updating technical overview

Author: Janis Erdmanis

_assets/auto/peacefounder.el

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
     "sampigethaya2006"
     "schneider2017"
     "veliz2021"
-    "Wikstrom2005"))
+    "Wikstrom2005"
+    "Selene2016"))
  '(or :bibtex :latex))
 

_assets/clockwork.jpg

@@ -268,4 +268,27 @@ @InProceedings{Wikstrom2005
 pages = {273--292},
 abstract = {We introduce the first El Gamal based mix-net in which each mix-server partially decrypts and permutes its input, i.e., no re-encryption is necessary. An interesting property of the construction is that a sender can verify non-interactively that its message is processed correctly. We call this sender verifiability.},
 isbn = {978-3-540-32267-2}
-}
+}
+
+@incollection{Selene2016,
+	location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
+	title = {Selene: Voting with Transparent Verifiability and Coercion-Mitigation},
+	volume = {9604},
+	isbn = {978-3-662-53356-7 978-3-662-53357-4},
+	url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_12},
+	shorttitle = {Selene},
+	abstract = {End-to-end verifiable voting schemes typically involves voters handling an encrypted ballot in order to confirm that their vote is accurately included in the tally. While this may be technically valid, from a public acceptance standpoint is may be problematic: many voters may not really understand the purpose of the encrypted ballot and the various checks that they can perform. In this paper we take a different approach and revisit an old idea: to provide each voter with a private tracking number. Votes are posted on a bulletin board in the clear along with their associated tracking number. This is appealing in that it provides voters with a very simple, intuitive way to verify their vote, in the clear. However, there are obvious drawbacks: we must ensure that no two voters are assigned the same tracker and we need to keep the trackers private.},
+	pages = {176--192},
+	booktitle = {Financial Cryptography and Data Security},
+	publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
+	author = {Ryan, Peter Y. A. and Rønne, Peter B. and Iovino, Vincenzo},
+	editor = {Clark, Jeremy and Meiklejohn, Sarah and Ryan, Peter Y.A. and Wallach, Dan and Brenner, Michael and Rohloff, Kurt},
+	urldate = {2021-11-20},
+	date = {2016},
+        year = 2016,
+	langid = {english},
+	doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_12},
+	note = {Series Title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
+	file = {Ryan et al. - 2016 - Selene Voting with Transparent Verifiability and .pdf:/Users/jerdmanis/BtSync/System/Zotero/storage/VIJU67MD/Ryan et al. - 2016 - Selene Voting with Transparent Verifiability and .pdf:application/pdf},
+}
+

_assets/peacefounder.bib

@@ -850,6 +850,58 @@ width: 100px;
   margin-bottom: 1rem;
 }
 
+/* blockquote { */
+/*   background: #f8f8f8; */
+/*   border-radius: 8px; */
+/*   padding: 2rem; */
+/*   margin: 2rem 0; */
+/* } */
+
+/* blockquote p { */
+/*   margin-bottom: 1rem !important; */
+/* } */
+
+/* .isolation-detail h3 { */
+/*   font-size:1.5rem; */
+/* } */
+
+/* .isolation-detail p { */
+/*   margin-top:1.5rem; */
+/* } */
+
+
+blockquote {
+  /* background: #f8f9fa; */
+  background: linear-gradient(135deg, #f8f9fa 0%, #e9ecef 100%);
+  border-radius: 8px;
+  padding: 2rem;
+  padding-top: 1rem;
+  margin: 2rem 0;
+  /* border-left: 4px solid #17a2b8; */
+}
+
+blockquote p:last-of-type {
+  margin-bottom: 0 !important;
+}
+
+blockquote ul {
+  margin-top: 1.5rem;
+  margin-left:2rem;
+}
+
+blockquote h3 {
+  margin-top:1rem;
+  font-size:1.5rem;
+}
+
+blockquote p {
+  margin-top:1rem;
+  margin-bottom: 1rem !important;
+  
+}
+
+
+
 .contact-section {
   background: #f0f0f0;
   border-radius: 8px;

_assets/protocol.svg

@@ -103,11 +103,12 @@
 
 The development prototype includes comprehensive documentation for setting up test elections and verifying the cryptographic protocols. We recommend starting with the provided test scenarios to understand the system's operation.
 
+The PeaceFounder e-voting system offers two deployment options. A basic mode that displays votes on the tally board, signed directly with their pseudonym, and can be used without calculators. A main mode that requires voters to have calculators on hand provides vote deniability and permanent privacy for high-stakes elections. Currently, only the basic mode is supported.
+
 ~~~
 <div class="warning-notice"><strong>⚠️ Development Preview Notice:</strong> This prototype is intended for research and testing purposes only. It can be used on a small scale in low stakes scenarios until production hardening happens.</div>
 ~~~
 
-
 ### Server Setup
 
 ~~~

_css/style.css

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ <h1>Evoting for Democracy</h1>
     <div class="cta-buttons">
       <a href="/vision" class="btn btn-secondary">Why It Matters?</a>
       <a href="#" class="btn btn-secondary" onclick="openDemoModal()">Watch Demo</a>
-      <a href="#inovation" class="btn btn-secondary">Read the Research</a>
+      <a href="/solution" class="btn btn-secondary">Technical Overview</a>
     </div>
 
     <!-- Simple text link for prototype -->
@@ -55,16 +55,16 @@ <h4>Vote Buying and Coercion Risks</h4>
 
 
     <div class="quote-box">
-      If voters cannot independently verify that their votes are accurately counted while maintaining their privacy—regardless of whether administrators are honest or corrupt—then the system has failed its fundamental democratic purpose.
-
-      <div class="cta-buttons" style="margin-top: 2rem;">
-        <a href="/problem" class="btn btn-secondary">Read Full Analysis</a>
-      </div>
-
+      An e-voting system where voters must trust intitutional promises that their votes were counted correctly and the final tally consists only of legitimate voters is merely a survey with extra steps.
+      <!-- <div class="cta-buttons" style="margin-top: 2rem;"> -->
+      <!--   <a href="/problem" class="btn btn-secondary">Read Full Analysis</a> -->
+      <!-- </div> -->
     </div>
 
     <p class="problem-conclusion">
-      The solution is not to eliminate technology, but to democratize participation in deployment and verification, empowering voters to independently verify their votes without depending on institutional promises.
+
+Democratic legitimacy requires broad participation in verification, not just select observers. To enable this, e-voting must produce publicly accessible, indisputable cryptographic evidence that anyone can verify across borders—establishing trust in the final result while preserving vote privacy.
+      <!-- The solution is not to eliminate technology, but to democratize participation in deployment and verification, empowering voters to independently verify their votes without depending on institutional promises. -->
     </p>
   </div>
 </section>
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ <h4>CI/CD Evidence Publishing</h4>
 
     <div class="research-highlight">
       <h3>Research Foundation</h3>
-      <p>"Unconditional Individual Verifiability with Receipt Freeness via Post-Cast Isolation"</p>
+      <p>Unconditional Individual Verifiability with Receipt Freeness via Post-Cast Isolation</p>
       <div class="cta-buttons">
         <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1186" class="btn btn-primary">Read the Preprint</a>
         <a href="/solution" class="btn btn-secondary">Technical Overview</a>