fix(security): [HIGH] resolve host header injection vulnerability#30
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| BREVO_EMAIL_FROM_ADDRESS: str = os.getenv("BREVO_EMAIL_FROM_ADDRESS", "noreply@example.com") | ||
| BREVO_EMAIL_FROM_NAME: str = os.getenv("BREVO_EMAIL_FROM_NAME", "BookLib") | ||
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| app_base_url: str = os.getenv("APP_BASE_URL", "") |
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Isn't it possible to extract the base url from another place instead of a new ENV var?
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Tugamer89
temporarily deployed
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fix/host-header-injection-1446097122364347027 - booklib PR #30
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Severity: HIGH
Vulnerability: Host Header Injection. The
request.base_urlwas being used to construct password reset and account verification links. An attacker could craft a request with a maliciousHostheader, causing the application to send these links pointing to the attacker's server, leading to potential account takeover.Impact: Attackers can potentially take over accounts by capturing password reset tokens or verification tokens.
Fix: Added an
app_base_urlconfiguration variable retrieved fromAPP_BASE_URL. Inroutes/auth.py, the code now prioritizes this configured URL over the user-providedHostheader when building links.Verification: The change was verified using a script crafting a mock request with an
evil.comhost header. It was confirmed that ifapp_base_urlis configured, it is used instead of the malicious header.PR created automatically by Jules for task 1446097122364347027 started by @Tugamer89