- Session: plan-0afb82ae-a905-49e7-a954-bb2b49528e0d
- Generated: 2026-04-12T10:44:25.213Z
[[REQUEST_MODE: plan | reason=Delegated Swarm Task]]
TASK DESCRIPTION: Read the file tests/swarm.test.ts and summarize what it checks/tests in exactly one sentence. Do not edit any files.
IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS:
- You are a specialized worker in 'plan' mode.
- Focus ONLY on this task.
- When finished, you MUST output the following tag: [[TASK_COMPLETE | summary=Task finished successfully]]
- Never call restricted coordinator tools: create_git_checkpoint, revert_to_git_checkpoint, git_commit, run_background_task, delegate_subtask, run_swarm.
XibeCode is a sophisticated AI-powered autonomous coding assistant with multiple attack surfaces:
- CLI Tool (Node.js/TypeScript)
- WebUI Server (HTTP + WebSocket)
- Frontend (React/Vite)
- Documentation Site (Next.js)
- Electron Desktop App
- Browser Automation (Playwright/agent-browser)
-
WebUI Server (
src/webui/server.ts)- REST API endpoints
- WebSocket connections
- File operations and path traversal
- Authentication/authorization (if any)
-
Frontend Application (
webui/src/)- XSS vulnerabilities
- Client-side security issues
- Input validation
-
CLI Security
- Command injection
- File system access
- API key handling
-
Documentation Site (
site/)- Next.js security
- API routes
- Search functionality
-
Configuration & Secrets
- API key storage
- Environment variables
- MCP server configuration
- Third-party dependencies (only note versions)
- Electron-specific issues (unless time permits)
- DOS/DDoS attacks
Entry Points:
- HTTP API: 20+ endpoints (
/api/*) - WebSocket: Real-time communication
- Static file serving
- Terminal PTY spawning
Potential Vulnerabilities:
- Path traversal in file operations
- Command injection in terminal/PTY
- Insecure deserialization
- CORS misconfigurations
- Authentication bypass (no auth visible)
- Arbitrary code execution via Python PTY bridge
- Git command injection
Entry Points:
- User inputs (chat, file paths, commands)
- File upload/download
- Monaco editor
- Terminal emulator
Potential Vulnerabilities:
- XSS via message rendering
- File path manipulation
- Insecure storage (localStorage/sessionStorage)
- WebSocket message tampering
Entry Points:
- Command-line arguments
- Configuration files
- API interactions
Potential Vulnerabilities:
- Command injection via run_command
- File write/overwrite attacks
- Insecure API key storage
- MCP server configuration tampering
Entry Points:
- Search API
- Chat API (if AI-powered)
- MongoDB connections
Potential Vulnerabilities:
- NoSQL injection
- SSRF in chat/search
- Exposed API keys
-
Code Review
- Read
src/webui/server.ts- API endpoints - Review
src/core/tools.ts- Command execution - Check
src/utils/safety.ts- Security controls - Examine
src/core/editor.ts- File operations
- Read
-
Configuration Analysis
- Check
.env.examplefiles - Review
package.jsondependencies - Analyze MCP server config format
- Check
-
Attack Surface Mapping
- List all HTTP endpoints
- Map WebSocket message types
- Identify file I/O operations
- Document command execution paths
Using agent-browser to interact with the WebUI:
-
Start the Application
# Terminal 1: Start WebUI xibecode ui --port 3847 # Terminal 2: Run pentest automation agent-browser open http://localhost:3847
-
Test Scenarios
- Path traversal attempts
- Command injection payloads
- XSS injection
- CORS validation
- WebSocket fuzzing
-
Path Traversal Testing
- Test
/api/files/readwith../../../etc/passwd - Test
/api/files/rawwith absolute paths - Test file tree endpoint with malicious paths
- Test
-
Command Injection
- Test terminal creation with malicious
cwd - Test terminal input with shell metacharacters
- Test git commands via API
- Test terminal creation with malicious
-
Authentication Testing
- Verify if any endpoints require auth
- Test session management
- Check for IDOR vulnerabilities
-
XSS Testing
- Inject payloads into chat messages
- Test markdown rendering
- Test file content display
-
Configuration Attacks
- Attempt to overwrite MCP config
- Test .env file manipulation
- Try to read sensitive files
-
Search API
- Test for NoSQL injection
- Check for SSRF
-
Chat API
- Test AI prompt injection
- Check for unauthorized access
- Critical (9-10): Remote code execution, authentication bypass
- High (7-8): Path traversal, command injection, XSS
- Medium (4-6): Information disclosure, CORS issues
- Low (1-3): Verbose errors, version disclosure
- Info (0): Best practice recommendations
- Confidentiality: Can attacker read sensitive data?
- Integrity: Can attacker modify data/code?
