AxonOS is designed for safety-critical brain-computer interface applications. Security vulnerabilities in this crate can contribute to patient-safety hazards in downstream systems. We take them seriously.
This policy applies to:
- The
axonos-sdkcrate (this repository). - The related
axonos-consentcrate at https://github.com/AxonOS-org/axonos-consent. - Published documentation and examples.
Do not file public GitHub issues for security reports.
Email: connect@axonos.org
Subject line: Security: axonos-sdk <one-line summary>
Please include:
- The affected crate and version (
cargo pkgidoutput). - The feature flags you were using.
- A minimal reproducer or a written description.
- Your assessment of impact: does this affect confidentiality of intent events, integrity of the consent state machine, availability of the stream, or kernel-application isolation?
- Whether you have a fix in mind.
You will receive an acknowledgement within 3 business days (Singapore time). If you have not heard back within 5 business days, please email again — inboxes sometimes eat mail.
- Acknowledgement within 3 business days.
- Triage within 10 business days: either a reproduction confirming the issue, or a written explanation of why we assess it as not a vulnerability.
- Coordinated disclosure window of up to 90 days from acknowledgement, during which we ask you not to publish. For issues affecting downstream medical-device integrations, we may request a longer window (up to 180 days) with the reporter's agreement.
- Credit in the published advisory, unless you prefer anonymity.
- A fix shipped in a patch release, with the advisory cross-referenced in
CHANGELOG.md.
- A bug bounty. AxonOS is a small, self-funded project. We value reports and reporters but cannot pay cash rewards at this stage. Enterprise support customers receive formal SLAs; see
ENTERPRISE.md. - Support for unmaintained versions. Security fixes land on the latest minor; previous minors receive fixes at our discretion for 6 months after their last release.
The AxonOS SDK sits at the application side of a trust boundary. The following properties are intended:
- An application compromise cannot extract raw neural signals (there is no API for them).
- An application compromise cannot forge intent observations to other applications (each subscription is isolated; observations are kernel-attested).
- An application compromise cannot prevent a user consent-withdraw from reaching the hardware interlock (the consent frame is emitted by a separate kernel task, not by the SDK process).
Reports describing violations of these properties are treated as critical.
- Vulnerabilities in third-party crates we depend on. Please report those upstream; we will coordinate when you do.
- Social-engineering of AxonOS maintainers.
- Issues requiring physical access to the victim's device (this is by design: AxonOS's hardware interlock assumes physical custody is part of the trusted computing base).
axonos.org · medium.com/@AxonOS · connect@axonos.org