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Add comprehensive security audit #67

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Add comprehensive security audit#67
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@Sam-Bolling

Description

@Sam-Bolling
Sam-Bolling
opened on Jan 28, 2026

Problem

The ogc-client-CSAPI library has no comprehensive security audit to identify vulnerabilities, assess security risks, and establish security best practices. While the library implements OGC standards with 98% compliance and demonstrates excellent architecture, security has not been systematically evaluated.

Current Security Posture:

  • ✅ Type Safety: Comprehensive TypeScript types reduce runtime errors
  • ✅ Input Validation: Validators for GeoJSON, SWE Common (97.4%+ coverage)
  • ✅ Error Handling: Extensive error handling with detailed messages
  • ❌ Security Audit: No systematic security review
  • ❌ Dependency Scanning: No automated vulnerability scanning
  • ❌ Threat Modeling: No security threat assessment
  • ❌ Security Testing: No dedicated security test suite
  • ❌ Security Documentation: No security best practices guide

Missing Security Assessments:

1. Dependency Vulnerabilities

  • Risk: Third-party packages may have known CVEs
  • Current State: No automated dependency scanning (npm audit, Snyk, Dependabot)
  • Impact: Users may unknowingly use library with vulnerable dependencies

2. Input Validation Gaps

  • Risk: Malicious or malformed data could cause crashes, injection attacks, or DoS
  • Current State: Validators exist but not comprehensive (GeoJSON 40.95%, SWE 73.68%)
  • Areas of Concern:
    • URL parameter injection (bbox, datetime, query strings)
    • JSON parsing vulnerabilities (prototype pollution, deep nesting)
    • Regular expression DoS (ReDoS) in parsers
    • XML injection in SensorML (if supported)
    • XSS vectors in string properties

3. Authentication/Authorization Handling

  • Risk: Improper credential handling could leak sensitive data
  • Current State: Library accepts arbitrary fetch options (including headers)
  • Areas of Concern:
    • API keys/tokens in URLs (logged, cached, exposed)
    • Bearer tokens in request headers (storage, transmission)
    • Cookie handling (HttpOnly, Secure flags)
    • CORS configuration

4. Data Sanitization

  • Risk: Unsanitized user-provided data could enable XSS, injection attacks
  • Current State: No explicit sanitization in parsers or builders
  • Areas of Concern:
    • User-provided strings in properties (name, description, label)
    • URLs in link arrays (href fields)
    • GeoJSON properties (arbitrary key-value pairs)
    • SWE Common textual values

5. Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerabilities

  • Risk: Malicious data could exhaust resources (CPU, memory, stack)
  • Current State: No explicit DoS protection mechanisms
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Deeply nested JSON structures (stack overflow)
    • Extremely large GeoJSON collections (memory exhaustion)
    • Circular references in objects (infinite loops)
    • Complex regular expressions (ReDoS)
    • Large query parameters (URL length limits)

6. Cryptographic Security

  • Risk: Weak crypto could compromise data integrity/confidentiality
  • Current State: No cryptographic operations in library
  • Future Considerations:
    • If adding ETags: Hash function choice (MD5 vs SHA-256)
    • If adding authentication: Token generation, storage
    • If adding encryption: Algorithm selection, key management

7. Supply Chain Security

  • Risk: Compromised build pipeline could inject malicious code
  • Current State: No build provenance, no signing
  • Areas of Concern:
    • NPM package integrity (no package lock file verification)
    • Build script security (arbitrary code execution)
    • CI/CD pipeline security (GitHub Actions)
    • Release artifact signing (provenance)

Real-World Security Scenarios:

Scenario 1: Prototype Pollution Attack

// Malicious server response
const maliciousResponse = {
  "type": "Feature",
  "properties": {
    "name": "Sensor-123",
    "__proto__": {
      "isAdmin": true  // Prototype pollution!
    }
  }
};

// Current parser may not sanitize __proto__
const system = systemParser.parse(maliciousResponse);

// Later code checks:
if (user.isAdmin) {  // Now ALL objects have isAdmin=true!
  // Unauthorized access
}

Scenario 2: ReDoS (Regular Expression DoS)

// If parser uses vulnerable regex like: /^(a+)+$/
// Malicious datetime parameter
const maliciousDatetime = "a".repeat(50) + "!";

// Regex backtracking causes CPU spike
validateDatetime(maliciousDatetime);  // Hangs for minutes

Scenario 3: Deep Nesting DoS

// Malicious deeply nested GeoJSON
const maliciousGeoJSON = {
  "type": "FeatureCollection",
  "features": [
    { "properties": { 
      "nested": { "nested": { "nested": { /* 1000 levels deep */ } } }
    }}
  ]
};

// Recursive parsing causes stack overflow
const parsed = parser.parse(maliciousGeoJSON);  // Stack overflow!

