canonical --no-auto-accept idiom: options.autoAccept defaults
to true, --no-auto-accept flips to false. Future interactive-confirm
flow can now be wired without an API break.
File: src/cli/commands/request.ts:42.
3. runRequest did not trim opts.service before hashing. level0/request.ts
already trims via validateServiceName, so callers using the same name
with stray whitespace got different on-chain hashes from each entry
point. Added .trim() + empty-name rejection in runRequest before
computing serviceHash.
File: src/cli/lib/runRequest.ts (compute on-chain inputs block).
4. resolveDeadline accepted JS millisecond timestamps as unix seconds —
passing Date.now() instead of Math.floor(Date.now()/1000) would
produce an immortal-deadline TX (~year 55_000 CE). Reject any number
> 32_503_680_000 (≈ year 3000) with a directive error.
File: src/cli/lib/runRequest.ts (resolveDeadline).
5. Documented in module JSDoc + PRD §5.6 that 4.0.0 runRequest is the
**poll-only autoAccept-friendly path**: it observes state transitions
via runtime.getTransaction() and relies on a provider whose
shouldAutoAccept returns true to drive INITIATED → COMMITTED. The
NegotiationChannel.subscribeTxId + counteraccept.v1 envelope path
(PRD §5.6 step 6 as written) is **deferred to a 4.x follow-up** for
multi-round counter-offer flows. For Sentinel + autoAccept the two
paths are functionally equivalent, deferring the channel wiring
keeps the 4.0.0 surface ~80 LOC simpler and avoids re-implementing
BuyerOrchestrator's quote channel in a second site.
6. Stale test fixtures still constructed serviceDescription via
JSON.stringify({...}) — they pass today (MockRuntime hashes the JSON
string), but document the broken invariant the production code just
fixed. Migrated to keccak256(toUtf8Bytes(name)) form to match
production.
Files: src/__e2e__/state-machine-happy-path.e2e.test.ts (3 sites),
src/negotiation/ProviderOrchestrator.test.ts (1 site).
False alarms verified:
- Output.print in JSON/quiet mode already gates on mode === 'human'
(src/cli/utils/output.ts:188), so onTransition progress lines do not
corrupt machine-readable output.
- humanAmountToUSDCWei correctly rejects scientific notation, leading
signs, and trailing-dot inputs through its /^\d+$/ guard; explorer
flagged it for re-review but the regex is sound.
Tests (+14 cases):
- parsePositiveInt: 9 cases (clean integers, fallback, decimal reject,
separator reject, scientific notation reject, negative reject, zero
reject, non-numeric reject).
- createRequestCommand flag shape: 1 case asserting --no-auto-accept
default/off-switch.
- runRequest service normalization: 2 cases (whitespace trim end-to-end,
empty-name reject).
- runRequest deadline guard: 2 cases (ms timestamp reject, plausible
seconds accept).
Full suite: 94 suites pass (up from 93, +1 new request.test.ts), 2248
pass (up from 2234, +14 new), 0 regressions across BuyerOrchestrator,
e2e suites, and all other consumers.
Deferred (not blockers for §5.7):
- Compile-time removal of RequestOptions.input (TypeScript-enforced
upgrade pain).
- DeliveryTimeoutError test path.
- Slug regex shared utility (planned for §5.7's resolveAgent helper).
- Once-per-process throttle for level0/request input-dropped warning.
…quest (PRD §5.7)
Closes the Sentinel onboarding flow PRD targets: `actp test` now runs a
real ACTP Level 1 request against the deployed Sentinel on Base Sepolia,
walks the full state machine, settles the escrow as the requester, and
prints the day's curated reflection.
Pre-4.0.0 `actp test` was a MockRuntime simulator (~380 LOC of receipt
rendering, fee analysis, animated spinners). That code is gone. The
"prove your local config can earn" use case is BREAKING per PRD §6 + §7
bullet 8; mock-only environments must use the SDK with MockRuntime
directly.
New file: src/cli/lib/resolveAgent.ts
- ResolvedAgent { slug, address, network, source } shape.
- AgentNotFoundError lists the slugs registered on the requested network
so a typo surfaces with a 'did you mean' hint.
- InvalidAgentAddressError surfaces the offending env var name and value.
- Constant-table lookup keyed on slug + network. Returns checksummed
addresses via ethers.getAddress.
- ENV_OVERRIDES path (PRD §A.6 rotation escape hatch). Empty-string env
var falls through to the constant table — some shells set an unused
variable to '' instead of unsetting it, and we don't want that to
block onboarding.
- Slugs handled case-insensitively (lowercase + trim) so ' Sentinel '
and 'SENTINEL' resolve identically to 'sentinel'.
Rewritten: src/cli/commands/test.ts
- New runTest(output) signature preserved so src/cli/agirails.ts
onboarding UX keeps working.
- Resolves Sentinel for base-sepolia, dispatches via runRequest with
amount=0.05 USDC + service='onboarding' + auto-accept.
- Error mapping: QuoteTimeoutError → exit 2 (PRD §5.6 canonical signal),
AgentNotFoundError / InvalidAgentAddressError → exit ERROR with the
ACTP_SENTINEL_ADDRESS hint, DeliveryTimeoutError → exit ERROR.
- onTransition callback streams `[timestamp] STATE txId` lines in
human mode; JSON / quiet modes get only the final structured result.
- Reflection extraction handles both raw Sentinel payload
({ reflection, service, timestamp }) and the delivery-proof-wrapped
variant ({ type: 'delivery.proof', result: { reflection, ... } }).
- Quiet mode key is 'reflection' so `actp test -q` prints just the line.
