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# Triage Guide: Mass File Enumeration in User Data Paths
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# Mass File Access in User Data Paths by Uncommon Process Triage Guide
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## Detection Title
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Mass File Enumeration in User Data Paths
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## Rule Overview
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## Detection ID
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SENT-COLL-0002
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**Title:** Mass File Access in User Data Paths by Uncommon Process
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**Rule ID:** SENT-COLL-0002
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**Severity:** Medium
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**Risk Score:** 58
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**Tactic:** Collection
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**Techniques:** T1005 - Data from Local System, T1039 - Data from Network Shared Drive
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**Platform:** Microsoft Sentinel
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**Data Source:** DeviceFileEvents
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**Lifecycle:** Experimental
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## Objective
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## Purpose
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This detection identifies processes touching large numbers of files across user data paths within a short period. This may indicate data discovery, staging, or collection activity prior to archiving or exfiltration.
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This detection identifies high-volume access to files in user data paths by uncommon processes, which may indicate collection or staging activity.
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## Why It Matters
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This matters because attackers often enumerate or access many files across user directories before:
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Large-scale file enumeration across:
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- user profiles
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- desktop folders
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- document folders
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- download directories
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- Exfiltration
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- Compression
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- Cloud upload
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- Removable media transfer
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- Internal staging
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can indicate an attempt to identify or collect valuable user data. While some legitimate tools do this, the behavior is important to review when tied to suspicious processes or timing.
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## Detection Logic Summary
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## Alert Logic Summary
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The rule reviews `DeviceFileEvents` in common user data paths such as:
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The rule looks for activity in paths such as:
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- `\Users\`
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- `\Desktop\`
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- `\Documents\`
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- `\Downloads\`
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It summarizes file touches over 15 minutes and alerts when:
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- file touches are high
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- multiple distinct user-data paths are involved
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It excludes common expected processes such as:
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- `explorer.exe`
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- `SearchIndexer.exe`
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- `OneDrive.exe`
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- `MsMpEng.exe`
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- `svchost.exe`
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The rule summarizes activity over 15-minute windows and alerts when:
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- `FileTouches >= 200`
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- `Paths >= 3`
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## Likely Analyst Goal
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Determine whether the file activity was:
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- Normal backup, sync, indexing, or administrative behavior
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- Approved enterprise software activity
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- Suspicious mass file enumeration or collection
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## Initial Triage Questions
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- What process touched the files?
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- Is the process a known backup, indexing, or security tool?
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- Was the user performing normal file-management activity?
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- Did the process also create archives or stage files?
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- Is there outbound transfer behavior soon after?
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1. What uncommon process touched the files?
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2. Is the process normal for the host or business workflow?
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3. How broad was the file access?
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4. Was the activity followed by archiving, upload, or transfer?
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5. Is there evidence of local or remote data staging?
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---
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## Investigation Steps
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1. Identify the initiating process and account.
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2. Review the time window and total file-touch volume.
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3. Confirm whether the process is expected on the host.
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4. Determine whether the activity is:
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- backup
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- search indexing
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- anti-malware scanning
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- scripted file collection
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5. Review for related activity after enumeration:
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- zip or archive creation
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- cloud upload
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- external network transfer
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- copying to temporary or staging locations
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6. Check whether the same process touched sensitive departments, shared data, or multiple users’ folders.
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## Common False Positives
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- backup agents
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- indexing services
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- anti-malware or EDR scanning
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- administrative bulk file operations
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- migration or profile-copy utilities
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## Escalation Guidance
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### 1. Review the Process Identity
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Inspect:
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- `InitiatingProcessFileName`
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- `InitiatingProcessCommandLine`
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- `InitiatingProcessAccountName`
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Determine whether the process is:
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- Known and approved
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- Rare or previously unseen
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- Unsigned
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- Running from a suspicious path
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**Why this matters:**
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Uncommon processes touching large numbers of user files can indicate collection tooling.
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---
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### 2. Review the Volume and Path Distribution
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Assess:
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- Number of file touches
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- Number of distinct paths
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- Whether activity spans multiple user folders
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- Whether the activity is broad or narrowly targeted
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**Why this matters:**
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Broad access across many directories is more consistent with automated enumeration or staging.
