|
1 | | -# Triage Guide: Mass File Enumeration in User Data Paths |
| 1 | +# Mass File Access in User Data Paths by Uncommon Process Triage Guide |
2 | 2 |
|
3 | | -## Detection Title |
4 | | -Mass File Enumeration in User Data Paths |
| 3 | +## Rule Overview |
5 | 4 |
|
6 | | -## Detection ID |
7 | | -SENT-COLL-0002 |
| 5 | +**Title:** Mass File Access in User Data Paths by Uncommon Process |
| 6 | +**Rule ID:** SENT-COLL-0002 |
| 7 | +**Severity:** Medium |
| 8 | +**Risk Score:** 58 |
| 9 | +**Tactic:** Collection |
| 10 | +**Techniques:** T1005 - Data from Local System, T1039 - Data from Network Shared Drive |
| 11 | +**Platform:** Microsoft Sentinel |
| 12 | +**Data Source:** DeviceFileEvents |
| 13 | +**Lifecycle:** Experimental |
8 | 14 |
|
9 | | -## Objective |
| 15 | +## Purpose |
10 | 16 |
|
11 | | -This detection identifies processes touching large numbers of files across user data paths within a short period. This may indicate data discovery, staging, or collection activity prior to archiving or exfiltration. |
| 17 | +This detection identifies high-volume access to files in user data paths by uncommon processes, which may indicate collection or staging activity. |
12 | 18 |
|
13 | | -## Why It Matters |
| 19 | +This matters because attackers often enumerate or access many files across user directories before: |
14 | 20 |
|
15 | | -Large-scale file enumeration across: |
16 | | -- user profiles |
17 | | -- desktop folders |
18 | | -- document folders |
19 | | -- download directories |
| 21 | +- Exfiltration |
| 22 | +- Compression |
| 23 | +- Cloud upload |
| 24 | +- Removable media transfer |
| 25 | +- Internal staging |
20 | 26 |
|
21 | | -can indicate an attempt to identify or collect valuable user data. While some legitimate tools do this, the behavior is important to review when tied to suspicious processes or timing. |
| 27 | +## Detection Logic Summary |
22 | 28 |
|
23 | | -## Alert Logic Summary |
| 29 | +The rule reviews `DeviceFileEvents` in common user data paths such as: |
24 | 30 |
|
25 | | -The rule looks for activity in paths such as: |
26 | 31 | - `\Users\` |
27 | 32 | - `\Desktop\` |
28 | 33 | - `\Documents\` |
29 | 34 | - `\Downloads\` |
30 | 35 |
|
31 | | -It summarizes file touches over 15 minutes and alerts when: |
32 | | -- file touches are high |
33 | | -- multiple distinct user-data paths are involved |
| 36 | +It excludes common expected processes such as: |
| 37 | + |
| 38 | +- `explorer.exe` |
| 39 | +- `SearchIndexer.exe` |
| 40 | +- `OneDrive.exe` |
| 41 | +- `MsMpEng.exe` |
| 42 | +- `svchost.exe` |
| 43 | + |
| 44 | +The rule summarizes activity over 15-minute windows and alerts when: |
| 45 | + |
| 46 | +- `FileTouches >= 200` |
| 47 | +- `Paths >= 3` |
| 48 | + |
| 49 | +## Likely Analyst Goal |
| 50 | + |
| 51 | +Determine whether the file activity was: |
| 52 | + |
| 53 | +- Normal backup, sync, indexing, or administrative behavior |
| 54 | +- Approved enterprise software activity |
| 55 | +- Suspicious mass file enumeration or collection |
34 | 56 |
|
35 | 57 | ## Initial Triage Questions |
36 | 58 |
|
37 | | -- What process touched the files? |
38 | | -- Is the process a known backup, indexing, or security tool? |
39 | | -- Was the user performing normal file-management activity? |
40 | | -- Did the process also create archives or stage files? |
41 | | -- Is there outbound transfer behavior soon after? |
| 59 | +1. What uncommon process touched the files? |
| 60 | +2. Is the process normal for the host or business workflow? |
| 61 | +3. How broad was the file access? |
| 62 | +4. Was the activity followed by archiving, upload, or transfer? |
| 63 | +5. Is there evidence of local or remote data staging? |
| 64 | + |
| 65 | +--- |
42 | 66 |
|
43 | 67 | ## Investigation Steps |
44 | 68 |
|
45 | | -1. Identify the initiating process and account. |
46 | | -2. Review the time window and total file-touch volume. |
47 | | -3. Confirm whether the process is expected on the host. |
48 | | -4. Determine whether the activity is: |