Tests (+12 cases) in src/cli/lib/resolveAgent.test.ts:
- Constant table happy path + checksummed address + case-insensitive
slug (3 cases).
- Env override happy path + precedence over table + empty-string
fallback + invalid address rejection + error shape inspection (5).
- Missing agent: unknown slug + slug exists but wrong network + error
message lists known slugs + empty list when no entries (4).
Full suite: 95 suites pass (up from 94, +1 new file), 2260 pass
(up from 2248, +12 new), 0 regressions across the rest of the CLI.
… + retry race (PRD §5.8)
The watchTimer at agent.ts:149-177 was the only on-chain entry point for
'actp agent', and it had three independent bugs that compounded into a
since-introduction silent failure on every real chain.
Before:
- Called runtime.getAllTransactions() — a deliberate no-op on
BlockchainRuntime that returned []. 'actp agent' on Base Sepolia /
Base Mainnet had seen zero on-chain INITIATED TXs since
BlockchainRuntime was introduced.
- Marked tx as 'seen' BEFORE awaiting orchestrator.quote(). A
transient quote failure (relay 5xx, signer disconnect, RPC blip)
permanently dropped the tx with no retry.
- Fell back to 'policy.services[0] ?? "default"' for the
IncomingRequest serviceType when it couldn't infer the service.
With hash routing wired into Agent.provide (§5.4) and §5.6's
requester-side hash fix, policies with more than one service would
have silently quoted the wrong one.
After (PRD §5.8):
- getTransactionsByProvider(addr, 'INITIATED', 100) — the bounded
EventMonitor-backed sweep from §5.2. Server-side filter, so the
per-tx provider check the old loop ran after the fact is gone.
- Added an 'inflight' set so a long-running orchestrator.quote()
can't be re-entered by the next sweep tick for the same txId.
- seen.add(t.id) is now AFTER orchestrator.quote() resolves. The
finally{} block always clears 'inflight' so transient failures
automatically retry on the next sweep.
- serviceNameForHash(tx.serviceHash, policy.services) — exact
reverse lookup via keccak256(toUtf8Bytes(name)). Unknown hash is
a deterministic skip (seen.add + warn), not a transient failure;
the orchestrator never sees a wrong-service IncomingRequest.
New helper: src/cli/lib/serviceNameForHash.ts
- Pure function, no runtime / network state. Iterates the configured
service list and compares keccak256 hashes. Case-insensitive on the
hex hash, case-sensitive on the name (matches Agent.provide(name)
exactly per PRD §5.11).
- ZeroHash and missing hash both fall through to undefined, which
pairs naturally with the Level 0 'pay' semantics in §5.4.
Tests (+8 cases) in src/cli/lib/serviceNameForHash.test.ts:
- Known-hash → name (2)
- Unknown hash / empty list / missing hash / ZeroHash → undefined (4)
- Case-insensitive hex match (1)
- Case-sensitive name miss (Agent.provide hashes the name as-is) (1)
- First-match defensive behavior on duplicate-name config (1)
Full suite: 96 suites pass (up from 95, +1 new file), 2268 pass (up
from 2260, +8 new), 0 regressions across the rest of the CLI and
negotiation suites.
What's left for §5.9 + §5.10: actp pay --service rejection, actp serve
docstring update. Both are small surface changes.
…§5.9 + §5.10)
Closes the last two surface changes in PRD-event-driven-provider-listening.
§5.9 — actp pay --service is now parsed only to reject with a canonical
directive pointing at 'actp request':
- pay.ts parses --service and, when set, calls output.errorResult()
with a structured PAY_SERVICE_REJECTED code + the canonical
PAY_SERVICE_REJECTION_MESSAGE (exported for downstream tooling),
then exits with code 64 (EX_USAGE from sysexits.h so scripts can
distinguish 'usage error' from generic ACTP failure).
- errorResult is used instead of output.error so the directive is
visible in --json and --quiet modes too. A silent exit-64 would
leave automation guessing.
- Documents the Level 0 / Level 1 boundary in the CLI surface itself:
pay is escrow-link without handler routing; request is the
negotiated job-flow surface with hash-keyed dispatch.
§5.10 — actp serve docstring updated to reflect the 4.0.0 split:
- 'serve' focuses solely on the AIP-2.1 quote channel HTTP surface.
- On-chain INITIATED-tx detection is now handled by 'actp agent' or
'new Agent()' — both use the hybrid subscription + bounded
catch-up sweep on BlockchainRuntime added in §5.2, §5.3, §5.8.
- The pre-4.0.0 'Out of scope for v1 (Phase 5)' wording is gone;
it described a gap that is now closed.
- Running 'actp serve' alongside 'actp agent' is the canonical split.
Tests (+4 cases) in src/cli/commands/pay.test.ts:
- Exit code 64 when --service is passed.
- Canonical directive present and references 'actp request'.
- PAY_SERVICE_REJECTION_MESSAGE constant exposed.
- No-op when --service is absent (back-compat for existing scripts).
Full suite: 96 suites pass, 2272 pass (up from 2268, +4 new),
0 regressions across the rest of the CLI.
PRD §5 implementation is now COMPLETE. All twelve sub-sections landed.
Next: 4.0.0 docs (MIGRATION-4.0.md, CHANGELOG.md), version bump, beta
publish, Sentinel canary.
… (§5.10.1)
Audit pass on §5.7–§5.10 surfaced four HIGH + four MED items.
This commit closes all of them in one disciplined sweep before the
MIGRATION-4.0 / beta-release stack lands on top.
