From 821b6dce033344c805debff86d8cddd277090da4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roxana Nicolescu Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 14:47:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/9] crypto: xts - Handle EBUSY correctly jira VULN-157047 cve CVE-2023-53494 commit-author Herbert Xu commit 51c082514c2dedf2711c99d93c196cc4eedceb40 As it is xts only handles the special return value of EINPROGRESS, which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the request. However, as the caller of xts may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged requests will trigger a use-after-free. Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu (cherry picked from commit 51c082514c2dedf2711c99d93c196cc4eedceb40) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu --- crypto/xts.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c index 6c12f30dbdd6d..9f90121b69994 100644 --- a/crypto/xts.c +++ b/crypto/xts.c @@ -203,12 +203,12 @@ static void xts_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err) if (!err) { struct xts_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); - rctx->subreq.base.flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + rctx->subreq.base.flags &= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG; err = xts_xor_tweak_post(req, true); if (!err && unlikely(req->cryptlen % XTS_BLOCK_SIZE)) { err = xts_cts_final(req, crypto_skcipher_encrypt); - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) + if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY) return; } } @@ -223,12 +223,12 @@ static void xts_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err) if (!err) { struct xts_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); - rctx->subreq.base.flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + rctx->subreq.base.flags &= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG; err = xts_xor_tweak_post(req, false); if (!err && unlikely(req->cryptlen % XTS_BLOCK_SIZE)) { err = xts_cts_final(req, crypto_skcipher_decrypt); - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) + if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY) return; } } From a6c989bc7dd3240b5342317663ea35fea2e37016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roxana Nicolescu Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 14:48:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 2/9] sctp: linearize cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv jira VULN-136342 cve CVE-2025-38718 commit-author Xin Long commit fd60d8a086191fe33c2d719732d2482052fa6805 A cloned head skb still shares these frag skbs in fraglist with the original head skb. It's not safe to access these frag skbs. syzbot reported two use-of-uninitialized-memory bugs caused by this: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211 sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x1a7/0xc50 net/sctp/associola.c:998 sctp_inq_push+0x2ef/0x380 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_backlog_rcv+0x397/0xdb0 net/sctp/input.c:331 sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1122 __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3106 release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3660 sctp_wait_for_connect+0x487/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9360 sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x1ec1/0x1f00 net/sctp/socket.c:1885 sctp_sendmsg+0x32b9/0x4a80 net/sctp/socket.c:2031 inet_sendmsg+0x25a/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] and BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987 sctp_inq_push+0x2a3/0x350 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_backlog_rcv+0x3c7/0xda0 net/sctp/input.c:331 sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148 __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213 release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767 sctp_wait_for_connect+0x458/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9367 sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x223a/0x2260 net/sctp/socket.c:1886 sctp_sendmsg+0x3910/0x49f0 net/sctp/socket.c:2032 inet_sendmsg+0x269/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] This patch fixes it by linearizing cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv(). Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support") Reported-by: syzbot+773e51afe420baaf0e2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+70a42f45e76bede082be@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Link: https://patch.msgid.link/dd7dc337b99876d4132d0961f776913719f7d225.1754595611.