week1.html

<title> CS349 Spring 2019: Robert McInvale</title>
<h1 style = "font-size:300%;"><b> Robert McInvale CS 349 Blog</h1></b>
<h2 style = "font-size:200%;">Week 1 - Understanding Systems of Ethics (Virtue Ethics)</h1></b>

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The idea of an ethical system that emphasizes the qualities and “goodness” of the individual has existed for much of human history, and is traceable back to ancient Greek society (Plato and Aristotle), as well as ancient asian society (Mencius and Confucius)<sup>2</sup>. However, its modern incarnation is largely shaped by the ideas of Elisabeth Anscombe, Bernard Williams, and Alasdair MacIntyre, who stimulated interest in the idea of modern virtue ethics and brought it again to the forefront of philosophical thought<sup>1</sup>. For many years, modern philosophy had heavily emphasized duty and outcomes in its discussion of ethical systems. However, when Anscombe published her paper titled “Modern Moral Philosophy” in 1958, she began a new school of philosophical thought and ushered in the rebirth the ethical framework known today as <b>virtue ethics</b><sup>1</sup>.<br><br>

In essence, rather than describing the consequences or correctness of individual actions, virtue ethics seeks to establish a pattern of living that is (by some shared, supposedly axiomatic standard) “ideal”. By focusing on a pattern of living that is virtuous, as opposed to emphasizing the ethics of individual choices, this system can, in theory, help to promote the cultivation of virtuous people whose lives will contribute to the betterment of humanity. By emphasizing analysis of the individual, the ethicality of specific actions becomes less important than raising a society of righteous individuals who will <i>actively seek</i> to live virtuously. A society that adheres to such a framework could find itself with a population that does the “right thing” out of instinct and an innate virtuosity, as opposed to resorting to contrived evaluation of individual actions based on an arbitrary, consequence-based analysis. <br><br>

For instance, under virtue ethics, a person who is extremely honest may be considered to be virtuous even in a circumstance in which they tell a harmful lie. Though the lie itself would be considered unethical in many other ethical systems, under virtue ethics, we may still consider the person who told the lie to be virtuous and ethical because of their honest “nature”. This removes a burden of judgement from individual actions, and allows us to value individuals not by such isolated circumstances, but by the quality of the virtues they possess.<br>
In cases where the virtue of individual persons can be so easily determined, and in a world in which “good” and “virtuous” characteristics can be absolutely defined, virtue ethics succeeds in making accurate determinations. However, neither of these are easy to achieve, and it is all too possible that the standards of virtue to which a person is supposed to adhere may be nebulous, or defined in such a way that society is actually harmed. For instance, the virtue of “honesty” must be carefully defined, as someone who always speaks their mind despite the (often harmful) consequences could certainly be considered honest, but not in a way that earns legitimate virtue<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>Athanassoulis, Nafiska. "Virtue Ethics." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <a href="https://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/">https://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/</a><br>
<sup>2</sup>Hursthouse, Rosalind and Pettigrove, Glen. "Virtue Ethics." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/</a>

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