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Design proposal: Embodied AI Evidence Profile for physical-action traces #337

Description

@carloshvp

Context

I would like to propose a focused design discussion for an Embodied AI Evidence Profile in cMCP/TRACE.

This builds on #301, where external_execution_evidence landed as an optional AuditEntry field for binding an independent issuer's signed assertion to a call. That first iteration established the right trust boundary: response_payload_hash remains "what the gateway forwarded", while external_execution_evidence is "what an independent authority attested".

The next question is whether cMCP/TRACE should define a small profile for embodied-agent workflows that composes that primitive with governance decision context, controller handoff metadata, and optional downstream receipts.

Why this matters

Embodied-agent workflows introduce a gap between:

  • the governance decision that allows or denies a physical-action request,
  • the tool or controller handoff that follows that decision, and
  • any downstream receipt that claims what an external controller, monitor, or safety authority decided.

A governance layer can decide whether a physical-action request should be allowed, but it does not by itself prove what was sent to a controller, which policy/context was used, or how later receipts should be bound back to the original decision.

This proposal is intentionally scoped to evidence binding, not physical safety, hardware attestation, real-time control, or proof of physical completion.

Related work

The distinction I am trying to preserve is:

  • AGT / governance layer: decides whether a physical-action request should proceed under policy.
  • cMCP / TRACE evidence layer: binds the request, decision context, handoff, and optional external receipts into an auditable chain.

Possible profile shape

A first profile could define how an embodied action trace binds fields such as:

  • action_digest
  • policy_version
  • governance_decision
  • approval_context
  • controller_target
  • handoff_timestamp
  • external_execution_evidence
  • receipt_digest
  • receipt_type
  • evidence_limitations

The goal would be to define the minimum useful evidence shape for verification without implying that cMCP observed physical execution or certified safety behavior.

Open questions

  • Should this be a standalone TRACE profile, or an extension/profile of the existing external_execution_evidence field?
  • What fields are minimally required for useful embodied-action verification?
  • How should the profile represent missing, partial, stale, or untrusted downstream receipts?
  • Should verifier behavior be specified here, or should this issue define only the evidence shape and leave verifier rules to a follow-up?
  • Should controller/tool identity be linked through Agent Manifest identity binding when available?
  • How should this profile avoid duplicating or overloading response_payload_hash?

Non-goals

If maintainers think this direction fits the project, I am happy to draft a first profile sketch and keep it scoped to evidence semantics, verification boundaries, and compatibility with the existing audit model.

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