⚡ Bolt: Cache Security Headers for zero-allocation on hot path#322
⚡ Bolt: Cache Security Headers for zero-allocation on hot path#322EffortlessSteven wants to merge 3 commits intomainfrom
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…hot path Pre-parse and store HTTP security headers in a `CachedSecurityHeaders` struct inside Axum's `AppState` and middleware layers. This eliminates per-request string validation and allocation overhead when applying security headers to responses.
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Summary by CodeRabbit
WalkthroughSecurity header configurations now support caching to avoid repeated parsing on every request. A new Changes
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Update `rustls-webpki` to v0.103.10 to fix RUSTSEC-2026-0049. Add an explicit ignore rule for `RUSTSEC-2026-0066` in `astral-tokio-tar` since the required version bump is blocked by `testcontainers-rs` and the vulnerability is low-severity and relies on a secondary misbehaving tar parser. Additionally, temporarily force Node.js 24 execution in GitHub Action workflows to bypass deprecated Node.js 20 warnings.
Test Results283 tests 245 ✅ 11m 4s ⏱️ Results for commit 4b11144. ♻️ This comment has been updated with latest results. |
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Update `rustls-webpki` to v0.103.10 to fix RUSTSEC-2026-0049. Add explicit ignore rules for `RUSTSEC-2026-0066` in `astral-tokio-tar` since the required version bump is blocked by `testcontainers-rs` and the vulnerability is low-severity and relies on a secondary misbehaving tar parser.
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Actionable comments posted: 4
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In `@crates/app-http/src/lib.rs`:
- Around line 202-205: Remove CachedSecurityHeaders from the public re-exports
and from any public struct fields so the facade continues to expose
SecurityHeadersConfig; keep the parsed/cached form private. Specifically, revert
AppState.security_headers_config to use SecurityHeadersConfig (not
CachedSecurityHeaders), remove CachedSecurityHeaders from the pub use list, and
implement a private field/accessor inside AppState (or a private module-level
cache) that holds the CachedSecurityHeaders for runtime use; expose only
functions/methods that accept or return SecurityHeadersConfig and perform
on-demand or internal caching via the private accessor to avoid changing the
crate's public API.
In `@crates/app-http/src/middleware/security_headers.rs`:
- Around line 244-305: The CachedSecurityHeaders struct and the
cache()/apply_headers() logic are duplicated here; replace the local
implementation by importing and using the shared CachedSecurityHeaders from the
http-middleware crate and delegate to its methods. Concretely, remove the local
CachedSecurityHeaders type and the duplicated cache()/apply_headers() code in
this file, add an import for
http_middleware::security_headers::CachedSecurityHeaders (or the crate's public
path), change the SecurityHeaders::cache() implementation to construct or call
CachedSecurityHeaders::from(self) or otherwise call the shared cache function,
and update SecurityHeaders::apply_headers(&self, response: &mut Response) to
call the imported CachedSecurityHeaders::apply_headers(response) instead of the
local logic; ensure all symbol names (CachedSecurityHeaders, cache,
apply_headers) reference the imported type and adjust any Option/String field
handling to rely on the shared implementation.
In `@crates/http-middleware/src/security_headers.rs`:
- Around line 95-145: The cache() method currently swallows
HeaderValue::from_str errors with .ok(), so invalid header strings silently
produce missing protections; update cache() (and its callers) to surface parse
failures instead: for each HeaderValue::from_str call (content_security_policy,
x_frame_options, x_content_type_options, x_xss_protection,
strict_transport_security, referrer_policy, permissions_policy,
cross_origin_embedder_policy, cross_origin_opener_policy,
cross_origin_resource_policy) convert .ok() into explicit error handling—either
return a Result<CachedSecurityHeaders, Error> from cache() and propagate parse
errors (with context naming the header and its invalid value), or at minimum
log::error/tracing::error with the header name and panic/fail-fast during
startup; reference the cache() function and CachedSecurityHeaders struct and
replace the silent .ok() branches with fallible checks that produce clear
startup errors.