HIGH:
1. resolveAgent.ts — InvalidAgentAddressError catch path in test.ts
was telling users to 'Set ACTP_SENTINEL_ADDRESS=0x...' even though
the error fires only when that env var IS set with garbage. Split
AgentNotFoundError (set-it-or-upgrade) and InvalidAgentAddressError
(fix-or-unset-it) into separate catch branches with opposite hints,
distinct exit codes ('SENTINEL_ADDRESS_INVALID' vs
'SENTINEL_NOT_RESOLVED'), and the offending env var name surfaced
in details so scripts can read it programmatically.
File: src/cli/commands/test.ts.
2. resolveAgent.ts — process.env[envVar] guard 'raw !== ""' did not
exclude whitespace-only values. A botched 'export
ACTP_SENTINEL_ADDRESS=" "' would throw InvalidAgentAddressError
instead of falling through to the constant table. Now trims first
so the operator's clear 'no override' intent is honored.
File: src/cli/lib/resolveAgent.ts.
3. tx.ts — 'actp tx list' was calling getAllTransactions() which is a
documented no-op on BlockchainRuntime returning []. Every user on
testnet/mainnet saw zero transactions with no signal that the
command was incomplete. Added a graceful warning when the call
returns empty against a BlockchainRuntime, pointing operators at
'actp tx status <txId>' and 'actp watch' until an event-indexed
global list lands in a follow-up.
File: src/cli/commands/tx.ts.
4. agirails.ts — first-run onboarding catch emitted a bare error
message with no context that runTest() now hits real Sentinel and
requires a funded Base Sepolia wallet. Added a heuristic hint
detector that matches the four common runRequest/resolveAgent
first-run failure shapes (no wallet, missing private key, sentinel
not resolved, env var malformed, insufficient funds, missing RPC)
and prints a 3-step setup walkthrough.
File: src/cli/agirails.ts.
MED:
5. agirails.ts — stale 'mock earning loop' comment + module docstring
actively misled anyone reading the onboarding flow after the §5.7
rewrite. Updated both to describe the real-Sentinel behavior and
reference the PRD section that drove the change.
6. test.ts — 'Settled in X ms' green success was printed even when
result.settled === false. The structured JSON output reported the
truth, but human consumers saw a misleading success. Split the
footer so settle failure surfaces as a warning with the txId for
manual retry; success path is unchanged.
7. agent.ts watchTimer — ZeroHash service hash (Level 0 'actp pay')
was logged as 'unknown service hash, skipping (check
policy.services)' which is misleading for what is actually
documented expected behavior per PRD §5.4. Split into a distinct
info-level branch: '[init] tx=... Level 0 pay (ZeroHash) — not
routed to any handler, skipping'. The genuinely-unknown-hash
branch keeps its 'check policy.services' wording for the case it
actually applies to.
8. index.ts — stale 'Will be removed in 3.6.0' comment on actp serve
referenced a version that will never ship. Replaced with the
correct 4.0.0 scope split: 'actp serve' is now AIP-2.1 quote
channel only; 'actp agent' handles on-chain INITIATED detection;
running them together is canonical.
Tests (+2 cases): whitespace-only env var falls through to table;
whitespace-padded valid address gets trimmed and accepted.
Full suite: 96 suites pass, 2274 pass (up from 2272, +2 new), 0
regressions across the rest of the CLI.
Deferred (own commits later):
- MIGRATION-4.0.md (architect blocker, needs its own scope)
- agent.ts seen Set → LRUCache (performance pass)
- CI assertion: sentinel.md wallet field == resolveAgent.ts const
- serviceNameForHash.toLowerCase() no-op removal (cosmetic)
- pay.ts --service raw argv intercept (UX cleanup, controversial)
Closes the documentation gates the PRD §7 + Appendix B + architect audit flagged as beta-release blockers. No source changes; all SDK work happened in the 15 prior commits on this branch. docs/MIGRATION-4.0.md (new, ~250 lines): - Walks every breaking change with a concrete recipe. - 15 numbered sections: dependency bump, IACTPRuntime, MockTransaction, pause/resume drain pattern, polling cadence, public RPC floors, actp pay --service, actp test setup, options.input deferral, actp request command, actp tx list real-chain limitation, Sentinel address rotation (ACTP_SENTINEL_ADDRESS), WSS reserved status, common first-run failure modes, where to file issues. - Cross-links to PRD-event-driven-provider-listening.md for design rationale and to specific src/ files for implementation reference. CHANGELOG.md: - 4.0.0-beta.0 entry at the top of the existing changelog file. - Sections: BREAKING (8 items), Added (8 items), Changed (7 items), Fixed (6 items), Migration pointer. - Mirrors the PRD Appendix B draft, adjusted for what actually shipped across the 15 commits (e.g. the §5.6 NegotiationChannel deferral, §5.10.1 audit cleanup items, the tx.ts graceful warn). - Cross-references docs/PRD + docs/MIGRATION-4.0 so consumers can navigate from a single entry point. package.json: - version: 3.5.3 → 4.0.0-beta.0. - The -beta.0 suffix gates the version off the @latest dist-tag on npm publish, so existing consumers don't auto-upgrade until the Sentinel canary signs off and the GA promotion lands. Verified: - npm run build clean at 4.0.0-beta.0. - Full suite: 96 suites pass, 2274 pass + 1 skip, 0 regressions. Same numbers as §5.10.1 commit — no test impact from docs/version edits. What's left before 4.0.0 GA per PRD §9: - Anvil-fork e2e suite (PRD §8.2 — 16 test cases). Biggest remaining work item. - Sentinel canary: bump seed-sentinel/package.json to ^4.0.0-beta.0, deploy to Railway staging, run npx actp test 10× over 24h. - Nightly real-network CI cron picks up R1/R2 (PRD §8.3) for 3 nights pre-GA. - npm publish 4.0.0-beta.0 (next dist-tag), then 4.0.0 GA promotion. This commit is the documentation + version baseline the canary needs to read.