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---
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### 3. Determine Whether the Activity Is Expected
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Ask:
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- Is this a backup, sync, or migration utility?
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- Is the device undergoing software inventory or migration?
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- Does the process belong to approved enterprise tooling?
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- Does the user role justify large-scale file interaction?
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**Why this matters:**
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Some enterprise tools touch large file volumes as part of normal operations.
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---
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### 4. Review the Execution Context
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Check:
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- Parent process
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- Signer information
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- File path
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- Launch location
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- User-writable directory execution
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- Script host usage
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Focus on whether the process launched from:
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- `%TEMP%`
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- Downloads
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- AppData
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- USB media
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- Network shares
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**Why this matters:**
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Execution context often shows whether a process is legitimate software or suspicious tooling.
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---
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### 5. Hunt for Follow-On Staging or Exfiltration
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Look for nearby events involving:
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- Archive creation
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- ZIP or RAR usage
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- Cloud upload
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- Email transfer
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- USB transfer
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- Copies into temp folders
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- Outbound network connections
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**Why this matters:**
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Mass file access followed by transfer or compression is highly suspicious.
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---
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### 6. Assess the User and Host
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Review:
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- Whether the host is a workstation, admin system, or high-value endpoint
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- Whether the user works with large file collections
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- Whether similar file access has happened before
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- Whether other alerts exist on the same system
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**Why this matters:**
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Collection behavior on finance, HR, executive, or admin systems can have greater impact.
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---
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## Benign Explanations
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Common legitimate scenarios include:
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1. Backup, indexing, sync, or anti-malware scanning
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2. Bulk file handling by administrators or approved enterprise tooling
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3. Software inventory or migration utilities
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---
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## Suspicious Indicators
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Escalate concern when you observe:
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- Rare or unsigned process touching many files
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- Execution from temp or user-writable paths
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- Mass access followed by compression or transfer
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- Similar activity across multiple hosts
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- Concurrent credential or browser data access
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- Other compromise indicators on the host
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---
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## Triage Decision
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### Close as Benign / False Positive
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Close as benign when:
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- The process is approved and expected
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- The volume aligns to backup, inventory, or migration workflows
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- No staging or exfiltration is observed
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### Escalate as Suspicious
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Escalate when:
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- the process is unusual or unsigned
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- enumeration is followed by compression or transfer
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- the user context is suspicious
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- the process is script-based or attacker-adjacent
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- the host shows related discovery, collection, or exfiltration behavior
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## Recommended Enrichment
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- The process is uncommon or suspicious
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- File access volume is abnormal for the host
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- There is evidence of staging or transfer preparation
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### Escalate as Likely Malicious
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Escalate as likely malicious when:
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- Mass file access clearly supports collection behavior
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- Exfiltration or staging is confirmed
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- The device shows broader intrusion evidence
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---
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## Response Actions
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Depending on findings, consider:
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- Isolating the device
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- Collecting the binary and execution artifacts
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- Hunting for the same process across endpoints
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- Reviewing cloud, email, and removable media activity
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- Escalating to incident response for suspected collection and staging
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---
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## Example Analyst Notes Template
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### Analyst Summary
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- initiating process details
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- signer and file path of the process
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- parent process
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- archive creation events
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- outbound network telemetry
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- cloud application activity
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- recent alerts on the same host
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Alert fired for mass file access in user data paths by an uncommon process, potentially indicating data collection or staging activity.
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## ATT&CK Mapping
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### Key Findings
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- Collection
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- T1005 – Data from Local System
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- T1039 – Data from Network Shared Drive
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- **Affected device:**
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- **Affected user:**
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- **Process:**
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- **Command line:**
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- **File touch volume:**
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- **Distinct paths:**
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- **Expected business purpose:**
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- **Nearby staging or exfiltration behavior:**
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- **Final assessment:**
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## Related Rule
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### Recommended Disposition
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- `detections/sentinel/collection/mass-file-enumeration-in-user-data-paths.yml`
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- Benign / False Positive
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- Suspicious - Needs Deeper Investigation
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- Confirmed Malicious

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