Scenario 4: Credential Leakage via URL

// Developer accidentally puts API key in URL
const systems = await navigator.getSystems({
  apiKey: 'secret-key-12345'  // Gets logged, cached, exposed in URLs
});

// URL is: https://api.example.com/systems?apiKey=secret-key-12345
// - Logged in browser history
// - Cached by HTTP cache
// - Visible in server logs
// - Exposed in Referer headers

Scenario 5: XSS via Unsanitized Properties

// Malicious server sends XSS payload
const maliciousSystem = {
  "type": "Feature",
  "properties": {
    "name": "\u003cscript\u003ealert('XSS')\u003c/script\u003e",
    "description": "\u003cimg src=x onerror='steal_cookies()'\u003e"
  }
};

// Application renders without sanitization
document.getElementById('systemName').innerHTML = system.properties.name;
// XSS executed!

Context

This issue was identified during the comprehensive validation conducted January 27-28, 2026.

Related Validation Issues: #20 (OGC Standards Compliance), #23 (Architecture Assessment)

Work Item ID: 44 from Remaining Work Items

Repository: https://github.com/OS4CSAPI/ogc-client-CSAPI

Validated Commit: a71706b9592cad7a5ad06e6cf8ddc41fa5387732

Detailed Findings

1. Current Security-Related Features (Issue #23)

From Issue #23 Architecture Validation Report:

Strengths with Security Implications:

Type Safety (Confirmed):

  • ✅ Comprehensive TypeScript types for all resources (4,159 lines)
  • ✅ Generic interfaces (ParseResult<T>, CSAPIParser<T>)
  • ✅ Type guards (isCSAPIFeature) for runtime checking
  • ✅ Discriminated unions (featureType literals)
  • Security Benefit: Type safety reduces runtime errors, prevents type confusion attacks

Input Validation (Confirmed):

  • ✅ GeoJSON validator (61 tests, 97.4% coverage) - but only 40.95% of spec
  • ✅ SWE Common validator (50 tests, 100% coverage) - but only 73.68% of spec
  • ⚠️ SensorML validator exists but not integrated into parsers
  • Security Gap: Incomplete validation coverage leaves attack surface

Error Handling (Confirmed):

  • ✅ Extensive error handling with CSAPIParseError
  • ✅ Clear error messages with context
  • ✅ Validation errors captured in ParseResult
  • Security Benefit: Proper error handling prevents information leakage
  • Security Gap: Error messages may expose internal details

Production Ready (Confirmed):

  • ✅ 94% test coverage (832+ tests)
  • ✅ Comprehensive JSDoc documentation
  • ✅ Optional validation (opt-in)
  • Security Benefit: High test coverage catches bugs before production
  • Security Gap: No dedicated security tests

2. Parser Vulnerabilities (Issue #23)

From Issue #23 Validation Report:

Parsing Layer: src/ogc-api/csapi/parsers/base.ts (13,334 bytes)

export abstract class CSAPIParser<T> {
  parse(data: unknown, options: ParserOptions = {}): ParseResult<T> {
    const format = detectFormat(options.contentType, data);
    
    let parsed: T;
    switch (format.format) {
      case 'geojson': parsed = this.parseGeoJSON(data); break;
      case 'sensorml': parsed = this.parseSensorML(data); break;
      case 'swe': parsed = this.parseSWE(data); break;
    }

    if (options.validate) {
      const validationResult = this.validate(parsed, format.format);
    }

    return { data: parsed, format, errors, warnings };
  }
}

Security Concerns:

  1. No input sanitization before parsing
  2. Validation is optional (default: false) - most users don't validate
  3. Unknown data type (data: unknown) - no type guard before parsing
  4. No recursion depth limit - vulnerable to deep nesting DoS
  5. No size limit - vulnerable to memory exhaustion

Potential Attack Vectors:

  • Prototype pollution via __proto__, constructor, prototype keys
  • Stack overflow via deeply nested objects
  • Memory exhaustion via extremely large arrays
  • ReDoS in format detection or validation regexes

3. URL Building Security (Issue #20, #23)

From Issue #20 Validation Report:

Navigator URL Building: src/ogc-api/csapi/navigator.ts (2,091 lines)

getSystemsUrl(options: SystemsQueryOptions = {}): string {
  const url = new URL(`${this.baseUrl}/systems`);
  
  if (options.limit !== undefined) {
    url.searchParams.set('limit', options.limit.toString());
  }
  
  if (options.bbox !== undefined) {
    url.searchParams.set('bbox', this._serializeBbox(options.bbox));
  }
  
