diff --git a/src/lint/lints.sql b/src/lint/lints.sql
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..12ffea00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lint/lints.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+-- REQUIRE: src/schema.sql
+
+--! @brief EQL lint: detect non-inlinable operator implementation functions
+--!
+--! Returns one row per violation found in the installed EQL surface. The
+--! Postgres planner can only inline a function during index matching when:
+--!
+--!   * `LANGUAGE sql` (plpgsql / C / etc. cannot be inlined)
+--!   * `IMMUTABLE` or `STABLE` volatility (VOLATILE cannot be inlined into
+--!     index expressions)
+--!   * No `SET` clauses (e.g. `SET search_path = ...`)
+--!   * Not `SECURITY DEFINER`
+--!   * Single-statement SELECT body
+--!
+--! @note The single-statement SELECT body condition is **not yet checked** by
+--! this lint. A `LANGUAGE sql` function with a multi-statement body, a CTE,
+--! or any pre-SELECT statement will pass all four implemented checks while
+--! remaining non-inlinable. Implementing the check requires walking `prosrc`
+--! (or `pg_get_functiondef`); tracked as a follow-up to #194.
+--!
+--! Operators on encrypted types (`eql_v2_encrypted`, `eql_v2.bloom_filter`,
+--! `eql_v2.ore_*`, etc.) whose implementation functions fail any of these
+--! rules silently fall back to seq scan when the documented functional
+--! indexes (`eql_v2.hmac_256(col)`, `eql_v2.bloom_filter(col)`,
+--! `eql_v2.ste_vec(col)`) are in place. This lint surfaces every such case.
+--!
+--! Severity:
+--!   `error`   — fixable, blocks index matching, ship-blocking.
+--!   `warning` — likely-fixable, may not block matching but signals intent.
+--!   `info`    — observational; useful for review, not a defect on its own.
+--!
+--! Categories:
+--!   `inlinability_language`   — implementation function isn't `LANGUAGE sql`.
+--!   `inlinability_volatility` — implementation function is VOLATILE.
+--!   `inlinability_set_clause` — implementation function has a `SET` clause.
+--!   `inlinability_secdef`     — implementation function is `SECURITY DEFINER`.
+--!   `inlinability_transitive` — implementation function is itself inlinable
+--!                                but its body invokes a non-inlinable function
+--!                                (depth 1; the planner can't peek through
+--!                                that boundary).
+--!
+--! @example
+--! ```
+--! SELECT severity, category, object_name, message
+--!   FROM eql_v2.lints()
+--!  WHERE severity = 'error'
+--!  ORDER BY category, object_name;
+--! ```
+--!
+--! @return SETOF record (severity text, category text, object_name text, message text)
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION eql_v2.lints()
+RETURNS TABLE (
+  severity text,
+  category text,
+  object_name text,
+  message text
+)
+LANGUAGE sql STABLE
+AS $$
+  WITH
+  -- All operators where at least one operand involves an EQL type. Limits
+  -- the scope of the lint to the operator surface customers actually hit
+  -- via SQL (`col = val`, `col LIKE '...'`, `col @> '...'` and friends).
+  eql_operators AS (
+    SELECT
+      op.oid              AS oprid,
+      op.oprname          AS opname,
+      op.oprcode          AS implfunc,
+      op.oprleft::regtype AS lhs,
+      op.oprright::regtype AS rhs,
+      op.oprcode::regprocedure AS impl_signature
+    FROM pg_operator op
+    WHERE EXISTS (
+        SELECT 1 FROM pg_type t
+         WHERE t.oid IN (op.oprleft, op.oprright)
+           AND (t.typname LIKE 'eql_v2%'
+             OR t.typnamespace = 'eql_v2'::regnamespace)
+      )
+  ),
+
+  -- Cross-join with each operator's implementation function metadata.
+  -- One row per operator; columns describe the inlinability of the impl.
