diff --git a/packagehandlers/commonpackagehandler.go b/packagehandlers/commonpackagehandler.go
index 9a874d521..844d9faaf 100644
--- a/packagehandlers/commonpackagehandler.go
+++ b/packagehandlers/commonpackagehandler.go
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package packagehandlers
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io/fs"
+	"os"
 	"os/exec"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"regexp"
@@ -107,6 +108,11 @@ func (cph *CommonPackageHandler) GetAllDescriptorFilesFullPaths(descriptorFilesS
 		regexpPatternsCompilers = append(regexpPatternsCompilers, regexp.MustCompile(patternToExclude))
 	}
 
+	wd, err := os.Getwd()
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
 	err = filepath.WalkDir(".", func(path string, d fs.DirEntry, innerErr error) error {
 		if innerErr != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("an error has occurred when attempting to access or traverse the file system: %w", innerErr)
@@ -129,7 +135,12 @@ func (cph *CommonPackageHandler) GetAllDescriptorFilesFullPaths(descriptorFilesS
 				if innerErr != nil {
 					return fmt.Errorf("couldn't retrieve file's absolute path for './%s': %w", path, innerErr)
 				}
-				descriptorFilesFullPaths = append(descriptorFilesFullPaths, absFilePath)
+				resolvedPath, validateErr := utils.ValidateFileWithinDir(absFilePath, wd)
+				if validateErr != nil {
+					log.Warn(fmt.Sprintf("skipping descriptor file '%s' as it resolves outside the project directory: %s", path, validateErr.Error()))
+					return nil
+				}
+				descriptorFilesFullPaths = append(descriptorFilesFullPaths, resolvedPath)
 			}
 		}
 		return nil
@@ -153,3 +164,4 @@ func GetVulnerabilityRegexCompiler(impactedName, impactedVersion, dependencyLine
 	regexpCompleteFormat := fmt.Sprintf(strings.ToLower(dependencyLineFormat), regexpFitImpactedName, regexpFitImpactedVersion)
 	return regexp.MustCompile(regexpCompleteFormat)
 }
+
diff --git a/packagehandlers/pythonpackagehandler.go b/packagehandlers/pythonpackagehandler.go
index 3ff6569ac..92e5b6e87 100644
--- a/packagehandlers/pythonpackagehandler.go
+++ b/packagehandlers/pythonpackagehandler.go
@@ -77,7 +77,15 @@ func (py *PythonPackageHandler) handlePip(vulnDetails *utils.VulnerabilityDetail
 	if fixedFile == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("impacted package %s not found, fix failed", vulnDetails.ImpactedDependencyName)
 	}
-	if err = os.WriteFile(py.pipRequirementsFile, []byte(fixedFile), 0600); err != nil {
+	wd, err := os.Getwd()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	resolvedWritePath, err := utils.ValidateFileWithinDir(filepath.Join(wd, py.pipRequirementsFile), wd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("wrong requirements file input '%s': %s", py.pipRequirementsFile, err.Error())
+	}
+	if err = os.WriteFile(resolvedWritePath, []byte(fixedFile), 0600); err != nil {
 		err = fmt.Errorf("an error occured while writing the fixed version of %s to the requirements file:\n%s", vulnDetails.SuggestedFixedVersion, err.Error())
 	}
 	return
@@ -112,10 +120,11 @@ func (py *PythonPackageHandler) tryReadRequirementFile(file string) (string, err
 		return "", err
 	}
 	fullPath := filepath.Join(wd, file)
-	if !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Clean(fullPath), wd) {
-		return "", errors.New("wrong requirements file input: " + fullPath)
+	resolvedPath, err := utils.ValidateFileWithinDir(fullPath, wd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("wrong requirements file input '%s': %s", file, err.Error())
 	}
-	data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Clean(file))
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(resolvedPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", errors.New("an error occurred while attempting to read the requirements file:\n" + err.Error())
 	}
diff --git a/utils/pathutils.go b/utils/pathutils.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..628208afb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/utils/pathutils.go
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+package utils
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// ValidateFileWithinDir receives a file path and an allowed directory, resolves any symlinks in both,
+// and verifies the real (on-disk) target still resides under the allowed directory.
+// Returns the resolved absolute path on success, or an error if the file escapes the allowed boundary.