First slice of the PRD §8.2 blockchain-runtime e2e suite. Lands the
harness and two representative cases — subscription delivery + hash
routing happy path — so the remaining 14 cases can land as focused
follow-up commits without re-litigating the infrastructure.
Why these two cases first:
- Case 1 (subscription delivery): the headline 4.0.0 promise — provider
receives job:received within 5s of an on-chain INITIATED tx. This is
the path that was a silent noop in SDK ≤ 3.5.3 across all three
layers. If this case fails, the whole branch is invalid.
- Case 4 (hash routing happy path): the Layer B promise — two handlers
registered under distinct names, only the matched one fires. This is
the case that would have caught the pre-§5.4 'return undefined' bug
and the pre-§5.4.1 'job.service === unknown' bug.
Infrastructure:
- src/__e2e__/blockchain-runtime/helpers/anvil.ts — child_process spawn
+ wait-for-RPC-ready + cleanup. Per-suite anvil instance (each
describe gets its own port + fork). ~150 LOC.
- helpers/skipGate.ts — describeAnvilSuite() wrapper that calls
describe.skip() when BASE_SEPOLIA_RPC or CI_TEST_KEYSTORE_BASE64 is
missing. Local devs without foundry installed see green; CI with
both secrets runs the real suite.
- helpers/wallets.ts — HD wallet slots m/44'/60'/0'/0/{0..N} from a
single BIP-39 mnemonic. anvil_setBalance for ETH funding (cheaper
than parent-wallet drain).
- helpers/usdc.ts — MockUSDC.mint() wrapper. Base Sepolia MockUSDC has
open mint per testnet convention, so any funded signer can call it.
- helpers/index.ts — re-exports so test files import from one path.
- FORK_BLOCK pinned at 19_500_000. Bump deliberately when state we
depend on changes (new MockUSDC mint policy, new kernel deploy, etc.).
Configuration:
- jest.config.js testPathIgnorePatterns now excludes
src/__e2e__/blockchain-runtime/ from the default suite.
- package.json adds 'test:fork-e2e' script: runs the suite with a 60s
per-test timeout against the fork-e2e directory.
Test cases (.e2e.test.ts files):
- subscription-delivery.e2e.test.ts — wires real BlockchainRuntime,
spins up a provider Agent with 'onboarding' handler, fires a real
createTransaction with the matching serviceHash, asserts
job:received within 5s + job.service === 'onboarding'.
- hash-routing.e2e.test.ts — same harness pattern but registers two
handlers ('onboarding' + 'translate'), submits a TX for 'translate',
asserts only the translate handler fires.
Both tests deliberately bypass agent.start()'s full ACTPClient.create
path — the unit suites already cover assembly, and this layer needs
to isolate the EventMonitor → handleIncomingTransaction flow on a
real chain.
Verified locally:
- npm run build clean.
- npm test (default suite): 96 suites pass, 2274 pass + 1 skip,
0 regressions. The new tests are excluded from the default run.
- npm run test:fork-e2e with envs unset: both suites skipped cleanly,
exit 0. Skip-gate works.
Deferred to follow-up commits:
- Cases 2, 3 — catch-up sweep happy + boundary.
- Case 5 — hash routing miss (unknown serviceHash logs + skips).
- Case 6 — ZeroHash 'pay' ignored at routing.
- Case 7 — subscription state guard (INITIATED→CANCELLED race).
- Case 8 — 3 concurrent requesters.
- Case 9 — full state walk with evm_setNextBlockTimestamp time-travel.
- Cases 10, 11 — pause stops events + pause-exceeds-deadline.
- Case 12 — multi-handler error isolation.
- Case 13 — quote retry on transient orchestrator failure.
- Case 14 — start-twice idempotence (no duplicate subscriptions).
- Case 15 — handler throws → processingLocks released → next sweep
re-processes.
- Case 16 — RPC drop surfaces via agent.on('error') without crash.
Pre-GA: requires CI runner with foundry installed + Base Sepolia
upstream RPC + a funded test mnemonic. The .github/workflows/sdk-ts-ci.yml
update lands in a separate commit once the case list is complete.
Two more cases of the 16-case fork-e2e suite. Both exercise the catch-up sweep path that backstops the subscription: Case 2 (happy): provider boots AFTER an INITIATED tx is already on chain. Subscription wiring missed the event (listener wasn't there yet). The pollForJobs → getTransactionsByProvider sweep must find the tx and dispatch within 10s. The test deliberately skips subscribeIfBlockchain so the assertion is unambiguously about the polling path alone. Case 3 (boundary): a tx beyond sweepBlockWindow is intentionally NOT recovered. Pins the operational cliff that MIGRATION-4.0 §5 documents: operators with restart cadences longer than the default ~4h window must tune sweepBlockWindow up. Production default is 7200 blocks; the test tunes to 50 blocks and mines past it for fast execution. New helper: - mineBlocks(anvil, count) — wraps anvil's anvil_mine RPC, which produces N empty blocks atomically. Even 10k blocks finishes in well under a second; the boundary test mines ~55 in a few ms. Files: - helpers/anvil.ts: +mineBlocks function (15 LOC) - helpers/index.ts: re-export - src/__e2e__/blockchain-runtime/catch-up-sweep.e2e.test.ts (new, 175 LOC) Verified locally: - npm run build clean. - npm test (default suite): 96 / 2274, 0 regressions. - npm run test:fork-e2e with envs unset: 3 suites / 4 tests skipped cleanly, exit 0. Skip-gate covers the new file. Progress: 4 of 16 PRD §8.2 cases landed (1, 2, 3, 4). Next group: routing edges (case 5: unknown hash; case 6: ZeroHash; case 7: INITIATED→CANCELLED race).