+  op_impl AS (
+    SELECT
+      eo.opname,
+      eo.lhs,
+      eo.rhs,
+      eo.impl_signature::text                       AS impl_signature,
+      lang_l.lanname                                AS lang,
+      p.provolatile                                 AS volatility,
+      p.proconfig                                   AS config,
+      p.prosecdef                                   AS secdef,
+      p.prosrc                                      AS body
+    FROM eql_operators eo
+    JOIN pg_proc p ON p.oid = eo.implfunc
+    JOIN pg_language lang_l ON lang_l.oid = p.prolang
+  )
+
+  -- ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+  -- │ Direct inlinability checks: each row examines one operator's    │
+  -- │ implementation function and emits a violation if any rule is    │
+  -- │ broken. Multiple violations on the same function become         │
+  -- │ multiple rows (developers see every reason it doesn't inline).  │
+  -- └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+
+  SELECT
+    'error'                                                             AS severity,
+    'inlinability_language'                                             AS category,
+    format('operator %s(%s, %s) -> %s',
+           opname, lhs, rhs, impl_signature)                            AS object_name,
+    format(
+      'Operator implementation function is `LANGUAGE %s`; only `LANGUAGE sql` functions can be inlined by the planner. Bare `col %s val` queries fall back to seq scan even when a matching functional index exists.',
+      lang, opname)                                                     AS message
+  FROM op_impl
+  WHERE lang <> 'sql'
+
+  UNION ALL
+
+  SELECT
+    'error',
+    'inlinability_volatility',
+    format('operator %s(%s, %s) -> %s', opname, lhs, rhs, impl_signature),
+    format(
+      'Operator implementation function is `VOLATILE`. The Postgres planner refuses to inline volatile functions into index expressions, so functional indexes never engage. Mark the function `IMMUTABLE` (or `STABLE` if it depends on session state).',
+      opname)
+  FROM op_impl
+  WHERE volatility = 'v'
+
+  UNION ALL
+
+  SELECT
+    'error',
+    'inlinability_set_clause',
+    format('operator %s(%s, %s) -> %s', opname, lhs, rhs, impl_signature),
+    format(
+      'Operator implementation function has a `SET` clause (e.g. `SET search_path = ...`). Per Postgres function-inlining rules, any `SET` clause blocks inlining. Use schema-qualified identifiers in the body and remove the `SET` clause to allow the planner to inline.')
+  FROM op_impl
+  WHERE config IS NOT NULL
+
+  UNION ALL
+
+  SELECT
+    'error',
+    'inlinability_secdef',
+    format('operator %s(%s, %s) -> %s', opname, lhs, rhs, impl_signature),
+    'Operator implementation function is `SECURITY DEFINER`. Such functions cannot be inlined; remove `SECURITY DEFINER` or use a non-inlinable wrapper layer.'
+  FROM op_impl
+  WHERE secdef
+
+  -- ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+  -- │ Transitive inlinability: an operator implementation function    │
+  -- │ that's itself inlinable can still fail to inline if its body    │
+  -- │ calls a non-inlinable function. Walk one level via pg_depend.   │
+  -- │                                                                 │
+  -- │ Postgres records function-to-function dependencies in           │
+  -- │ pg_depend with deptype 'n' (normal) when one function references│
+  -- │ another in its body — but only at CREATE time and only for      │
+  -- │ direct calls. This is good enough for v1; deeper transitive     │
+  -- │ analysis is a follow-up.                                        │
+  -- └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+
+  UNION ALL
+
+  SELECT
+    'error',
+    'inlinability_transitive',
+    format('operator %s(%s, %s) -> %s', oi.opname, oi.lhs, oi.rhs,
+           oi.impl_signature),
+    format(
+      'Operator implementation function is inlinable but invokes non-inlinable function `%s` (lang=%s, volatility=%s%s). The chain blocks at depth 1: the planner inlines the outer call but cannot reduce the inner call into an index expression.',
+      called.proname,
+      called_lang.lanname,
+      CASE called.provolatile
+        WHEN 'i' THEN 'IMMUTABLE'
+        WHEN 's' THEN 'STABLE'
+        WHEN 'v' THEN 'VOLATILE'
+      END,
+      CASE WHEN called.proconfig IS NOT NULL
+           THEN ', has SET clause'
+           ELSE '' END)
+  FROM op_impl oi
+  -- Only worth the transitive check if the outer function is otherwise
+  -- inlinable — otherwise the direct lints above already report it.
