coordinator attack: add clearnet/Tor attack and inconsistent round id attack

[MarnixCroes]

[yahiheb]

Nit: "anonymization" is used elsewhere in the docs.

Suggested change

	This allows the coordinator to link all communication and inputs and outputs of the coinjoin and thus complete de-anonymisation.
	This is why Wasabi communicates over Tor by default.
	- (Theoretical) Tor network-level de-anonymisation:
	Wasabi uses Tor by default, assuming that this is the most available and usable anonymous way to communicate, and that it cannot be de-anonymised at the network level.
	If Tor does not uphold these assumptions, the client could be de-anonymised.
	This allows the coordinator to link all communication and inputs and outputs of the coinjoin and thus complete de-anonymization.
	This is why Wasabi communicates over Tor by default.
	- (Theoretical) Tor network-level de-anonymization:
	Wasabi uses Tor by default, assuming that this is the most available and usable anonymous way to communicate, and that it cannot be de-anonymized at the network level.
	If Tor does not uphold these assumptions, the client could be de-anonymized.

[nothingmuch]

that doesn't mitigate anything because ownership proof "verification" trusts the coordinator to provide prevouts

even if they were, the round id is insufficient to ensure consistency

[turbolay]

I will wait to merge this until all known potential attacks are clarified & mitigated.
This is a task I am currently undergoing.