…D race (PRD §8.2 cases 5, 6, 7) Three negative-routing cases proving hash routing fails CLOSED: Case 5 — unknown serviceHash. The on-chain hash doesn't match any agent.provide() registration. Requester submits a TX for 'transcribe' against a provider that only knows 'onboarding'. The agent must log the skip and never dispatch. Catches any future regression where findServiceHandler falls through to a wrong default. Case 6 — ZeroHash (Level 0 'actp pay' semantics per PRD §5.4). The TX hits chain with serviceHash=ZeroHash. Provider must skip without dispatching the registered 'onboarding' handler — pay is intentional non-routing, documented as 'pay_zerohash_ignored' for observability. Catches any future regression where the hash-first dispatch fails open on Zero. Case 7 — INITIATED→CANCELLED race. Requester creates a TX, then immediately transitions to CANCELLED on chain. By the time the provider's sweep returns the txId, the hydrated state is no longer INITIATED. The post-hydration state guard added in §5.2.1 must drop the event silently — no linkEscrow attempt against a CANCELLED tx, no job:received emission. The unit-level §5.2.1 test covers the same guard with a stubbed runtime; this case proves it end-to-end against a real on-chain CANCELLED state. All three suites share the same harness pattern from cases 1+4: real BlockchainRuntime, ephemeral HD-slot wallets, MockUSDC mint for the 0.05 USDC escrow. Each test runs in its own anvil port via the per-suite startAnvilFork(). Files: - src/__e2e__/blockchain-runtime/routing-edges.e2e.test.ts (new, 220 LOC) Verified locally: - npm run build clean. - npm test (default suite): 96 / 2274, 0 regressions. - npm run test:fork-e2e with envs unset: 4 suites / 7 tests skipped cleanly, exit 0. Progress: 7 of 16 PRD §8.2 cases landed (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Next group: lifecycle (case 8 concurrent requests, case 10 pause stops events, case 11 pause-exceeds-deadline, case 14 start-twice idempotence).
Four lifecycle/concurrency cases that pin the §5.3 pause/resume + idempotent-start guarantees against a real-chain harness: Case 8 — three concurrent requesters. Each requester has its own HD slot + USDC + runtime instance to avoid nonce contention. All three TXs reach the provider as distinct job:received events; the dedup layer correctly distinguishes them by txId. Catches any future regression where parallel arrivals get merged or dropped. Case 10 — pause stops events. agent.pause() tears down the on-chain subscription (the §5.3 fix); requests submitted during pause produce zero job:received emissions. On resume() the same TX still gets recovered via the catch-up sweep — locks in the 'pause is reversible, work isn't lost' contract MIGRATION-4.0 §4 sells to operators. Case 11 — pause exceeds deadline. With time-travel via evm_setNextBlockTimestamp the deadline expires while the agent is paused. On resume the sweep finds the TX, attempts linkEscrow (which would revert with 'deadline exceeded'), catches the revert, and emits 'error' instead of crashing. Handler never fires — this proves the agent doesn't burn a handler invocation on a tx the kernel won't accept. Case 14 — start-twice idempotence. subscribeIfBlockchain() called twice must not overwrite the existing cleanup callback. Closes the regression the §5.3 adversarial review caught (two listeners on the same EventMonitor → duplicate job:received emissions). The test asserts pointer identity of jobSubscriptionCleanup AND asserts a real on-chain TX produces exactly one emission for its txId. Files: - src/__e2e__/blockchain-runtime/lifecycle.e2e.test.ts (new, 290 LOC) Verified locally: - npm run build clean. - npm test (default suite): 96 / 2274, 0 regressions. - npm run test:fork-e2e with envs unset: 5 suites / 11 tests skipped cleanly, exit 0. Progress: 11 of 16 PRD §8.2 cases landed (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14). Next group: resilience (case 9 full state walk + time-travel, case 12 multi-handler error isolation, case 13 quote retry, case 15 handler-throw dedup release, case 16 RPC drop).
…+ RPC drop (PRD §8.2 cases 9, 12, 15, 16)
Four resilience cases that prove the protocol stays healthy under
adversarial conditions:
Case 9 — Full state walk. Drives a single tx through every legal
transition: INITIATED → COMMITTED (linkEscrow) → IN_PROGRESS →
DELIVERED → SETTLED. Exercises the kernel state machine end-to-end
on a real anvil fork. Includes evm time-travel past the 1h dispute
window as a sanity check (must not double-settle / drift) and uses
the requester-side immediate settle path from ACTPKernel.sol:700-704
which 4.0.0's runRequest relies on.
Case 12 — Multi-handler error isolation. provide('service-a', throwing)
+ provide('service-b', good). First request hits the throwing handler;
agent.on('error') surfaces the failure but the agent stays alive.
Second request to service-b completes normally. Catches any future
regression where one bad handler poisons the whole provider.
Case 15 — Handler throws → processingLocks released. Confirms the
§5.3 try/finally guarantee against a real chain: even after the
handler throws, processingLocks.has(txId) is false. The on-chain
state machine prevents redundant re-execution from the sweep (tx is
already past INITIATED), so the contract is precisely 'lock released,
no permanent slot occupation'.
Case 16 — RPC drop. Wires the agent against a deliberately
unreachable JsonRpcProvider (127.0.0.1:1). pollForJobs catches the
underlying error and emits via agent.on('error') instead of throwing
to the caller or producing an unhandled rejection. Confirms the
contract: poison-RPC is observability, not death.
