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fat-tire and others added 13 commits January 15, 2016 01:10
Change-Id: If9d99aa38f988a11be178f1586ab049dbcc8f42b
Change-Id: I589d556af3437e82a95959e7d287c85dd6ffbde8
Change-Id: Ic1b61b2bbb7ce74c9e9422b5e22ee9078251de21
This deliberately changes the behavior of the per-cpuset
cpus file to not be effected by hotplug. When a cpu is offlined,
it will be removed from the cpuset/cpus file. When a cpu is onlined,
if the cpuset originally requested that that cpu was part of the cpuset, that
cpu will be restored to the cpuset. The cpus files still
have to be hierachical, but the ranges no longer have to be out of
the currently online cpus, just the physically present cpus.

Change-Id: I3efbae24a1f6384be1e603fb56f0d3baef61d924
Thanks to Pafcholini for catching this.

Change-Id: Iccdd69e9e38b2f73a5ea42e16c5062914f046871
If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stddef.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
	{
		int i = 0;
		key_serial_t serial;

		serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
				"leaked-keyring");
		if (serial < 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
			   KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
			serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
					"leaked-keyring");
			if (serial < 0) {
				perror("keyctl");
				return -1;
			}
		}

		return 0;
	}

If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:

3f3d898f I--Q---   100 perm 3f3f0000     0     0 keyring   leaked-keyring: empty

with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning.  If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.

Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Change-Id: If8c09b76ab07f371418eab524a5cf5631dea53a2
Update cpu.c to keep CPU cores 0 and 1 always on
…tomic

pipe_iov_copy_{from,to}_user() may be tried twice with the same iovec,
the first time atomically and the second time not.  The second attempt
needs to continue from the iovec position, pipe buffer offset and
remaining length where the first attempt failed, but currently the
pipe buffer offset and remaining length are reset.  This will corrupt
the piped data (possibly also leading to an information leak between
processes) and may also corrupt kernel memory.

This was fixed upstream by commits f0d1bec9d58d ("new helper:
copy_page_from_iter()") and 637b58c2887e ("switch pipe_read() to
copy_page_to_iter()"), but those aren't suitable for stable.  This fix
for older kernel versions was made by Seth Jennings for RHEL and I
have extracted it from their update.

CVE-2015-1805

Bug: 27275324

Change-Id: I459adb9076fcd50ff1f1c557089c4e421b036ec4
References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1202855
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 85c34d007116f8a8aafb173966a605fb03532f45)
Change-Id: Idecd984814dbd4bfd2432150ddd0b10b0e675e2a
Validate the ashmem memory entry against f_op pointer
rather then comparing its name with path of the dentry.

This is to avoid any invalid access to ashmem area in cases
where some one deliberately set the dentry name to /ashmem.

Change-Id: I74e50cd244f68cb13009cf2355e528485f4de34b
Signed-off-by: Sunil Khatri <sunilkh@codeaurora.org>
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7 participants