diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..00271601
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+## 2025-03-09 - Sanitize Error Messages for Shell Commands with Tokens
+**Vulnerability:** Command execution error messages (like `git clone`) can leak sensitive authentication tokens injected into the URL/command if the raw `error.message` is returned directly to the client.
+**Learning:** Always sanitize output strings (using regex or redaction) before sending error messages derived from system processes to the frontend API responses, especially when tokens are involved.
+**Prevention:** Use `.replace(/https:\/\/[^@]+@/g, 'https://***@')` or similar patterns in catch blocks when handling process errors containing URLs with embedded credentials.
diff --git a/pr_body.txt b/pr_body.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cf05109b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pr_body.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+🚨 **Severity:** CRITICAL
+💡 **Vulnerability:** The API endpoint `github-clone.ts` used `exec` for cloning repositories, which parses inputs via the shell, exposing the application to Command Injection vulnerabilities. Furthermore, failure cases directly exposed the `error.message` to the client, leading to a potential leak of the Github OAuth token embedded within the clone URL.
+🎯 **Impact:** An attacker could execute arbitrary code on the server by crafting malicious inputs in the `repoUrl` or `repoName` payload. Additionally, token leakage compromises the Github account's security.
+🔧 **Fix:** Replaced `exec` with `execFile`, utilizing an argument array `['clone', '--', authUrl, repoName]` which isolates inputs strictly as arguments and prevents option injection via `--`. Intercepted the error payload in the catch block to sanitize output with `.replace(/https:\/\/[^@]+@/g, 'https://***@')`, preventing secret spillage. Added a journal entry to `.jules/sentinel.md` regarding proper process output sanitization.
+✅ **Verification:** Ran `pnpm run check` and `pnpm test` (vitest) to confirm functional stability. The patch uses exact replacement methodologies to ensure identical behavior with strict shell isolation.
diff --git a/src/pages/api/github-clone.ts b/src/pages/api/github-clone.ts
index 5ff437b8..9ccd3274 100644
--- a/src/pages/api/github-clone.ts
+++ b/src/pages/api/github-clone.ts
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 import type { APIRoute } from 'astro';
-import { exec } from 'node:child_process';
+import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
 import util from 'node:util';
 import fs from 'node:fs';
 import path from 'node:path';
 import { getReposRootResolved } from '../../lib/forge-repos';
 import { getConfig } from '../../lib/config-db';
 
-const execPromise = util.promisify(exec);
+const execFilePromise = util.promisify(execFile);
 
 export const POST: APIRoute = async ({ request }) => {
   try {
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ export const POST: APIRoute = async ({ request }) => {
     // Assuming format https://github.com/user/repo.git
     const authUrl = repoUrl.replace('https://', `https://oauth2:${githubToken}@`);
 
-    // Clone the repository
-    const { stdout, stderr } = await execPromise(`git clone ${authUrl} ${repoName}`, { cwd: reposRoot });
+    // Clone the repository securely using execFile to prevent command injection.
+    // We use '--' to prevent argument injection if the repo URL or name starts with '-'.
+    const { stdout, stderr } = await execFilePromise('git', ['clone', '--', authUrl, repoName], { cwd: reposRoot });
 
     // Try to auto-sync it into the database
     try {
@@ -53,7 +54,11 @@ export const POST: APIRoute = async ({ request }) => {
     });
 
   } catch (error: any) {
-    return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: error.message || 'Erreur lors du clonage' }), {
+    // 🛡️ Sentinel: Prevent GitHub token from leaking in error messages
+    const rawError = error.message || 'Erreur lors du clonage';
+    const safeError = rawError.replace(/https:\/\/[^@]+@/g, 'https://***@');
+
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: safeError }), {
       status: 500,
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
     });