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski (cherry picked from commit fd60d8a086191fe33c2d719732d2482052fa6805) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu --- net/sctp/input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index bf70371301ff4..b013f644dc043 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ int sctp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) * it's better to just linearize it otherwise crc computing * takes longer. */ - if ((!is_gso && skb_linearize(skb)) || + if (((!is_gso || skb_cloned(skb)) && skb_linearize(skb)) || !pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct sctphdr))) goto discard_it; From 753aa878e072c41d9bf637ed4075cf4d95c7055c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roxana Nicolescu Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 14:48:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 3/9] ALSA: usb-audio: Validate UAC3 power domain descriptors, too jira VULN-136373 cve CVE-2025-38729 commit-author Takashi Iwai commit d832ccbc301fbd9e5a1d691bdcf461cdb514595f UAC3 power domain descriptors need to be verified with its variable bLength for avoiding the unexpected OOB accesses by malicious firmware, too. Fixes: 9a2fe9b801f5 ("ALSA: usb: initial USB Audio Device Class 3.0 support") Reported-and-tested-by: Youngjun Lee Cc: Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250814081245.8902-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai (cherry picked from commit d832ccbc301fbd9e5a1d691bdcf461cdb514595f) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu --- sound/usb/validate.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/usb/validate.c b/sound/usb/validate.c index 6fe206f6e9110..4f4e8e87a14cd 100644 --- a/sound/usb/validate.c +++ b/sound/usb/validate.c @@ -221,6 +221,17 @@ static bool validate_uac3_feature_unit(const void *p, return d->bLength >= sizeof(*d) + 4 + 2; } +static bool validate_uac3_power_domain_unit(const void *p, + const struct usb_desc_validator *v) +{ + const struct uac3_power_domain_descriptor *d = p; + + if (d->bLength < sizeof(*d)) + return false; + /* baEntities[] + wPDomainDescrStr */ + return d->bLength >= sizeof(*d) + d->bNrEntities + 2; +} + static bool validate_midi_out_jack(const void *p, const struct usb_desc_validator *v) { @@ -285,6 +296,7 @@ static const struct usb_desc_validator audio_validators[] = { struct uac3_clock_multiplier_descriptor), /* UAC_VERSION_3, UAC3_SAMPLE_RATE_CONVERTER: not implemented yet */ /* UAC_VERSION_3, UAC3_CONNECTORS: not implemented yet */ + FUNC(UAC_VERSION_3, UAC3_POWER_DOMAIN, validate_uac3_power_domain_unit), { } /* terminator */ }; From 86e020edd4391f358802b4277f2ae52036d5faad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roxana Nicolescu Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 14:50:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 4/9] ALSA: hda/ca0132: Fix buffer overflow in add_tuning_control jira VULN-152899 cve CVE-2025-39751 commit-author Lucy Thrun commit a409c60111e6bb98fcabab2aeaa069daa9434ca0 The 'sprintf' call in 'add_tuning_control' may exceed the 44-byte buffer if either string argument is too long. This triggers a compiler warning. Replaced 'sprintf' with 'snprintf' to limit string lengths to prevent overflow. Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202506100642.95jpuMY1-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Lucy Thrun Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250610175012.918-3-lucy.thrun@digital-rabbithole.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai (cherry picked from commit a409c60111e6bb98fcabab2aeaa069daa9434ca0) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu --- sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c index 748a3c40966e9..c19164089ae4e 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c @@ -4399,7 +4399,7 @@ static int add_tuning_control(struct hda_codec *codec, } knew.private_value = HDA_COMPOSE_AMP_VAL(nid, 1, 0, type); - sprintf(namestr, "%s %s Volume", name, dirstr[dir]); + snprintf(namestr, sizeof(namestr), "%s %s Volume", name, dirstr[dir]); return snd_hda_ctl_add(codec, nid, snd_ctl_new1(&knew, codec)); } From 62d5273fe8a49c51dc93c720dc2399edd2ee592a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roxana Nicolescu Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 14:50:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 5/9] ALSA: usb-audio: Validate UAC3 cluster segment descriptors jira VULN-152937 cve CVE-2025-39757 commit-author Takashi Iwai commit ecfd41166b72b67d3bdeb88d224ff445f6163869 UAC3 class segment descriptors need to be verified whether their sizes match with the declared lengths and whether they fit with the allocated buffer sizes, too. Otherwise malicious firmware may lead to the unexpected OOB accesses. Fixes: 11785ef53228 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Initial Power Domain support") Reported-and-tested-by: Youngjun Lee Cc: Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250814081245.8902-2-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai (cherry picked from commit ecfd41166b72b67d3bdeb88d224ff445f6163869) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu --- sound/usb/stream.