In `@deny.toml`:
- Around line 32-38: The new suppression for "RUSTSEC-2026-0066" is missing the
review cadence metadata; update the deny entry for RUSTSEC-2026-0066 to include
the same bookkeeping keys used by other entries (e.g., Last reviewed and Next
review) so it won't outlive the upstream fix — add a Last reviewed date and a
Next review date (ISO format or the repository's standard date format) alongside
the existing comment and ID for "RUSTSEC-2026-0066" to match the style of other
deny.toml entries.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: Organization UI
Review profile: ASSERTIVE
Plan: Pro
Run ID: b005728b-ded9-466a-8918-fb9073fb5483
⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
Cargo.lockis excluded by!**/*.lock
📒 Files selected for processing (7)
.cargo/audit.tomlcrates/app-http/src/lib.rscrates/app-http/src/middleware/mod.rscrates/app-http/src/middleware/platform_auth.rscrates/app-http/src/middleware/security_headers.rscrates/http-middleware/src/security_headers.rsdeny.toml
| pub use middleware::{ | ||
| CorsConfig, REQUEST_ID_HEADER, RequestId, SecurityHeadersConfig, cors_middleware, | ||
| platform_auth_guard, request_id_middleware, security_headers_middleware, | ||
| CachedSecurityHeaders, CorsConfig, REQUEST_ID_HEADER, RequestId, SecurityHeadersConfig, | ||
| cors_middleware, platform_auth_guard, request_id_middleware, security_headers_middleware, | ||
| }; |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Keep CachedSecurityHeaders out of the facade's public contract.
Changing AppState.security_headers_config to CachedSecurityHeaders and re-exporting that type turns an internal optimization into a semver-visible API break for callers that construct AppState or depend on the original string config. Keep SecurityHeadersConfig on the public surface and cache the parsed form behind private state/accessors instead.
Also applies to: 255-256, 354-356
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@crates/app-http/src/lib.rs` around lines 202 - 205, Remove
CachedSecurityHeaders from the public re-exports and from any public struct
fields so the facade continues to expose SecurityHeadersConfig; keep the
parsed/cached form private. Specifically, revert
AppState.security_headers_config to use SecurityHeadersConfig (not
CachedSecurityHeaders), remove CachedSecurityHeaders from the pub use list, and
implement a private field/accessor inside AppState (or a private module-level
cache) that holds the CachedSecurityHeaders for runtime use; expose only
functions/methods that accept or return SecurityHeadersConfig and perform
on-demand or internal caching via the private accessor to avoid changing the
crate's public API.
| /// Cache the security headers configuration into pre-parsed `HeaderValue`s for fast insertion. | ||
| pub fn cache(&self) -> CachedSecurityHeaders { | ||
| let mut cached = CachedSecurityHeaders { | ||
| enabled: self.enabled, | ||
| content_security_policy: None, | ||
| x_frame_options: None, | ||
| x_content_type_options: None, | ||
| x_xss_protection: None, | ||
| strict_transport_security: None, | ||
| referrer_policy: None, | ||
| permissions_policy: None, | ||
| cross_origin_embedder_policy: None, | ||
| cross_origin_opener_policy: None, | ||
| cross_origin_resource_policy: None, | ||
| }; | ||
|
|
||
| if !self.enabled { | ||
| return cached; | ||
| } | ||
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|
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| if let Some(csp) = &self.content_security_policy { | ||
| cached.content_security_policy = HeaderValue::from_str(csp).ok(); | ||
| } | ||
|
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| cached.x_frame_options = HeaderValue::from_str(&self.x_frame_options).ok(); | ||
| cached.x_content_type_options = HeaderValue::from_str(&self.x_content_type_options).ok(); | ||
| cached.x_xss_protection = HeaderValue::from_str(&self.x_xss_protection).ok(); | ||
|
|
||
| if let Some(sts) = &self.strict_transport_security { | ||
| cached.strict_transport_security = HeaderValue::from_str(sts).ok(); | ||
| } | ||
|
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| cached.referrer_policy = HeaderValue::from_str(&self.referrer_policy).ok(); | ||
|
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| if let Some(pp) = &self.permissions_policy { | ||
| cached.permissions_policy = HeaderValue::from_str(pp).ok(); | ||
| } | ||
|
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| if let Some(coep) = &self.cross_origin_embedder_policy { | ||
| cached.cross_origin_embedder_policy = HeaderValue::from_str(coep).ok(); | ||
| } | ||
|
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| if let Some(coop) = &self.cross_origin_opener_policy { | ||
| cached.cross_origin_opener_policy = HeaderValue::from_str(coop).ok(); | ||
| } | ||
|
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| cached.cross_origin_resource_policy = | ||
| HeaderValue::from_str(&self.cross_origin_resource_policy).ok(); | ||
|
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| cached | ||
| } | ||
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| /// Apply security headers to a response directly from this config (unoptimized). | ||
| pub fn apply_headers(&self, response: &mut Response) { | ||
| if !self.enabled { | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
|
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| // This dynamically parses on every call. Use `CachedSecurityHeaders` in hot paths instead. | ||
| let cached = self.cache(); | ||
| cached.apply_headers(response); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion | 🟠 Major
Deduplicate the cached-header implementation.