  // ... more parameters
  
  return url.toString();
}

Security Concerns:

  1. No URL parameter validation - accepts arbitrary values
  2. No URL encoding validation - could break with special characters
  3. No URL length limits - could exceed server limits (414 error)
  4. No sensitive parameter warnings - developers could put secrets in URLs

Potential Attack Vectors:

  • URL injection via malicious bbox, datetime, q parameters
  • Parameter pollution (e.g., limit=10&limit=9999999)
  • Server-side template injection if server processes query strings unsafely
  • Credential leakage if developers put API keys in query parameters

4. Validation Coverage Gaps (Issues #12, #14)

From Issue #12 (GeoJSON Validation):

Actual Coverage: 40.95% (78 of 190+ validation criteria)
Documented Claim: 97.4% (misleading - refers to test coverage, not spec coverage)

Missing GeoJSON Validations:

  • ❌ Geometry coordinate validation (no range checking, no CRS validation)
  • ❌ Link structure validation (no URL format checking, no rel validation)
  • ❌ Temporal validation (no ISO 8601 enforcement, no range validation)
  • ❌ Property value validation (arbitrary data accepted)
  • ❌ Collection-level validation (0% coverage)

From Issue #14 (SWE Common Validation):

Actual Coverage: 73.68% (84 of 114+ validation criteria)
Documented Claim: 100% (misleading - refers to test coverage, not spec coverage)

Missing SWE Common Validations:

  • ❌ Boolean, Vector, Matrix, DataStream, DataChoice, Geometry validators
  • ❌ Definition and label validation (required per OGC 24-014)
  • ❌ Recursive validation for nested DataRecord/DataArray
  • ❌ Constraint validation (allowedValues, allowedTimes)

Security Impact:

  • Malicious data can bypass validation
  • No protection against malformed or adversarial inputs
  • Parser may crash or behave unexpectedly with invalid data

5. Dependency Security (No Evidence of Scanning)

Current Dependencies (from typical OGC client libraries):

  • TypeScript (build-time)
  • Testing frameworks (jest, ts-jest)
  • Possibly: fetch polyfills, WebSocket libraries, etc.

Security Risks:

  • Dependencies may have known CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures)
  • Transitive dependencies (dependencies of dependencies) may be vulnerable
  • Outdated packages may have unpatched security issues

No Evidence of:

  • npm audit in CI/CD pipeline
  • Snyk integration
  • Dependabot alerts
  • SBOM (Software Bill of Materials)
  • Security policy (SECURITY.md)

6. Authentication/Authorization Gaps (Issue #20)

From Issue #20 Validation Report:

TypedCSAPINavigator: src/ogc-api/csapi/typed-navigator.ts

private async _fetch(
  url: string,
  options: TypedFetchOptions = {}
): Promise<Response> {
  const fetchFn = options.fetch || fetch;
  const headers: Record<string, string> = {
    ...options.headers,  // User-provided headers
  };
  
  const response = await fetchFn(url, { headers });
  return response;
}

Security Concerns:

  1. Arbitrary headers accepted - no validation
  2. No credential storage guidance - developers may store insecurely
  3. No HTTPS enforcement - allows insecure HTTP
  4. No authentication helpers - developers implement ad-hoc solutions
  5. No token refresh logic - stale tokens cause auth failures

Insecure Usage Examples:

// BAD: API key in URL
const systems = await navigator.getSystems({ apiKey: 'secret' });

// BAD: Token in localStorage (XSS vulnerability)
localStorage.setItem('token', 'bearer-token-123');
const systems = await navigator.getSystems({
  headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${localStorage.getItem('token')}` }
});

// BAD: Credentials in source code
const systems = await navigator.getSystems({
  headers: { 'X-API-Key': 'hardcoded-secret-key' }
});

7. No Security Documentation (Confirmed)

Documentation Files Examined:

  • README.md - No security section
  • No SECURITY.md file
  • No security best practices guide
  • No threat model documentation
  • No vulnerability disclosure policy

Impact:

  • Developers don't know how to use library securely
  • No guidance on credential management
  • No recommendations for input sanitization
  • No security contact for reporting vulnerabilities

Proposed Solution

1. Automated Dependency Scanning

Integrate Automated Tools:

# .github/workflows/security.yml
name: Security Audit

on: [push, pull_request, schedule]

jobs:
  dependency-scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
      
      # NPM Audit
      - name: Run npm audit
        run: npm audit --audit-level=moderate
      
      # Snyk Security Scan
      - name: Snyk Security Scan
        uses: snyk/actions/node@master
        env:
          SNYK_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SNYK_TOKEN }}
      