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/stream.c b/sound/usb/stream.c index 3d4add94e367d..e26cea9f74ede 100644 --- a/sound/usb/stream.c +++ b/sound/usb/stream.c @@ -338,20 +338,28 @@ snd_pcm_chmap_elem *convert_chmap_v3(struct uac3_cluster_header_descriptor len = le16_to_cpu(cluster->wLength); c = 0; - p += sizeof(struct uac3_cluster_header_descriptor); + p += sizeof(*cluster); + len -= sizeof(*cluster); - while (((p - (void *)cluster) < len) && (c < channels)) { + while (len > 0 && (c < channels)) { struct uac3_cluster_segment_descriptor *cs_desc = p; u16 cs_len; u8 cs_type; + if (len < sizeof(*p)) + break; cs_len = le16_to_cpu(cs_desc->wLength); + if (len < cs_len) + break; cs_type = cs_desc->bSegmentType; if (cs_type == UAC3_CHANNEL_INFORMATION) { struct uac3_cluster_information_segment_descriptor *is = p; unsigned char map; + if (cs_len < sizeof(*is)) + break; + /* * TODO: this conversion is not complete, update it * after adding UAC3 values to asound.h @@ -453,6 +461,7 @@ snd_pcm_chmap_elem *convert_chmap_v3(struct uac3_cluster_header_descriptor chmap->map[c++] = map; } p += cs_len; + len -= cs_len; } if (channels < c) @@ -873,7 +882,7 @@ snd_usb_get_audioformat_uac3(struct snd_usb_audio *chip, u64 badd_formats = 0; unsigned int num_channels; struct audioformat *fp; - u16 cluster_id, wLength; + u16 cluster_id, wLength, cluster_wLength; int clock = 0; int err; @@ -1000,6 +1009,16 @@ snd_usb_get_audioformat_uac3(struct snd_usb_audio *chip, return ERR_PTR(-EIO); } + cluster_wLength = le16_to_cpu(cluster->wLength); + if (cluster_wLength < sizeof(*cluster) || + cluster_wLength > wLength) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, + "%u:%d : invalid Cluster Descriptor size\n", + iface_no, altno); + kfree(cluster); + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + } + num_channels = cluster->bNrChannels; chmap = convert_chmap_v3(cluster); kfree(cluster); From 7623c647e1126e09cb237dc53e3a1f6f95bc09f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roxana Nicolescu Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 14:51:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 6/9] ALSA: usb-audio: Fix size validation in convert_chmap_v3() jira VULN-152937 cve-bf CVE-2025-39757 commit-author Dan Carpenter commit 89f0addeee3cb2dc49837599330ed9c4612f05b0 The "p" pointer is void so sizeof(*p) is 1. The intent was to check sizeof(*cs_desc), which is 3, instead. Fixes: ecfd41166b72 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Validate UAC3 cluster segment descriptors") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aKL5kftC1qGt6lpv@stanley.mountain Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai (cherry picked from commit 89f0addeee3cb2dc49837599330ed9c4612f05b0) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu --- sound/usb/stream.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/stream.c b/sound/usb/stream.c index e26cea9f74ede..83e5f5bbf8fc4 100644 --- a/sound/usb/stream.c +++ b/sound/usb/stream.c @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ snd_pcm_chmap_elem *convert_chmap_v3(struct uac3_cluster_header_descriptor u16 cs_len; u8 cs_type; - if (len < sizeof(*p)) + if (len < sizeof(*cs_desc)) break; cs_len = le16_to_cpu(cs_desc->wLength); if (len < cs_len) From e5ee274b4f390ffa8abb078a2fa81c7470be56c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roxana Nicolescu Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 14:51:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 7/9] efivarfs: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in efivarfs_d_compare jira VULN-155162 cve CVE-2025-39817 commit-author Li Nan commit a6358f8cf64850f3f27857b8ed8c1b08cfc4685c Observed on kernel 6.6 (present on master as well): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x98/0xd0 Call trace: kasan_check_range+0xe8/0x190 __asan_loadN+0x1c/0x28 memcmp+0x98/0xd0 efivarfs_d_compare+0x68/0xd8 __d_lookup_rcu_op_compare+0x178/0x218 __d_lookup_rcu+0x1f8/0x228 d_alloc_parallel+0x150/0x648 lookup_open.isra.0+0x5f0/0x8d0 open_last_lookups+0x264/0x828 path_openat+0x130/0x3f8 do_filp_open+0x114/0x248 do_sys_openat2+0x340/0x3c0 __arm64_sys_openat+0x120/0x1a0 If dentry->d_name.len < EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN , 'guid' can become negative, leadings to oob. The issue can be triggered by parallel lookups using invalid filename: T1 T2 lookup_open ->lookup simple_lookup d_add // invalid dentry is added to hash list lookup_open d_alloc_parallel __d_lookup_rcu __d_lookup_rcu_op_compare hlist_bl_for_each_entry_rcu // invalid dentry can be retrieved ->d_compare efivarfs_d_compare // oob Fix it by checking 'guid' before cmp. Fixes: da27a24383b2 ("efivarfs: guid part of filenames are case-insensitive") Signed-off-by: Li Nan Signed-off-by: Wu Guanghao Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel (cherry picked from commit a6358f8cf64850f3f27857b8ed8c1b08cfc4685c) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu --- fs/efivarfs/super.