This file now carries the same CachedSecurityHeaders struct and cache/apply_headers logic as crates/http-middleware/src/security_headers.rs. The next header addition or validation fix will have to land in two places, so please source the shared type from http-middleware and keep app-http as a thin wiring layer. As per coding guidelines, "Modify the middleware stack in app-http when adding or changing middleware behavior".
Also applies to: 308-371
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@crates/app-http/src/middleware/security_headers.rs` around lines 244 - 305,
The CachedSecurityHeaders struct and the cache()/apply_headers() logic are
duplicated here; replace the local implementation by importing and using the
shared CachedSecurityHeaders from the http-middleware crate and delegate to its
methods. Concretely, remove the local CachedSecurityHeaders type and the
duplicated cache()/apply_headers() code in this file, add an import for
http_middleware::security_headers::CachedSecurityHeaders (or the crate's public
path), change the SecurityHeaders::cache() implementation to construct or call
CachedSecurityHeaders::from(self) or otherwise call the shared cache function,
and update SecurityHeaders::apply_headers(&self, response: &mut Response) to
call the imported CachedSecurityHeaders::apply_headers(response) instead of the
local logic; ensure all symbol names (CachedSecurityHeaders, cache,
apply_headers) reference the imported type and adjust any Option/String field
handling to rely on the shared implementation.
| /// Cache the security headers configuration into pre-parsed `HeaderValue`s for fast insertion. | ||
| pub fn cache(&self) -> CachedSecurityHeaders { | ||
| let mut cached = CachedSecurityHeaders { | ||
| enabled: self.enabled, | ||
| content_security_policy: None, | ||
| x_frame_options: None, | ||
| x_content_type_options: None, | ||
| x_xss_protection: None, | ||
| strict_transport_security: None, | ||
| referrer_policy: None, | ||
| permissions_policy: None, | ||
| cross_origin_embedder_policy: None, | ||
| cross_origin_opener_policy: None, | ||
| cross_origin_resource_policy: None, | ||
| }; | ||
|
|
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| if !self.enabled { | ||
| return cached; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
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| if let Some(csp) = &self.content_security_policy { | ||
| cached.content_security_policy = HeaderValue::from_str(csp).ok(); | ||
| } | ||
|
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||
| cached.x_frame_options = HeaderValue::from_str(&self.x_frame_options).ok(); | ||
| cached.x_content_type_options = HeaderValue::from_str(&self.x_content_type_options).ok(); | ||
| cached.x_xss_protection = HeaderValue::from_str(&self.x_xss_protection).ok(); | ||
|
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| if let Some(sts) = &self.strict_transport_security { | ||
| cached.strict_transport_security = HeaderValue::from_str(sts).ok(); | ||
| } | ||
|
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||
| cached.referrer_policy = HeaderValue::from_str(&self.referrer_policy).ok(); | ||
|
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| if let Some(pp) = &self.permissions_policy { | ||
| cached.permissions_policy = HeaderValue::from_str(pp).ok(); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| if let Some(coep) = &self.cross_origin_embedder_policy { | ||
| cached.cross_origin_embedder_policy = HeaderValue::from_str(coep).ok(); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| if let Some(coop) = &self.cross_origin_opener_policy { | ||
| cached.cross_origin_opener_policy = HeaderValue::from_str(coop).ok(); | ||
| } | ||
|
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| cached.cross_origin_resource_policy = | ||
| HeaderValue::from_str(&self.cross_origin_resource_policy).ok(); | ||
|
|
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| cached | ||
| } |
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🧩 Analysis chain
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
fd 'security_headers\.rs$' crates | xargs -r rg -n 'HeaderValue::from_str\([^)]*\)\.ok\(\)'Repository: EffortlessMetrics/Rust-Template
Length of output: 2782
Invalid security headers silently fail to load without startup error or logging.