      # OWASP Dependency Check
      - name: OWASP Dependency Check
        uses: dependency-check/Dependency-Check_Action@main

Enable Dependabot:

# .github/dependabot.yml
version: 2
updates:
  - package-ecosystem: "npm"
    directory: "/"
    schedule:
      interval: "weekly"
    open-pull-requests-limit: 10
    
    # Auto-merge minor/patch updates
    auto-merge: true
    
    # Security updates only
    security-updates-only: false

2. Input Validation Security Enhancements

Add Sanitization Layer:

// New file: src/ogc-api/csapi/security/sanitizer.ts

export class InputSanitizer {
  /**
   * Sanitize JSON object to prevent prototype pollution
   */
  static sanitizeJSON(obj: unknown): unknown {
    if (obj === null || typeof obj !== 'object') {
      return obj;
    }
    
    if (Array.isArray(obj)) {
      return obj.map(item => this.sanitizeJSON(item));
    }
    
    const sanitized: Record<string, unknown> = {};
    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj)) {
      // Block prototype pollution keys
      if (key === '__proto__' || key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype') {
        continue;
      }
      
      sanitized[key] = this.sanitizeJSON(value);
    }
    
    return sanitized;
  }
  
  /**
   * Validate and sanitize string to prevent XSS
   */
  static sanitizeString(str: string, options: { maxLength?: number } = {}): string {
    // Trim whitespace
    str = str.trim();
    
    // Enforce max length
    if (options.maxLength && str.length > options.maxLength) {
      throw new Error(`String exceeds max length of ${options.maxLength}`);
    }
    
    // Remove control characters (except newline, tab)
    str = str.replace(/[\x00-\x08\x0B\x0C\x0E-\x1F\x7F]/g, '');
    
    // Optionally escape HTML (if used in browser)
    // str = str.replace(/[<>"'&]/g, char => entityMap[char]);
    
    return str;
  }
  
  /**
   * Validate URL to prevent injection
   */
  static sanitizeURL(url: string): string {
    try {
      const parsed = new URL(url);
      
      // Only allow http/https protocols
      if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
        throw new Error(`Invalid URL protocol: ${parsed.protocol}`);
      }
      
      return parsed.toString();
    } catch {
      throw new Error(`Invalid URL: ${url}`);
    }
  }
  
  /**
   * Limit recursion depth to prevent stack overflow
   */
  static checkDepth(obj: unknown, maxDepth: number = 100): void {
    const check = (o: unknown, depth: number) => {
      if (depth > maxDepth) {
        throw new Error(`Object nesting exceeds max depth of ${maxDepth}`);
      }
      
      if (o && typeof o === 'object') {
        for (const value of Object.values(o)) {
          check(value, depth + 1);
        }
      }
    };
    
    check(obj, 0);
  }
  
  /**
   * Limit collection size to prevent memory exhaustion
   */
  static checkSize(arr: unknown[], maxSize: number = 10000): void {
    if (arr.length > maxSize) {
      throw new Error(`Collection size ${arr.length} exceeds max of ${maxSize}`);
    }
  }
}

Integrate into Parser:

// Modify: src/ogc-api/csapi/parsers/base.ts

export abstract class CSAPIParser<T> {
  parse(data: unknown, options: ParserOptions = {}): ParseResult<T> {
    // SECURITY: Sanitize input before parsing
    data = InputSanitizer.sanitizeJSON(data);
    
    // SECURITY: Check nesting depth
    InputSanitizer.checkDepth(data, options.maxDepth || 100);
    
    // SECURITY: Check collection size (if array)
    if (Array.isArray(data)) {
      InputSanitizer.checkSize(data, options.maxSize || 10000);
    }
    
    // Continue with normal parsing
    const format = detectFormat(options.contentType, data);
    // ...
  }
}

3. ReDoS Protection

Audit Regular Expressions:

// Tools to detect vulnerable regexes:
// - npm install -g safe-regex
// - npm install -g eslint-plugin-security

// Example vulnerable regex:
const VULNERABLE = /^(a+)+$/;  // Exponential backtracking!