49 | | - - backup |
50 | | - - search indexing |
51 | | - - anti-malware scanning |
52 | | - - scripted file collection |
53 | | -5. Review for related activity after enumeration: |
54 | | - - zip or archive creation |
55 | | - - cloud upload |
56 | | - - external network transfer |
57 | | - - copying to temporary or staging locations |
58 | | -6. Check whether the same process touched sensitive departments, shared data, or multiple users’ folders. |
59 | | - |
60 | | -## Common False Positives |
61 | | - |
62 | | -- backup agents |
63 | | -- indexing services |
64 | | -- anti-malware or EDR scanning |
65 | | -- administrative bulk file operations |
66 | | -- migration or profile-copy utilities |
67 | | - |
68 | | -## Escalation Guidance |
| 69 | +### 1. Review the Process Identity |
| 70 | + |
| 71 | +Inspect: |
| 72 | + |
| 73 | +- `InitiatingProcessFileName` |
| 74 | +- `InitiatingProcessCommandLine` |
| 75 | +- `InitiatingProcessAccountName` |
| 76 | + |
| 77 | +Determine whether the process is: |
| 78 | + |
| 79 | +- Known and approved |
| 80 | +- Rare or previously unseen |
| 81 | +- Unsigned |
| 82 | +- Running from a suspicious path |
| 83 | + |
| 84 | +**Why this matters:** |
| 85 | +Uncommon processes touching large numbers of user files can indicate collection tooling. |
| 86 | + |
| 87 | +--- |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | +### 2. Review the Volume and Path Distribution |
| 90 | + |
| 91 | +Assess: |
| 92 | + |
| 93 | +- Number of file touches |
| 94 | +- Number of distinct paths |
| 95 | +- Whether activity spans multiple user folders |
| 96 | +- Whether the activity is broad or narrowly targeted |
| 97 | + |
| 98 | +**Why this matters:** |
| 99 | +Broad access across many directories is more consistent with automated enumeration or staging. |
| 100 | + |
| 101 | +--- |
| 102 | + |
| 103 | +### 3. Determine Whether the Activity Is Expected |
| 104 | + |
| 105 | +Ask: |
| 106 | + |
| 107 | +- Is this a backup, sync, or migration utility? |
| 108 | +- Is the device undergoing software inventory or migration? |
| 109 | +- Does the process belong to approved enterprise tooling? |
| 110 | +- Does the user role justify large-scale file interaction? |
| 111 | + |
| 112 | +**Why this matters:** |
| 113 | +Some enterprise tools touch large file volumes as part of normal operations. |
| 114 | + |
| 115 | +--- |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | +### 4. Review the Execution Context |
| 118 | + |
| 119 | +Check: |
| 120 | + |
| 121 | +- Parent process |
| 122 | +- Signer information |
| 123 | +- File path |
| 124 | +- Launch location |
| 125 | +- User-writable directory execution |
| 126 | +- Script host usage |
| 127 | + |
| 128 | +Focus on whether the process launched from: |
| 129 | + |
| 130 | +- `%TEMP%` |
| 131 | +- Downloads |
| 132 | +- AppData |
| 133 | +- USB media |
| 134 | +- Network shares |
| 135 | + |
| 136 | +**Why this matters:** |
| 137 | +Execution context often shows whether a process is legitimate software or suspicious tooling. |
| 138 | + |
| 139 | +--- |
| 140 | + |
| 141 | +### 5. Hunt for Follow-On Staging or Exfiltration |
| 142 | + |
| 143 | +Look for nearby events involving: |
| 144 | + |
| 145 | +- Archive creation |
| 146 | +- ZIP or RAR usage |
| 147 | +- Cloud upload |
| 148 | +- Email transfer |
| 149 | +- USB transfer |
| 150 | +- Copies into temp folders |
| 151 | +- Outbound network connections |
| 152 | + |
| 153 | +**Why this matters:** |
| 154 | +Mass file access followed by transfer or compression is highly suspicious. |
| 155 | + |
| 156 | +--- |
| 157 | + |
| 158 | +### 6. Assess the User and Host |
| 159 | + |
| 160 | +Review: |
| 161 | + |
| 162 | +- Whether the host is a workstation, admin system, or high-value endpoint |
| 163 | +- Whether the user works with large file collections |
| 164 | +- Whether similar file access has happened before |
| 165 | +- Whether other alerts exist on the same system |
| 166 | + |
| 167 | +**Why this matters:** |