+  JOIN pg_proc outer_p ON outer_p.oid = oi.impl_signature::regprocedure
+  JOIN pg_depend d
+    ON d.classid = 'pg_proc'::regclass
+   AND d.objid = outer_p.oid
+   AND d.refclassid = 'pg_proc'::regclass
+   AND d.deptype = 'n'
+  JOIN pg_proc called ON called.oid = d.refobjid
+  JOIN pg_language called_lang ON called_lang.oid = called.prolang
+  WHERE oi.lang = 'sql'
+    AND oi.volatility IN ('i', 's')
+    AND oi.config IS NULL
+    AND NOT oi.secdef
+    AND called.oid <> outer_p.oid
+    AND (
+         called_lang.lanname <> 'sql'
+      OR called.provolatile = 'v'
+      OR called.proconfig IS NOT NULL
+      OR called.prosecdef
+    )
+
+  ORDER BY 1, 2, 3;
+$$;
+
+COMMENT ON FUNCTION eql_v2.lints() IS
+  'EQL lint: returns one row per non-inlinable operator implementation. '
+  'Run `SELECT * FROM eql_v2.lints() WHERE severity = ''error''` for a '
+  'CI-gateable check that all operator implementations on EQL types are '
+  'eligible for planner inlining.';
diff --git a/tests/sqlx/tests/lint_tests.rs b/tests/sqlx/tests/lint_tests.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..200deda8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/sqlx/tests/lint_tests.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+//! EQL lint runtime tests
+//!
+//! These tests run `eql_v2.lints()` against the installed EQL surface and
+//! assert on the shape of the result.
+//!
+//! The lint is intentionally noisy on the current state of EQL — every
+//! plpgsql / VOLATILE / SET-clause-bearing operator implementation is
+//! reported. The tests here validate that the lint *runs* and that its
+//! schema is sensible. A separate stacked PR (#193, the Phase 1 operator
+//! inlining work) reduces the violation count, and at that point a
+//! tighter test asserting `count = 0` for specific operators becomes
+//! appropriate.
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use sqlx::PgPool;
+
+#[derive(Debug, sqlx::FromRow)]
+struct LintRow {
+    severity: String,
+    category: String,
+    object_name: String,
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    message: String,
+}
+
+async fn fetch_lints(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<Vec<LintRow>> {
+    let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, LintRow>(
+        "SELECT severity, category, object_name, message FROM eql_v2.lints() ORDER BY category, object_name",
+    )
+    .fetch_all(pool)
+    .await?;
+    Ok(rows)
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test]
+async fn lint_function_exists_and_returns_rows(pool: PgPool) -> Result<()> {
+    let rows = fetch_lints(&pool).await?;
+    // The current state of EQL has a non-trivial number of inlinability
+    // violations on the operator surface. Confirm the lint produces output
+    // and the columns parse correctly.
+    assert!(
+        !rows.is_empty(),
+        "Expected lint to surface at least one inlinability violation \
+         against the current EQL surface; got 0 rows"
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test]
+async fn lint_severity_values_are_well_known(pool: PgPool) -> Result<()> {
+    let rows = fetch_lints(&pool).await?;
+    for row in rows {
+        assert!(
+            matches!(row.severity.as_str(), "error" | "warning" | "info"),
+            "Unexpected severity {:?} for {} ({})",
+            row.severity,
+            row.object_name,
+            row.category
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[sqlx::test]
+async fn lint_categories_are_well_known(pool: PgPool) -> Result<()> {
+    let rows = fetch_lints(&pool).await?;
+    let allowed = [
+        "inlinability_language",
+        "inlinability_volatility",
+        "inlinability_set_clause",
+        "inlinability_secdef",
+        "inlinability_transitive",
+    ];
+    for row in rows {
+        assert!(
+            allowed.contains(&row.category.as_str()),
+            "Unexpected lint category {:?} for {}",
+            row.category,
+            row.object_name
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Smoke test: at least one operator equality / pattern operator on
+/// `eql_v2_encrypted` is reported pre-#193. Once #193 lands and reduces
+/// violations on those specific operators, this test should be updated
+/// or removed.
+#[sqlx::test]
+async fn lint_reports_eql_v2_encrypted_operators(pool: PgPool) -> Result<()> {
+    let rows = fetch_lints(&pool).await?;
+    let names: Vec<&str> = rows.iter().map(|r| r.object_name.as_str()).collect();
+    assert!(
+        names
+            .iter()
+            .any(|n| n.starts_with("operator =(eql_v2_encrypted")
+                || n.starts_with("operator <>(eql_v2_encrypted")
+                || n.starts_with("operator ~~(eql_v2_encrypted")
+                || n.starts_with("operator @>(eql_v2_encrypted")),
+        "Expected at least one violation on a core eql_v2_encrypted \
+         operator; got: {:?}",
+        names
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}