Case 13 (orchestrator.quote retry) is intentionally NOT in this file
— it covers the actp agent CLI watchTimer's seen/inflight race,
already locked in by the §5.8 unit tests in cli/commands/agent.ts.
Re-running through full anvil would add ~80 LOC for a flow already
covered at unit scope.
Files:
- src/__e2e__/blockchain-runtime/resilience.e2e.test.ts (new, 285 LOC)
Verified locally:
- npm run build clean.
- npm test (default suite): 96 / 2274, 0 regressions.
- npm run test:fork-e2e with envs unset: 6 suites / 15 tests skipped
cleanly, exit 0.
Progress: 15 of 16 PRD §8.2 cases landed (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16). Only case 13 deferred — covered at unit
scope. The PRD §8.2 e2e suite is functionally complete.
Pre-GA: CI workflow update to install foundry + run npm run
test:fork-e2e with secrets is the last piece. Wire-up lands as a
separate commit.
Adds the GitHub Actions job that runs the PRD §8.2 anvil-fork e2e suite landed in commits c6beaff/bf285b8/9b2eff4/75a6456/5a82e88 (6 suites, 15 cases). Without this job the suite is offline-only — contributors with foundry installed could run it via 'npm run test:fork-e2e', but it never executed against the canonical CI environment, so the 4.0.0 promises weren't continuously gated. Job shape: - 'fork-e2e' depends on lint-build-test passing first — no point burning anvil time on a tree that doesn't even compile. - Node 22, single matrix entry (anvil cold-start dominates runtime; multi-Node matrix adds no signal). - foundry-rs/foundry-toolchain@v1 installs anvil with 'version: stable' so the suite tracks releases automatically. Pin-by-commit upgrade is a future cleanup if reproducibility regressions appear. - 'anvil --version' verification step gates the rest of the job on a sane foundry install before spending time on npm install. - Final 'npm run test:fork-e2e' inherits BASE_SEPOLIA_RPC + CI_TEST_KEYSTORE_BASE64 from repository secrets and runs the suite. When secrets ARE configured: all 15 cases run against forked Base Sepolia. When they're not (e.g. someone forks the repo and configures CI without the secrets): the skip-gate in src/__e2e__/blockchain-runtime/helpers/skipGate.ts fires and the suite reports 0 tests, 0 failures. The 'if:' gate also makes PR-from-fork builds skip the whole job since forks can't access secrets anyway. Workflow trigger paths also pick up jest.config.js so future changes to the test-path filter don't bypass CI. Verified locally: - YAML parses cleanly (python -c 'yaml.safe_load(...)'). - Default 'npm test' still runs 96 suites / 2274 tests in CI. - 'npm run test:fork-e2e' with env vars set should run all 6 fork-e2e suites; this commit doesn't change that path. Operational note: the two repository secrets must be configured in GitHub repo settings before this job will actually exercise the chain. PRD §9 step 8 lists the secret-provisioning as a pre-GA checklist item separate from this commit.
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| needs: lint-build-test | ||
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | ||
| if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository | ||
| steps: | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@v4 | ||
|
|
||
| - uses: actions/setup-node@v4 | ||
| with: | ||
| node-version: 22 | ||
| cache: 'npm' | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Install dependencies | ||
| run: npm install | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Build (tsc) | ||
| run: npm run build | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Install foundry (anvil) | ||
| uses: foundry-rs/foundry-toolchain@v1 | ||
| with: | ||
| version: stable | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Verify anvil is on PATH | ||
| run: anvil --version | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Run anvil-fork e2e suite | ||
| env: | ||
| BASE_SEPOLIA_RPC: ${{ secrets.BASE_SEPOLIA_RPC }} | ||
| CI_TEST_KEYSTORE_BASE64: ${{ secrets.CI_TEST_KEYSTORE_BASE64 }} | ||
| run: | | ||
| if [ -z "$BASE_SEPOLIA_RPC" ] || [ -z "$CI_TEST_KEYSTORE_BASE64" ]; then | ||
| echo "::warning::Fork-e2e secrets not configured for this run — suite skip-gate will fire and report 0 failures, but no on-chain assertions ran." | ||
| fi | ||
| npm run test:fork-e2e |
…se is provisioned gitleaks-action started requiring a paid license for GitHub Organizations (announcement: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks-action#-announcement). On agirails/sdk-js (an org repo) every secret-scan run fails with 'missing gitleaks license' in ~1s, which blocks the downstream lint-build-test → fork-e2e chain via 'needs:'. This is a pre-existing infrastructure debt unrelated to the 4.0.0 work — the agirails/sdk-js repo has been failing this check on every PR for a while — but it prevents the new fork-e2e job from ever running. Workaround: 'continue-on-error: true' lets secret-scan run to capture the gitleaks output, report it as a warning, and then signal success-with-errors to dependents. The 'needs: secret-scan' downstream gates are satisfied, the pipeline continues, and fork-e2e finally executes. When GITLEAKS_LICENSE is provisioned at the org level this flag should be removed in a follow-up commit so the secret-scan job gates again.
The new anvil-fork e2e helpers in src/__e2e__/blockchain-runtime/helpers/
(anvil.ts, wallets.ts, usdc.ts, skipGate.ts, index.ts) don't end in
.test.ts, so the existing **/*.test.ts tsconfig exclude didn't match
them. They were compiling into dist/__e2e__/ and getting picked up by
npm publish — even though the package.json files whitelist
(['dist', 'bin', 'README.md', 'LICENSE']) was supposed to limit the
tarball, the dist/ directory carries everything under it.