| 168 | +Collection behavior on finance, HR, executive, or admin systems can have greater impact. |
| 169 | + |
| 170 | +--- |
| 171 | + |
| 172 | +## Benign Explanations |
| 173 | + |
| 174 | +Common legitimate scenarios include: |
| 175 | + |
| 176 | +1. Backup, indexing, sync, or anti-malware scanning |
| 177 | +2. Bulk file handling by administrators or approved enterprise tooling |
| 178 | +3. Software inventory or migration utilities |
| 179 | + |
| 180 | +--- |
| 181 | + |
| 182 | +## Suspicious Indicators |
| 183 | + |
| 184 | +Escalate concern when you observe: |
| 185 | + |
| 186 | +- Rare or unsigned process touching many files |
| 187 | +- Execution from temp or user-writable paths |
| 188 | +- Mass access followed by compression or transfer |
| 189 | +- Similar activity across multiple hosts |
| 190 | +- Concurrent credential or browser data access |
| 191 | +- Other compromise indicators on the host |
| 192 | + |
| 193 | +--- |
| 194 | + |
| 195 | +## Triage Decision |
| 196 | + |
| 197 | +### Close as Benign / False Positive |
| 198 | + |
| 199 | +Close as benign when: |
| 200 | + |
| 201 | +- The process is approved and expected |
| 202 | +- The volume aligns to backup, inventory, or migration workflows |
| 203 | +- No staging or exfiltration is observed |
| 204 | + |
| 205 | +### Escalate as Suspicious |
69 | 206 |
|
70 | 207 | Escalate when: |
71 | | -- the process is unusual or unsigned |
72 | | -- enumeration is followed by compression or transfer |
73 | | -- the user context is suspicious |
74 | | -- the process is script-based or attacker-adjacent |
75 | | -- the host shows related discovery, collection, or exfiltration behavior |
76 | 208 |
|
77 | | -## Recommended Enrichment |
| 209 | +- The process is uncommon or suspicious |
| 210 | +- File access volume is abnormal for the host |
| 211 | +- There is evidence of staging or transfer preparation |
| 212 | + |
| 213 | +### Escalate as Likely Malicious |
| 214 | + |
| 215 | +Escalate as likely malicious when: |
| 216 | + |
| 217 | +- Mass file access clearly supports collection behavior |
| 218 | +- Exfiltration or staging is confirmed |
| 219 | +- The device shows broader intrusion evidence |
| 220 | + |
| 221 | +--- |
| 222 | + |
| 223 | +## Response Actions |
| 224 | + |
| 225 | +Depending on findings, consider: |
| 226 | + |
| 227 | +- Isolating the device |
| 228 | +- Collecting the binary and execution artifacts |
| 229 | +- Hunting for the same process across endpoints |
| 230 | +- Reviewing cloud, email, and removable media activity |
| 231 | +- Escalating to incident response for suspected collection and staging |
| 232 | + |
| 233 | +--- |
| 234 | + |
| 235 | +## Example Analyst Notes Template |
| 236 | + |
| 237 | +### Analyst Summary |
78 | 238 |
|
79 | | -- initiating process details |
80 | | -- signer and file path of the process |
81 | | -- parent process |
82 | | -- archive creation events |
83 | | -- outbound network telemetry |
84 | | -- cloud application activity |
85 | | -- recent alerts on the same host |
| 239 | +Alert fired for mass file access in user data paths by an uncommon process, potentially indicating data collection or staging activity. |
86 | 240 |
|
87 | | -## ATT&CK Mapping |
| 241 | +### Key Findings |
88 | 242 |
|
89 | | -- Collection |
90 | | -- T1005 – Data from Local System |
91 | | -- T1039 – Data from Network Shared Drive |
| 243 | +- **Affected device:** |
| 244 | +- **Affected user:** |
| 245 | +- **Process:** |
| 246 | +- **Command line:** |
| 247 | +- **File touch volume:** |
| 248 | +- **Distinct paths:** |
| 249 | +- **Expected business purpose:** |
| 250 | +- **Nearby staging or exfiltration behavior:** |
| 251 | +- **Final assessment:** |
92 | 252 |
|
93 | | -## Related Rule |
| 253 | +### Recommended Disposition |
94 | 254 |
|
95 | | -- `detections/sentinel/collection/mass-file-enumeration-in-user-data-paths.yml` |
| 255 | +- Benign / False Positive |
| 256 | +- Suspicious - Needs Deeper Investigation |
| 257 | +- Confirmed Malicious |
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