The cache() method converts all parsing failures to None with .ok(), allowing the service to start with missing protections (CSP, HSTS, etc.) for any misconfigured header value. Since caching runs at startup, not per-request, this should either fail-fast with a clear error or log invalid configuration.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@crates/http-middleware/src/security_headers.rs` around lines 95 - 145, The
cache() method currently swallows HeaderValue::from_str errors with .ok(), so
invalid header strings silently produce missing protections; update cache() (and
its callers) to surface parse failures instead: for each HeaderValue::from_str
call (content_security_policy, x_frame_options, x_content_type_options,
x_xss_protection, strict_transport_security, referrer_policy,
permissions_policy, cross_origin_embedder_policy, cross_origin_opener_policy,
cross_origin_resource_policy) convert .ok() into explicit error handling—either
return a Result<CachedSecurityHeaders, Error> from cache() and propagate parse
errors (with context naming the header and its invalid value), or at minimum
log::error/tracing::error with the header name and panic/fail-fast during
startup; reference the cache() function and CachedSecurityHeaders struct and
replace the silent .ok() branches with fallible checks that produce clear
startup errors.
| "RUSTSEC-2025-0134", | ||
| # RUSTSEC-2026-0066 (astral-tokio-tar parsing issue) | ||
| # - Path: astral-tokio-tar -> testcontainers -> adapters-db-sqlx (dev-only) | ||
| # - Risk: Parser differential due to silent skipping of malformed PAX extensions. Requires a secondary vulnerable parser. | ||
| # - Action: Blocked by testcontainers upstream. Wait for testcontainers to update. | ||
| # - Tracking: https://github.com/testcontainers/testcontainers-rs/issues | ||
| "RUSTSEC-2026-0066" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Add the usual review cadence metadata for this ignore.
This new suppression is missing the Last reviewed / Next review bookkeeping used by the existing deny.toml entries, so it can quietly outlive the upstream testcontainers-rs fix.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@deny.toml` around lines 32 - 38, The new suppression for "RUSTSEC-2026-0066"
is missing the review cadence metadata; update the deny entry for
RUSTSEC-2026-0066 to include the same bookkeeping keys used by other entries
(e.g., Last reviewed and Next review) so it won't outlive the upstream fix — add
a Last reviewed date and a Next review date (ISO format or the repository's
standard date format) alongside the existing comment and ID for
"RUSTSEC-2026-0066" to match the style of other deny.toml entries.
💡 What: Optimized the
SecurityHeadersConfigin bothcrates/app-httpandcrates/http-middlewareby pre-parsing the configuration strings intohttp::HeaderValueinstances at startup. These are stored in a newCachedSecurityHeadersstruct that lives in Axum's global state and middleware layers.🎯 Why: Previously, security headers (like Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, etc.) were represented as standard
Strings in the application state. On every single HTTP request, these strings were being converted toHeaderValues usingHeaderValue::from_str. This involves dynamic parsing, ASCII validity checking, and potential memory allocations on the hot path. For high-throughput endpoints, this is a significant bottleneck.📊 Impact: Reduces per-request CPU overhead and eliminates string allocation/validation per request for security headers.
http::HeaderValuehandles atomic ref-counting or inline copying internally, making it zero-allocation during the actual.insert()calls.🔬 Measurement: Ensure all middleware and security tests pass via
cargo test -p app-http -p http-middleware. Performance tests on the local HTTP server endpoints will show reduced CPU cycles spent inhttp::HeaderValue::from_str.PR created automatically by Jules for task 14706203024563599971 started by @EffortlessSteven