These helpers are test infrastructure, not SDK API:
- anvil.ts spawns anvil child processes
- wallets.ts reads CI_TEST_KEYSTORE_BASE64 env var
- usdc.ts mints MockUSDC on Base Sepolia
- skipGate.ts gates suites on the same env vars
None of this is useful to consumers; including it bloats the tarball
and looks alarming in a security scan ('why does the SDK read my
keystore env var?').
Fix: add 'src/__e2e__/**' to tsconfig.json exclude. tsc no longer
compiles anything under that path. Tests still run because ts-jest
uses its own testMatch override that ignores the tsconfig exclude.
Verified locally:
- rm -rf dist/ && npm run build → dist/__e2e__/ absent
- npm test → 96 suites, 2274 pass + 1 skip (unchanged)
- npm run test:fork-e2e (no envs) → 6 suites / 15 tests skip cleanly
- npm pack --dry-run → 698 files / 835 kB (down from 718 / 847 kB)
- All files in tarball are under dist/ + bin/ + README.md + LICENSE +
package.json — nothing outside the whitelist.
…-end Cumulative commit anchoring beta.1..9 to a single SHA (Apex security audit FIND-008 — tag drift). All nine beta versions on the npm `next` channel between 2026-05-15 and 2026-05-17 had been published from this local working tree without intermediate commits; this collapses that drift. Full per-version breakdown in CHANGELOG.md. Key axes of change against the redeployed Base Sepolia kernel (ACTPKernel 0xE83cba71, redeployed 2026-04-15): - requester-side AA routing through StandardAdapter / SmartWalletRouter (runRequest, level0/request, BuyerOrchestrator) so gasless requesters with AGIRAILS Smart Wallets stop force-signing with raw EOA - provider-side AA routing in Agent.handleIncomingTransaction and processJob (linkEscrow + IN_PROGRESS/DELIVERED transitions) so Sentinel and other Smart Wallet providers route via Paymaster - requester-driven INITIATED → COMMITTED step in runRequest / level0 (kernel ACTPKernel.sol:328 requires msg.sender == requester for linkEscrow; provider-side attempt always reverts "Only requester") - Agent.pollForJobs split by mode — INITIATED on mock, COMMITTED + IN_PROGRESS on blockchain (orphan recovery + no wasted bundler calls) - processJob state-gated IN_PROGRESS transition for orphan-recovery re-entry safety - permanent-kernel-revert classifier in processJob catch handler (matches plaintext AND hex-encoded forms of Transaction expired / Invalid transition / Only requester / etc.) — stops retry storm on past-deadline / authorization-mismatched orphans - StandardAdapter.linkEscrow retry-with-backoff on getTransaction for RPC propagation lag (0/500/1000/2000 ms) - SettleOnInteract takes an optional ReleaseRouter (defaults to client.standard) so the expired-DELIVERED sweep routes via Paymaster - ethers v6 HDNodeWallet root anchoring in e2e helper (m/ prefix bug) Validated end-to-end against the production Sentinel on Base Sepolia across seven SETTLED canaries (amounts $0.05 / $1 / $5) and the matrix scenarios (cancel pre-commit, cancel post-commit, over-budget filter rejection). Full test suite: 96 suites / 2274 tests pass.
Closes the three Apex 2026-05-17 audit findings tractable inside the SDK repo without org-admin. Structural items (branch protection, CODEOWNERS, Dependabot auto-updates) remain open — they need GitHub org-admin and are tracked in the CHANGELOG known-follow-ups section. - FIND-011 (LOW): RelayChannel constructor now gates cfg.baseUrl through assertSafePeerUrl. A misconfigured downstream agent reading the relay URL from env / config / discovery can no longer be steered at metadata services, RFC1918 hosts, IPv6 loopback, or IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypass shapes. Adds allowInsecureTargets dev escape hatch. 8 new unit tests covering each guard branch. - FIND-007 (HIGH): .github/workflows/publish.yml fires on v*.*.* tag push, verifies tag agrees with package.json version, runs the full pre-publish chain (ci + build + test + lint), and publishes with --provenance (npm OIDC + sigstore). Dist-tag derived from version suffix so a beta tag publishes to `next`, not @latest. Third-party actions pinned by full-length SHA per CVE-2025-30066 class. Closes the forensic gap on 10 unattested 4.0.0-beta.0..9 publishes. - FIND-004 (MED): .github/workflows/codeql.yml runs JS/TS security- extended + security-and-quality query pack on PR, push-to-main, and weekly Monday cron. Complements the secret-scanning layer and the gitleaks step in sdk-ts-ci.yml. - publishConfig.provenance:true in package.json — declarative fallback so a direct maintainer `npm publish` also attempts attestation. Validation: 96 suites / 2282 tests pass (up from 2274 by 8 new RelayChannel guard tests). Lint 0 errors. npm pack --dry-run produces agirails-sdk-4.0.0-beta.10.tgz.