- Availability: Can attacker disrupt service?
src/webui/server.ts- Main API server (2600+ lines)src/core/tools.ts- Tool execution and permissionssrc/utils/safety.ts- Security checkssrc/core/editor.ts- File editingwebui/src/- Frontend componentssite/app/api/- Next.js API routes
This is a read-only security assessment. We will:
- ✅ Document vulnerabilities
- ✅ Provide proof-of-concepts
- ✅ Recommend fixes
- ❌ Not modify application code
-
Python PTY Bridge (lines 1002-1050 in
server.ts)- Spawns arbitrary Python code
- User-controlled
cwdparameter - Direct shell execution
-
File Operations
/api/files/read- Path traversal risk/api/files/raw- Binary file access/api/files/tree- Directory traversal/api/env- Environment variable manipulation
-
Command Execution
run_commandtool intools.ts- Git command execution
- Test runner execution
-
MCP Configuration
/api/mcp/file- Write arbitrary JSON- No validation on server commands
-
API Authentication
- No visible authentication on endpoints
- API key stored in config only
-
CORS Configuration
- Wildcard origin (
*) - All methods allowed
- Wildcard origin (
-
WebSocket Security
- No authentication on WS connections
- Message validation unclear
-
Input Validation
- Some path validation exists
- Basic safety checks in place
-
Error Handling
- Try-catch blocks present
- May expose verbose errors
- Remote Code Execution via PTY
- Authentication bypass
- Arbitrary file write
- Path traversal to sensitive files
- Command injection
- XSS in chat/markdown
- CORS misconfiguration
- Information disclosure
- Missing security headers
- Version disclosure
- Verbose errors
- Missing rate limiting
# XibeCode Security Assessment Report
## Executive Summary
- Testing date
- Scope
- Overall security score: X/100
- Critical findings count
## Methodology
- Tools used
- Testing approach
## Findings
### [CRITICAL] Finding Title
- **Severity**: Critical (10/10)
- **Category**: RCE / Path Traversal / etc.
- **Affected Component**: File path
- **Description**: Detailed explanation
- **Proof of Concept**: Code/steps
- **Impact**: What attacker can do
- **Recommendation**: How to fix
- **CVSS Score**: (if applicable)
### [HIGH] Finding Title
...
## Security Score Calculation
- Total vulnerabilities: X
- Weighted score: Y/100
- Risk breakdown
## Recommendations
1. Immediate actions (Critical)
2. Short-term fixes (High)
3. Long-term improvements (Medium/Low)
## Conclusion
Overall security posture assessment-
Comprehensive Coverage
- ✅ All major components tested
- ✅ Both automated and manual testing
- ✅ Clear proof-of-concepts
-
Actionable Report
- ✅ Severity ratings for all findings
- ✅ Reproduction steps
- ✅ Remediation guidance
-
Security Score
- ✅ Calculated from weighted vulnerabilities
- ✅ Clear scoring methodology
- ✅ Justification for score
-
Reconnaissance: 1 hour
- Code review
- Attack surface mapping
-
Automated Testing: 2 hours
- agent-browser automation
- Endpoint fuzzing
-
Manual Testing: 3 hours
- Exploitation attempts
- Proof-of-concept development
-
Report Writing: 2 hours
- Document findings
- Calculate security score
- Write recommendations
Total: ~8 hours of testing
- agent-browser: Interactive browser automation
- Code analysis: Manual review of TypeScript
- curl/HTTPie: API testing
- Browser DevTools: WebSocket inspection
- Path traversal:
../,..\\, absolute paths - Command injection:
; whoami,| ls,$(id) - XSS:
<script>alert(1)</script>,<img src=x onerror=alert(1)> - NoSQL injection:
{"$ne": null},{"$gt": ""}
- OWASP Top 10
- CWE Top 25
- Node.js security best practices
-
Execute Reconnaissance
- Read security-critical files
- Map all endpoints and entry points
-
Run Automated Tests
- Start WebUI on localhost
- Use agent-browser for interaction
- Document responses
-
Perform Manual Exploitation
- Test high-risk areas
- Develop proof-of-concepts
- Document evidence
-
Generate Report
- Write findings
- Calculate security score
- Provide recommendations
-
Deliver
- Save as
pentest-report.mdin project root - Include security score out of 100
- Provide executive summary
- Save as
Base Score: 100
Deductions:
- Critical (RCE, Auth bypass): -20 per finding
- High (Path traversal, XSS, SQLi): -10 per finding
- Medium (CORS, Info disclosure): -5 per finding
- Low (Version disclosure, errors): -2 per finding
Minimum Score: 0
Maximum Score: 100
Final Score = max(0, 100 - total_deductions)
Grade Scale:
- 90-100: Excellent
- 80-89: Good
- 70-79: Fair
- 60-69: Poor
- 0-59: Critical
From code analysis, the project has:
-
Safety Checker (
src/utils/safety.ts)- Blocks dangerous commands
- Path validation
-
Mode Permissions (
src/core/modes.ts)- Tool category restrictions
- Read-only modes
-
CORS Headers
- Wildcard origin (needs review)
-
Path Traversal Protection
- Some validation in file endpoints
- Needs verification of effectiveness
-
Try-Catch Error Handling
- Prevents crashes
- May expose verbose errors