// Example safe regex:
const SAFE = /^a+$/;  // Linear time

// Audit all regexes in:
// - formats.ts (format detection)
// - validation/ (validators)
// - parsers/ (parsing logic)

Add Regex Timeout:

// New utility: src/shared/safe-regex.ts

export function safeRegexTest(
  regex: RegExp,
  str: string,
  timeoutMs: number = 1000
): boolean {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    const timeout = setTimeout(() => {
      reject(new Error('Regex timeout - potential ReDoS'));
    }, timeoutMs);
    
    try {
      const result = regex.test(str);
      clearTimeout(timeout);
      resolve(result);
    } catch (error) {
      clearTimeout(timeout);
      reject(error);
    }
  });
}

4. Authentication/Authorization Best Practices

Create Security Guide:

// New file: src/ogc-api/csapi/security/auth-helpers.ts

/**
 * Secure authentication helper
 */
export class SecureAuthHelper {
  /**
   * RECOMMENDED: Use Authorization header for tokens
   * DO NOT put credentials in URL parameters!
   */
  static createBearerAuthHeaders(token: string): Record<string, string> {
    if (!token || typeof token !== 'string') {
      throw new Error('Invalid token');
    }
    
    return {
      'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`
    };
  }
  
  /**
   * RECOMMENDED: Use API key header
   * DO NOT put API keys in URL parameters!
   */
  static createAPIKeyHeaders(apiKey: string): Record<string, string> {
    if (!apiKey || typeof apiKey !== 'string') {
      throw new Error('Invalid API key');
    }
    
    return {
      'X-API-Key': apiKey
    };
  }
  
  /**
   * RECOMMENDED: Check HTTPS enforcement
   */
  static enforceHTTPS(url: string): void {
    const parsed = new URL(url);
    if (parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
      console.warn('WARNING: Using insecure HTTP connection. Use HTTPS in production!');
    }
  }
  
  /**
   * SECURITY WARNING: Detect credentials in URLs
   */
  static detectCredentialsInURL(url: string): void {
    const suspiciousParams = ['apiKey', 'api_key', 'token', 'secret', 'password', 'key'];
    const parsed = new URL(url);
    
    for (const param of suspiciousParams) {
      if (parsed.searchParams.has(param)) {
        throw new Error(
          `SECURITY WARNING: Credential parameter '${param}' detected in URL. ` +
          `Use Authorization header instead!`
        );
      }
    }
  }
}

Usage Example (Secure):

import { TypedCSAPINavigator, SecureAuthHelper } from 'ogc-client-csapi';

// RECOMMENDED: Token from environment variable
const token = process.env.CSAPI_TOKEN;

// RECOMMENDED: Use Authorization header
const navigator = new TypedCSAPINavigator(collection, {
  headers: SecureAuthHelper.createBearerAuthHeaders(token)
});

// RECOMMENDED: Check HTTPS
SecureAuthHelper.enforceHTTPS(baseUrl);

// Get systems (securely authenticated)
const systems = await navigator.getSystems();

5. Security Testing Suite

Create Security Test Suite:

// New file: tests/security/security.spec.ts

describe('Security Tests', () => {
  describe('Prototype Pollution Prevention', () => {
    it('should block __proto__ in JSON', () => {
      const malicious = {
        type: 'Feature',
        properties: {
          __proto__: { isAdmin: true }
        }
      };
      
      const result = systemParser.parse(malicious);
      
      // Should not pollute prototype
      expect(({} as any).isAdmin).toBeUndefined();
    });
    
    it('should block constructor in JSON', () => {
      const malicious = {
        type: 'Feature',
        properties: {
          constructor: { prototype: { isAdmin: true } }
        }
      };
      
      const result = systemParser.parse(malicious);
      expect(({} as any).isAdmin).toBeUndefined();
    });
  });
  
  describe('DoS Prevention', () => {
    it('should reject deeply nested objects', () => {
      // Create 200-level deep nesting
      let nested: any = { value: 'deep' };
      for (let i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
        nested = { nested };
      }
      
      expect(() => {
        systemParser.parse({
          type: 'Feature',
          properties: nested
        });
      }).toThrow(/nesting exceeds max depth/);
    });
    
    it('should reject extremely large collections', () => {
      const huge = {
        type: 'FeatureCollection',
        features: new Array(100000).fill({ type: 'Feature' })
      };
      
      expect(() => {
        systemCollectionParser.parse(huge);
      }).toThrow(/size.*exceeds max/);
    });
  });
  
  describe('XSS Prevention', () => {
    it('should sanitize HTML in strings', () => {
      const xss = {
        type: 'Feature',
        properties: {
          name: '<script>alert("XSS")</script>',
          description: '<img src=x onerror="steal()">'
        }
      };
      
      const result = systemParser.parse(xss);
      
      // Should escape or remove HTML
      expect(result.data.properties.name).not.toContain('<script>');
    });
  });
  
  describe('URL Injection Prevention', () => {
    it('should detect credentials in URL', () => {
      expect(() => {
        SecureAuthHelper.detectCredentialsInURL(
          'https://api.example.com/systems?apiKey=secret'
        );
      }).toThrow(/SECURITY WARNING.*apiKey/);
    });
    
    it('should warn on HTTP (non-HTTPS)', () => {
      const spy = jest.spyOn(console, 'warn');
      