+func ValidateFileWithinDir(filePath, allowedDir string) (string, error) {
+	absPath, err := filepath.Abs(filePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("couldn't get absolute path for '%s': %s", filePath, err.Error())
+	}
+
+	realPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("couldn't resolve symlinks for '%s': %s", filePath, err.Error())
+	}
+
+	realAllowedDir, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(allowedDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("couldn't resolve symlinks for allowed directory '%s': %s", allowedDir, err.Error())
+	}
+
+	cleanAllowedDir := filepath.Clean(realAllowedDir)
+	realPath = filepath.Clean(realPath)
+
+	// The resolved path must either equal the allowed directory itself, or sit underneath it.
+	if realPath != cleanAllowedDir && !strings.HasPrefix(realPath, cleanAllowedDir+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("file '%s' resolves to '%s' which is outside the allowed directory '%s'", filePath, realPath, allowedDir)
+	}
+
+	return realPath, nil
+}
diff --git a/utils/pathutils_test.go b/utils/pathutils_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7c6b1e345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/utils/pathutils_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+package utils
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// evalTempDir creates a temporary directory and resolves any symlinks in its path.
+// Some platforms use symlinked temp directories (e.g., /var -> /private/var on macOS),
+// which would cause path comparisons to fail without resolving first.
+func evalTempDir(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(dir)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return resolved
+}
+
+func TestValidateFileWithinDir(t *testing.T) {
+	tmpDir := evalTempDir(t)
+
+	regularFile := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "requirements.txt")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(regularFile, []byte("requests==2.28.0"), 0600))
+
+	resolvedPath, err := ValidateFileWithinDir(regularFile, tmpDir)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, regularFile, resolvedPath)
+}
+
+func TestValidateFileWithinDir_Subdirectory(t *testing.T) {
+	tmpDir := evalTempDir(t)
+
+	subDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir")
+	require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(subDir, 0700))
+	nestedFile := filepath.Join(subDir, "setup.py")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(nestedFile, []byte("setup()"), 0600))
+
+	resolvedPath, err := ValidateFileWithinDir(nestedFile, tmpDir)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, nestedFile, resolvedPath)
+}
+
+func TestValidateFileWithinDir_SymlinkEscape(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("Symlink tests are not supported on Windows")
+	}
+
+	tmpDir := evalTempDir(t)
+	outsideDir := evalTempDir(t)
+
+	outsideFile := filepath.Join(outsideDir, "secret.txt")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(outsideFile, []byte("sensitive data"), 0600))
+
+	// Create a symlink inside the allowed dir that points outside
+	symlinkPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "requirements.txt")
+	require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(outsideFile, symlinkPath))
+
+	_, err := ValidateFileWithinDir(symlinkPath, tmpDir)
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "outside the allowed directory")
+}
+
+func TestValidateFileWithinDir_SymlinkWithinDir(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("Symlink tests are not supported on Windows")
+	}
+
+	tmpDir := evalTempDir(t)
+
+	realFile := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "real-requirements.txt")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(realFile, []byte("requests==2.28.0"), 0600))
+
+	// A symlink that resolves to a file still inside the allowed dir should be accepted
+	symlinkPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "requirements.txt")
+	require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(realFile, symlinkPath))
+
+	resolvedPath, err := ValidateFileWithinDir(symlinkPath, tmpDir)
+	assert.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, realFile, resolvedPath)
+}
+
+func TestValidateFileWithinDir_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
+	tmpDir := evalTempDir(t)
+	outsideDir := evalTempDir(t)
+
+	outsideFile := filepath.Join(outsideDir, "secret.txt")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(outsideFile, []byte("sensitive data"), 0600))
+
+	_, err := ValidateFileWithinDir(outsideFile, tmpDir)
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "outside the allowed directory")
+}
+
+func TestValidateFileWithinDir_NonexistentFile(t *testing.T) {
+	tmpDir := evalTempDir(t)
+
+	_, err := ValidateFileWithinDir(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "nonexistent.txt"), tmpDir)
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "couldn't resolve symlinks")
+}
+
+func TestValidateFileWithinDir_DirSymlinkEscape(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("Symlink tests are not supported on Windows")
+	}
+
+	tmpDir := evalTempDir(t)
+	outsideDir := evalTempDir(t)
+
+	outsideFile := filepath.Join(outsideDir, "secret.txt")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(outsideFile, []byte("sensitive data"), 0600))
+
+	// A symlinked directory pointing outside the workspace should be caught
+	symlinkDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "linked-dir")
+	require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(outsideDir, symlinkDir))
+
+	_, err := ValidateFileWithinDir(filepath.Join(symlinkDir, "secret.txt"), tmpDir)
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "outside the allowed directory")
+}