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/super.c b/fs/efivarfs/super.c index 3626816b174ad..f57fc217c46b7 100644 --- a/fs/efivarfs/super.c +++ b/fs/efivarfs/super.c @@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ static int efivarfs_d_compare(const struct dentry *dentry, { int guid = len - EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN; + /* Parallel lookups may produce a temporary invalid filename */ + if (guid <= 0) + return 1; + if (name->len != len) return 1; From e8c09c496b9194d7c35161ed6390875fa46fcf96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roxana Nicolescu Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 14:52:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 8/9] wifi: cfg80211: sme: cap SSID length in __cfg80211_connect_result() jira VULN-156052 cve CVE-2025-39849 commit-author Dan Carpenter commit 62b635dcd69c4fde7ce1de4992d71420a37e51e3 upstream-diff | Had to change the call from min to min_t due to type checking failure. This kernel is missing multiple improvements done in min, including the removal of type checking done in commit dc1c8034e31b1("minmax: simplify min()/max()/clamp() implementation"). This was not backported because it required other changes as well, including making sure that all C constant expression context that use min() or max() had to be converted. If the ssid->datalen is more than IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN (32) it would lead to memory corruption so add some bounds checking. Fixes: c38c70185101 ("wifi: cfg80211: Set SSID if it is not already set") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Link: https://patch.msgid.link/0aaaae4a3ed37c6252363c34ae4904b1604e8e32.1756456951.git.dan.carpenter@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg (cherry picked from commit 62b635dcd69c4fde7ce1de4992d71420a37e51e3) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu --- net/wireless/sme.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/sme.c b/net/wireless/sme.c index acfe66da7109b..12bf3e18fb0df 100644 --- a/net/wireless/sme.c +++ b/net/wireless/sme.c @@ -900,13 +900,16 @@ void __cfg80211_connect_result(struct net_device *dev, if (!wdev->u.client.ssid_len) { rcu_read_lock(); for_each_valid_link(cr, link) { + u32 ssid_len; + ssid = ieee80211_bss_get_elem(cr->links[link].bss, WLAN_EID_SSID); if (!ssid || !ssid->datalen) continue; - memcpy(wdev->u.client.ssid, ssid->data, ssid->datalen); + ssid_len = min_t(u32, ssid->datalen, IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN); + memcpy(wdev->u.client.ssid, ssid->data, ssid_len); wdev->u.client.ssid_len = ssid->datalen; break; } From fb63bee55430e4290d8549fb1305be766fa830c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roxana Nicolescu Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 14:49:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 9/9] ipv6: sr: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time jira VULN-136545 cve CVE-2025-39702 commit-author Eric Biggers commit a458b2902115b26a25d67393b12ddd57d1216aaa upstream-diff | Use crypto/algahi.h instead of crypto/utils.h To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time. Use the appropriate helper function for this. Fixes: bf355b8d2c30 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818202724.15713-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski (cherry picked from commit a458b2902115b26a25d67393b12ddd57d1216aaa) Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu --- net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c index 3c3800223e0e0..e21ccb2863c94 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -269,7 +270,7 @@ bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) if (seg6_hmac_compute(hinfo, srh, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, hmac_output)) return false; - if (memcmp(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN) != 0) + if (crypto_memneq(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN)) return false; return true;