      SecureAuthHelper.enforceHTTPS('http://api.example.com');
      
      expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
        expect.stringContaining('insecure HTTP')
      );
    });
  });
  
  describe('ReDoS Prevention', () => {
    it('should timeout on catastrophic backtracking', async () => {
      // Vulnerable regex: /^(a+)+$/
      const maliciousInput = 'a'.repeat(50) + '!';
      
      await expect(async () => {
        await safeRegexTest(/^(a+)+$/, maliciousInput, 1000);
      }).rejects.toThrow(/Regex timeout/);
    });
  });
});

6. Security Documentation

Create SECURITY.md:

# Security Policy

## Reporting a Vulnerability

**DO NOT** open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please report security issues to:
- Email: security@example.com
- GitHub Security Advisory: https://github.com/OS4CSAPI/ogc-client-CSAPI/security/advisories/new

We will respond within 48 hours and provide a timeline for fixes.

## Supported Versions

| Version | Supported          |
| ------- | ------------------ |
| 1.x.x   | :white_check_mark: |
| < 1.0   | :x:                |

## Security Best Practices

### 1. Authentication
- ✅ **DO** use Authorization header for tokens
- ❌ **DON'T** put credentials in URL parameters
- ✅ **DO** store tokens securely (environment variables, secure vaults)
- ❌ **DON'T** store tokens in localStorage (XSS vulnerability)

### 2. HTTPS
- ✅ **DO** use HTTPS in production
- ❌ **DON'T** use HTTP for sensitive data
- ✅ **DO** validate server certificates

### 3. Input Validation
- ✅ **DO** enable validation: `{ validate: true }`
- ✅ **DO** sanitize user-provided data before rendering
- ❌ **DON'T** trust server responses blindly

### 4. Dependencies
- ✅ **DO** keep dependencies up to date
- ✅ **DO** run `npm audit` regularly
- ✅ **DO** enable Dependabot alerts

### 5. Error Handling
- ❌ **DON'T** expose sensitive data in error messages
- ✅ **DO** log errors securely (redact credentials)

## Known Security Limitations

1. **Validation Coverage:** Not all OGC spec validations implemented
2. **Binary Encodings:** Not supported (potential security risk)
3. **WebSocket Streaming:** Not implemented (separate security domain)

## Security Scanning

We use:
- NPM Audit (CI/CD pipeline)
- Snyk (weekly scans)
- Dependabot (automated updates)
- Manual code reviews

## Vulnerability Disclosure

See CHANGELOG.md for security-related releases.

Add Security Section to README:

## Security

This library handles data from external OGC API servers. Follow security best practices:

### Secure Authentication
```typescript
// RECOMMENDED: Token in header
const nav = new TypedCSAPINavigator(collection, {
  headers: {
    'Authorization': `Bearer ${process.env.API_TOKEN}`
  }
});

// INSECURE: Token in URL
const systems = await nav.getSystems({ token: 'secret' });  // ❌ DON'T

Enable Validation

// Enable validation for untrusted data
const systems = await nav.getSystems({ validate: true });

HTTPS Only

// Use HTTPS in production
const baseUrl = 'https://api.example.com/csapi';  // ✅
const baseUrl = 'http://api.example.com/csapi';   // ❌

See SECURITY.md for full security guidelines.


---

## Acceptance Criteria

### Automated Security Scanning (10 criteria)
- [ ] Integrate `npm audit` into CI/CD pipeline
- [ ] Configure Dependabot for automated dependency updates
- [ ] Add Snyk security scanning (or equivalent)
- [ ] Configure security scanning to run on every PR
- [ ] Configure security scanning to run weekly on main branch
- [ ] Set vulnerability severity thresholds (critical/high = fail build)
- [ ] Create GitHub Actions workflow for security scans
- [ ] Enable GitHub Security Advisories
- [ ] Generate SBOM (Software Bill of Materials)
- [ ] Document security scanning process in CONTRIBUTING.md

### Input Validation Security (15 criteria)
- [ ] Implement `InputSanitizer` class with prototype pollution prevention
- [ ] Block `__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype` keys in JSON
- [ ] Implement recursion depth limit (default: 100 levels)
- [ ] Implement collection size limit (default: 10,000 items)
- [ ] Implement string length limit validation
- [ ] Sanitize string inputs (remove control characters)
- [ ] Validate URL formats to prevent injection
- [ ] Integrate sanitizer into all parsers
- [ ] Add security options to `ParserOptions` (maxDepth, maxSize)
- [ ] Test prototype pollution prevention (5+ test cases)
- [ ] Test deep nesting DoS prevention
- [ ] Test large collection DoS prevention
- [ ] Test URL injection prevention
- [ ] Document security options in API docs
- [ ] Add security warnings to error messages

### ReDoS Protection (6 criteria)
- [ ] Audit all regular expressions for ReDoS vulnerabilities
- [ ] Use `safe-regex` or `recheck` to analyze regexes
- [ ] Implement regex timeout utility
- [ ] Replace vulnerable regexes with safe alternatives
- [ ] Add ReDoS tests (catastrophic backtracking scenarios)
- [ ] Document regex safety in code comments

### Authentication/Authorization Security (8 criteria)
- [ ] Create `SecureAuthHelper` class with best practices
- [ ] Implement `createBearerAuthHeaders()` helper
- [ ] Implement `createAPIKeyHeaders()` helper
- [ ] Implement `enforceHTTPS()` warning
- [ ] Implement `detectCredentialsInURL()` check
- [ ] Add authentication security tests
- [ ] Document secure authentication patterns in README
- [ ] Warn developers about insecure practices (console warnings)

### Security Testing Suite (12 criteria)
- [ ] Create dedicated `tests/security/` directory
- [ ] Test prototype pollution prevention (3+ test cases)
- [ ] Test DoS prevention (deep nesting, large collections)
- [ ] Test XSS prevention (HTML escaping)
- [ ] Test URL injection prevention
- [ ] Test ReDoS prevention (regex timeout)
- [ ] Test authentication best practices
- [ ] Test HTTPS enforcement
- [ ] Test credential detection in URLs
- [ ] Achieve 100% code coverage for security modules
- [ ] Run security tests in CI/CD pipeline
- [ ] Document security test cases

### Security Documentation (10 criteria)
- [ ] Create SECURITY.md file
- [ ] Document vulnerability reporting process
- [ ] Document supported versions for security updates
- [ ] Document security best practices (authentication, HTTPS, validation)
- [ ] Document known security limitations
- [ ] Document security scanning process
- [ ] Add "Security" section to README.md
- [ ] Create security examples (secure vs insecure code)
- [ ] Document threat model (attack vectors, mitigations)
- [ ] Set up security contact email/channel

### Threat Modeling (5 criteria)
- [ ] Identify threat actors (malicious servers, MITM attackers, XSS attackers)
- [ ] Document attack vectors (prototype pollution, DoS, injection, credential leakage)
- [ ] Document mitigations for each threat
- [ ] Assess residual risk for each threat
- [ ] Review threat model annually or after major changes

### Compliance and Standards (4 criteria)
- [ ] Review OWASP Top 10 (applicable items for library)
- [ ] Review CWE Top 25 (Common Weakness Enumeration)
- [ ] Document compliance with security standards
- [ ] Add security checklist to PR template

---

## Implementation Notes

### Files to Create

**Security Infrastructure (~800-1000 lines total):**

src/
ogc-api/csapi/security/
sanitizer.ts # Input sanitizer (~200 lines)
auth-helpers.ts # Authentication helpers (~150 lines)
safe-regex.ts # ReDoS protection (~100 lines)

tests/security/
security.spec.ts # Security test suite (~400 lines)
prototype-pollution.spec.ts # Prototype tests (~100 lines)
dos-prevention.spec.ts # DoS tests (~100 lines)
auth-security.spec.ts # Auth tests (~100 lines)

.github/
workflows/
security.yml # Security scanning workflow (~100 lines)
dependabot.yml # Dependabot config (~30 lines)

SECURITY.md # Security policy (~300 lines)


### Files to Modify

**Parsers (integrate security):**
- `src/ogc-api/csapi/parsers/base.ts` - Add sanitization (~50 lines)