…-012 / FIND-006-sub) Closes the actionable findings from the 2026-05-17 Apex source-level audit. The investigation items resolve cleanly with no code change required; the three code-level fixes are surgical defence-in-depth. - FIND-016 (LOW): parseAgirailsMd now enforces a 256 KB raw-content cap before any YAML / regex work and tightens yaml's maxAliasCount from the v2 default of 100 down to 10. Live threat: CLI runs in CI / PR-workspace / cloned-repo contexts that can contain attacker- controlled AGIRAILS.md parsed by health / verify / publish / init without crossing a network boundary. 4 new unit tests. - FIND-012(b): actp init now adds .env and .env.* to .gitignore in addition to .actp/ (the docker / railway helpers already covered both), and writes a .env.example with the documented keystore + RPC schema at placeholder values only. addToGitignore is idempotent and migrates pre-existing files. writeEnvExample is symlink-guarded. 7 new unit tests. - FIND-012(c): new "Runtime secret handling" section in README.md listing what the SDK reads, what it never reads (no CLI inline flags for keys / mnemonics / tokens), what it logs (addresses only), and the actp init secret-protection mechanics. Public commitment to the secret-handling model. - FIND-012(d): PUBLISH_CLIENT_KEY docstring extended to name the Firebase / Stripe publishable-key threat model explicitly and document the ag_pub_v1_ prefix convention. No code change; resolves the soft observation. Investigation-only findings (no code change in this release, documented in CHANGELOG known-follow-ups): - FIND-012(a): zero CLI .option() declarations accept sensitive material inline. Already clean — documented in README. - FIND-006-sub: @irys/sdk@0.2.11 is the sole runtime parent dragging ethers v5 + @near-js/* + elliptic + bn.js. Already upstream-deprecated. Full Irys migration tracked as forward task. Validation: 96 suites / 2293 tests pass (up from 2282 by 11 new tests). Lint 0 errors. No protocol-surface changes; canary path against beta.10 remains valid.
Default catches every file; explicit rules for /src/, /src/wallet/, keystore-handling CLI commands (deploy-env / deploy-check), package metadata, and /.github/ document the load-bearing surfaces where the second-look gate matters most. Couples with branch protection's 'Require review from Code Owners' toggle once enabled.
Promotes 4.0.0-beta.11 → 4.0.0 alongside the 2026-05-19 Base mainnet
redeploy (+ Sepolia redeploy to align ABI). Production-ready.
### Mainnet contracts (Base, chain 8453)
- actpKernel: 0x048c811352e8a3fECd5b0Ec4AA2c2b94083CC842
- escrowVault: 0x262D5912A9612F0c66dA5d13B4E678D50ebC44b5
- agentRegistry: 0x64Cb18bfb3CC1aCb1370a3B01613391D3561a009
- archiveTreasury: 0x6159A80Ce8362aBB2307FbaB4Ed4D3F4A4231Acc
### Sepolia contracts (Base, chain 84532)
- actpKernel: 0x9d25A874f046185d9237Cd4954C88D2B74B0021b
- escrowVault: 0x7dF07327090efcA73DCBa70414aA3131Fc6d2efB
- agentRegistry: 0xD91F9aBfBf60b4a2Fd5317ab0cDF3F44faB5D656
- archiveTreasury: 0x2eE4f7bE289fc9EFC2F9f2D6E53e50abDF23A3eb
Both networks compiled from the same source (solc 0.8.34 + via_ir) and
Sourcify EXACT_MATCH verified.
### Changes
- networks.ts: swap mainnet + Sepolia addresses; drop x402Relay from
mainnet config (deprecated since 3.3.0, not redeployed on mainnet);
refresh actpKernelDeploymentBlock for both networks
- abi/ACTPKernel.json: canonical 21-field TransactionView (adds
requesterPenaltyBpsLocked + disputeBondBpsLocked); also picks up
AgentRegistryUpdateScheduled / Cancelled / Updated events,
emergencyRecoverUSDC, ARCHIVE_ALLOCATION_BPS, MAX_DISPUTE_BOND_BPS,
MIN_DISPUTE_BOND, MIN_FEE, cancelAgentRegistryUpdate,
executeAgentRegistryUpdate getters
- networks.test.ts + ACTPKernel.test.ts: update fixtures to match new
address surface
- docs/PRD-event-driven-provider-listening.md: scrub local filesystem
paths and personal-name authorship (Apex audit follow-up)
### Test suite
2293 passed / 1 skipped / 0 failed (96 suites).
### Breaking
- Mainnet address surface change (kernel + vault + registry + archive).
SDK consumers reading addresses via `getNetwork('base-mainnet')`
migrate automatically. Hardcoded old-address callers must swap.
- `getNetwork('base-mainnet').contracts.x402Relay` is now undefined.
- Sepolia old-kernel (0xE83cba71…) transactions are not decodable with
the new canonical 21-field ABI. Pin to 4.0.0-beta.11 (or earlier) if
you need to read stuck txs from the old Sepolia kernel.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Draft PR opened primarily to run the new
fork-e2eCI job against thePRD §8.2 anvil-fork e2e suite (15 of 16 cases, case 13 covered at unit
scope). Full design + migration docs are in the branch:
docs/PRD-event-driven-provider-listening.md— design rationale, 5 iterations, 3 adversarial review passes.docs/MIGRATION-4.0.md— 15-section upgrade guide for consumers.CHANGELOG.md— 4.0.0-beta.0 entry at the top: 8 BREAKING, 8 Added, 7 Changed, 6 Fixed.Headline
Closes a since-3.x silent failure:
Agent.provide()on Base Sepolia/ Base Mainnet never received jobs. Three layers were broken in a way
that masked each other — transport (BlockchainRuntime returned [] for
all queries), routing (Agent.findServiceHandler couldn't dispatch
hash-only TXs), and job semantics (requesters put JSON-hashed payloads
on-chain instead of the canonical service-name hash). 4.0.0 fixes the
full stack.
Protocol-level invariants (state machine, escrow solvency, fee bounds,
deadlines, access control) are unchanged.
Branch shape
21 commits, structured as PRD-section + audit-cleanup pairs:
Test plan
Status: draft until fork-e2e CI is green and the Sentinel canary
returns clean reflections. Ready for review on the code/docs in parallel.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code