Retrieving Bitlocker and LUKS keys from a dTPM using SPI, I2C or LPC communications requires an understanding of the specific protocol supported by a dTPM chip, as well as the device's make and model. Proper documentation and research are essential for successful key retrieval. This repo is to collaborate all the awesome resources and information hopefully into one place!
NOTE: I'm 100% sure that there is alot of blogs/data missing here, but please if you know of any and want to contribute, please DO a PR!
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a hardware-based security chip that is often used to store encryption keys securely, including Bitlocker keys and Luks used for full disk encryption in Windows and Linux environments. Retrieving these keys from a dTPM can be achieved through various communication channels, although the specific method may vary depending on the device's make and model.
| Make | Model | Model Number | TPM | Chipset | Protocol | Location | Debug Headers | Blog/Research | Extractable |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lenovo | Thinkpad | L440 | 1.2 | P24JPVSP | LPC | Under Keyboard | Yes | Blog | Yes |
| Lenovo | X1 Carbon | Gen 11 | 2.0 | ST33TPHF2XSPI | SPI | Under Motherboard | Test Pads | @NoobieDog | Yes |
| Lenovo | T460 | BT462 NM-A581 rev.2 | 1.2 | SLB9670VQ1.2 | SPI | Under Motherboard | Extractable via BIOS Chip | @zaphoxx | Yes |
| Lenovo | Thinkpad | X380 Yoga | 1.2/2.0 | P68HAHB5 | SPI | Under Motherboard | Test Pads | Github | Yes |
| Lenovo | Thinkpad | T470 | 2.0 | ST33HTPH2E32AHA6 | SPI | Motherboard (QFN package) | Extractable via BIOS Chip (U49) SOIC8 | @lowercase_drm | Yes |
| Dell | Latitude | E7450 | 1.2 | AT97SC3205 | SPI | Under Motherboard | No | @SecurityJon | Yes |
| Dell | Latitude | E5470 | 2.0 | NPCT650JAOYX | SPI | Motherboard | Yes | Blog | Yes |
| Dell | Latitude | E5450 | 1.2 | AT97SC3205 | SPI | Motherboard | Yes | Blog | Yes |
| Dell | Latitude | 3410 | 2.0 | NPCT750JABYX | SPI | Under Motherboard | Extractable via BIOS chip (U2501) SOIC8 | @lowercase_drm | Yes |
| Dell | Latitude | 5320 | 2.0 | ST33TPHF2XSPI | SPI | Under Motherboard (U9101) | Extractable via BIOS chip (U2501) WSON8 | @decrazyo | Yes |
| Dell | Latitude | 5420 | 2.0 | ? | SPI | Under Motherboard | Extractable via BIOS chip (UC2) WSON8 | @lowercase_drm | Yes |
| Dell | Latitude | 5431 | 2.0 | ? | SPI | ? (UZ4) | Extractable via BIOS chip (UC2) WSON8 | @decrazyo | Yes |
| Dell | Latitude | 9420 | 2.0 | ST33TPHF2XSPI | SPI | Under Motherboard | BIOS (UH8) and TPM are under the motherboard | @lowercase_drm | Yes |
| Dell | Pro 14 Plus | PB14250 | 2.0 | ST33HTPH2X32AHE4 | SPI | Under Motherboard | Extractable via BIOS chip (UC2) WSON8 | @lowercase_drm | Yes |
| Dell | Pro 16 Plus | PB16250 | 2.0 | ST33HTPH2X32AHE4 | SPI | Under Motherboard | BIOS and TPM are under the motherboard | @lowercase_drm | Yes |
| Dell | Precision | 3490 | 2.0 | ST33TPHF2XSPI | SPI | ? (UK4) | Extractable via BIOS chip (UC2) WSON8 | @decrazyo | Yes |
| Microsoft | Surface Pro 3 | 2.0 | SLB9665TT2.0 | LPC | Under Battery | No | Blog | Yes | |
| Asus | TPM-M R2.0 | 2.0 | SLB9665TT2.0 | LPC | - | Yes | Video | Yes | |
| HP | Elite | 640 g9 | 2.0 | SLB9670 | SPI | - | Yes | - | Yes |
| HP | Elite | 830 G7 | 2.0 | SLB9670VQ | SPI | Under Motherboard (QFN package) | Extractable via 25Q256JVEN chip WSON8 | @lowercase_drm | Yes |
| HP | Elite | 840 G6 | 2.0 | SLB9670VQ | SPI | Motherboard (U3500) | Extractable via BIOS chip (U367) WSON8 | POST CyberForce | Yes |
| HP | Elite | 1040 G3 | 2.0 | SLB9670VQ | SPI | Under Motherboard (QFN package) | Extractable via BIOS Chip (U23) SOIC8 | @lowercase_drm | Yes |
| HP | Elite | 645 G10 | 2.0 | ? | SPI | ? | Extractable via BIOS chip WSON8 | @decrazyo | Yes |
| HP | Elite | 1040 G10 | 2.0 | NPCT760HABYX | SPI | Under Motherboard | Extractable via 25Q256JVEN (chip U367) | @lowercase_drm | Yes |
| HP | ProBook | 4 G1 | 2.0 | NPCT760HABYX | SPI | Under Motherboard | Extractable via BIOS Chip | @gquere blog | Yes |
| Moxa | UC-1222A | Secure Edition | 2.0 | SLB9670 | SPI | Under Motherboard | No | Blog | Yes |
For further information and detailed instructions, refer to the provided blog posts and research documents.
TPM-sniffing with Saleae logic analyzer-2025
Privilege escalation through TPM Sniffing when BitLocker PIN is enabled
Stealing the Bitlocker key from a TPM
Microsoft bitLocker bypasses are practical
A Deep Dive into TPM-based BitLocker Drive Encryption
Extracting BitLocker keys from a TPM
Bypassing Bitlocker using a cheap logic analyzer on a Lenovo laptop
From Stolen Laptop to Inside the Company Network
Sniffing Bitlocker Keys on the SPI Bus
TPM 2.0: Extracting Bitlocker keys through SPI
Understanding TPM Sniffing Attacks
Breaking Bitlocker: Bypassing the Windows Disk Encryption
TPM Sniffing Attacks Against Non-Bitlocker Targets
Sniff, there leaks my BitLocker key
BitCracker: BitLocker meets GPUs
CVE-2026-0714: TPM Sniffing LUKS Keys on an Embedded Device
A list of awesome tools for sniffing TPM data are listed below.
Hands-on-security Bitlocker/TPM Hardware training Course
The only mitigation for this attack is to enable BitLocker with a PIN OR security key which is adds "Preboot Authentication”. The sniffable key isnt released until after the correct pin is entered. Enterprises rarely use the PIN or security key because it’s inconvenient for users, they need to enter the unlock PIN then their normal user password.