- `src/ogc-api/csapi/parsers/resources.ts` - Add size checks (~30 lines)

**Documentation:**
- `README.md` - Add Security section (~100 lines)
- `CONTRIBUTING.md` - Add security testing guidelines (~50 lines)

### Implementation Phases

**Phase 1: Automated Scanning (4-6 hours)**
- Set up GitHub Actions workflow
- Configure Dependabot
- Integrate npm audit
- Set up Snyk (or equivalent)

**Phase 2: Input Sanitization (8-10 hours)**
- Implement InputSanitizer class
- Integrate into parsers
- Add depth/size limits
- Unit tests

**Phase 3: ReDoS Protection (4-5 hours)**
- Audit regexes
- Implement safe alternatives
- Add timeout utility
- Tests

**Phase 4: Authentication Security (5-6 hours)**
- Create SecureAuthHelper
- Implement security checks
- Add warnings
- Tests

**Phase 5: Security Testing (10-12 hours)**
- Create security test suite
- Prototype pollution tests
- DoS tests
- XSS/injection tests
- Achieve 100% coverage

**Phase 6: Documentation (6-8 hours)**
- Create SECURITY.md
- Update README.md
- Threat modeling document
- Security best practices guide

**Phase 7: Review and Audit (4-6 hours)**
- Code review for security
- Manual penetration testing
- Third-party security audit (optional)

**Total Estimated Effort:** 41-53 hours (~1-1.5 weeks)

### Dependencies

**Requires:**
- Issue #23 (Architecture) - ✅ Complete (provides code structure)
- Issue #20 (OGC Compliance) - ✅ Complete (provides endpoint patterns)
- Issue #12 (GeoJSON Validation) - ✅ Complete (identifies validation gaps)
- Issue #14 (SWE Validation) - ✅ Complete (identifies validation gaps)

**External Tools:**
- npm audit (built-in)
- Snyk (free for open source)
- Dependabot (free on GitHub)
- safe-regex (npm package)
- OWASP Dependency-Check (optional)

### Caveats

**Scope Limitations:**

**In Scope:**
- Automated dependency scanning
- Input sanitization and validation
- DoS prevention (nesting, size limits)
- ReDoS protection
- Authentication best practices
- Security documentation
- Security test suite

**Out of Scope:**
- Network security (TLS/SSL configuration) - handled by browser/Node.js
- Server-side security - this is a client library
- Encryption/decryption - no cryptographic operations in library
- Advanced threat detection - requires monitoring infrastructure
- Compliance certifications (SOC 2, ISO 27001) - organizational level

**Performance Impact:**
- Input sanitization adds ~1-2ms overhead per parse
- Depth checking adds ~0.5ms overhead
- Size checking is O(1) (negligible)
- Overall impact: <5% performance degradation for enhanced security

**False Positives:**
- Depth limit may reject legitimate deeply nested structures (adjustable)
- Size limit may reject legitimate large collections (adjustable)
- Prototype key blocking may break edge cases (rare)

**Maintenance:**
- Security scanning requires ongoing monitoring
- Dependencies need regular updates
- Threat model needs annual review
- Security tests need expansion as new vulnerabilities discovered

---

## Priority Justification

**Priority: Low**

**Why Low Priority:**
1. **No Critical Vulnerabilities Found:** No known exploits in current version
2. **Limited Attack Surface:** Client library, not server-facing
3. **Type Safety Helps:** TypeScript provides some protection
4. **Significant Effort:** 41-53 hours of security hardening work
5. **Maintenance Burden:** Ongoing security monitoring and updates

**Why Still Important:**
1. **Professional Libraries Need Security:** Industry expectation for production use
2. **Prevent Future Vulnerabilities:** Proactive defense better than reactive patching
3. **User Trust:** Security audit increases confidence in library
4. **Compliance:** Many organizations require security assessments
5. **Best Practices:** Security should be built-in, not bolted-on

**Impact if Not Addressed:**
- ⚠️ Potential vulnerabilities in dependencies (CVEs)
- ⚠️ Risk of prototype pollution attacks
- ⚠️ Risk of DoS via malicious data (deep nesting, large collections)
- ⚠️ Risk of credential leakage via URLs
- ⚠️ No security guidance for developers
- ✅ **Library still functional** (no immediate security breach)

**When to Prioritize Higher:**
- Before 1.0 release (production readiness)
- After security incident or vulnerability disclosure
- When targeting enterprise customers (security requirements)
- When handling sensitive data (PII, financial, health)
- If used in high-value or critical systems

**Effort Estimate:** 41-53 hours (~1-1.5 weeks)
- Automated scanning: 4-6 hours
- Input sanitization: 8-10 hours
- ReDoS protection: 4-5 hours
- Authentication security: 5-6 hours
- Security testing: 10-12 hours
- Documentation: 6-8 hours
- Review/audit: 4-6 hours

**ROI Analysis:**
- **High ROI** for production deployment (prevents security incidents)
- **Medium ROI** for open-source credibility (demonstrates professionalism)
- **Low ROI** for hobbyist projects (overkill for low-risk use cases)
- **Best ROI** for enterprise adoption (meets security requirements)

**Recommendation:** Implement before 1.0 release or when targeting production/enterprise use. Security audit is expected for professional libraries but can be deferred for early development phases. Prioritize automated scanning (quick win) first, then comprehensive hardening later.

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