diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml
index 6d0305a..37c7182 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/release.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ jobs:
         if: steps.tag.outputs.exists == 'false'
         uses: actions/setup-node@v4
         with:
-          node-version: 20
+          node-version: 24
           registry-url: 'https://registry.npmjs.org'
 
       - name: Install dependencies
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..267158c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+## Supported versions
+
+Only the **current major** release line receives security fixes.
+
+| Version | Status              |
+| ------- | ------------------- |
+| 14.x    | ✅ Actively supported |
+| < 14    | ❌ Not supported     |
+
+Upgrade to the latest `14.x` release to receive all patches.
+
+## Reporting a vulnerability
+
+**Do not open a public GitHub issue for security reports.**
+
+Report vulnerabilities privately via **GitHub Security Advisories**:
+
+1. Go to the [Security tab](https://github.com/brmorillo/utils/security/advisories) of this repository.
+2. Click **"New draft security advisory"**.
+3. Fill in the description, affected versions, and steps to reproduce.
+4. Submit — the maintainer will be notified privately.
+
+Alternatively, send an e-mail to **bruno@rmorillo.com** with:
+- Subject: `[SECURITY] @brmorillo/utils — <short title>`
+- Affected version(s) and runtime environment.
+- A concise description and steps to reproduce.
+- (Optional) a suggested fix or patch.
+
+### Response timeline
+
+| Event | Target |
+| ----- | ------ |
+| Acknowledgement | within **48 hours** |
+| Initial triage & severity rating | within **5 business days** |
+| Patch or workaround | within **14 days** for critical/high; **30 days** for medium/low |
+| Public disclosure | after the patch is published (coordinated with reporter) |
+
+We follow [responsible disclosure](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsible_disclosure). Credit will be given in the release notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous.
+
+## Security defaults — what the library guarantees
+
+These invariants are tested in CI and must not regress:
+
+### Cryptography (`CryptUtils`)
+
+- Symmetric encryption uses **AES-256-GCM** or **ChaCha20-Poly1305** — both authenticated; the `authTag` is verified on decryption, so tampering throws.
+- RSA uses **OAEP with SHA-256** padding. PKCS#1 v1.5 is not provided.
+- ECC default curve is **prime256v1** (P-256).
+- **RC4 is intentionally absent** and must never be added.
+- AES-CBC is not provided; do not simplify back to it.
+
+### Hashing (`HashUtils`)
+
+- Password hashing uses **bcrypt** (minimum cost 10).
+- General-purpose digests are **SHA-256** and **SHA-512**.
+
+### JWT (`JWTUtils`)
+
+- `verify` enforces an `algorithms` allowlist (default `['HS256']`); the `none` algorithm is always rejected.
+- `generate` defaults to `expiresIn: '1h'` and pins `HS256`.
+- `decode` does **not** verify the signature — treat its output as untrusted.
+
+### Storage (`LocalStorageProvider`)
+
+- All file paths are confined to the configured `basePath`. Paths containing `../` or any other traversal sequence are rejected with a `StorageError`.
+
+### Object utilities (`ObjectUtils`)
+
+- `deepMerge` and `unflattenObject` silently drop keys that would modify `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` (prototype-pollution protection).
+
+### Error handling
+
+- `BaseError.toJSON()` omits the `stack` trace by default (opt in with `{ includeStack: true }`) — safe to forward in HTTP responses.
+- All library errors extend `BaseError`; the library never throws a bare `Error`.
+
+### Retry (`RetryUtils`)
+
+- Backoff is capped at `maxDelay` (default 30 s) with optional jitter to prevent thundering-herd.
+
+## Dependency policy
+
+- All runtime and dev dependencies are pinned to **exact versions** (no `^` or `~`) for reproducible installs.
+- Dependencies are updated **once a month**, intentionally staying **at least 3 months behind** the latest release to allow time for the community to detect supply-chain attacks or malicious publishes.
+- Before adopting a new runtime dependency major, it is verified to ship a **CommonJS build** (required for dual CJS+ESM output).
+- CI runs [Gitleaks](https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks) on every PR and push to `main` to detect accidentally committed secrets.
+
+## Scope
+
+In-scope for security reports:
+
+- Vulnerabilities in the library code itself (`src/`).
+- Weaknesses in the cryptographic or JWT defaults described above.
+- Path traversal or prototype-pollution bypasses.
+- Supply-chain issues in pinned dependencies.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Vulnerabilities in example code (`examples/`) — these are illustrative only.
+- Issues requiring physical access to the developer's machine.
+- Denial-of-service against the npm registry or GitHub Actions infrastructure.