testessfinal.txt

Selected file: /home/enrico/Documents/hackaton/main_example1.tf
Resources:
Resource Type: google_compute_autoscaler, Resource Name: default
Resource Type: google_compute_instance_template, Resource Name: default
Resource Type: google_compute_instance_group_manager, Resource Name: default
Provider: GCP
API called successfully! (Response is not JSON)
```gherkin
Feature: Secure Google Compute Autoscaler Configuration

  Scenario: Preventing Autoscaler from Creating Instances with Insecure Metadata
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_autoscaler resource named "my-autoscaler"
    And the autoscaler is configured to use a template with metadata including sensitive information like API keys
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the autoscaler should NOT create instances with the sensitive metadata exposed in the metadata section.
    And the Terraform plan should highlight a warning or error if sensitive metadata is detected.


  Scenario: Ensuring Autoscaler Uses Appropriate Service Accounts with Limited Permissions
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_autoscaler resource named "my-autoscaler"
    And the autoscaler is configured with a service account
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the autoscaler should use a service account with only the necessary permissions to manage instances.
    And the service account should NOT have broader permissions like storage admin or network admin.
    And the Terraform plan should explicitly list the granted permissions for the service account.


  Scenario: Preventing Autoscaler from Scaling to an Excessively Large Number of Instances
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_autoscaler resource named "my-autoscaler"
    And the autoscaler is configured with a maximum number of instances
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the autoscaler should NOT scale beyond the defined maximum number of instances, even under high load.
    And the Terraform configuration should include clear documentation explaining the rationale behind the maximum instance limit.


  Scenario: Verifying Autoscaler's Target Pool is Securely Configured
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_autoscaler resource named "my-autoscaler"
    And the autoscaler targets a google_compute_target_pool resource
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the target pool should be configured with appropriate security settings, such as HTTPS load balancing.
    And the target pool should only allow traffic from authorized sources (e.g., through firewall rules).
    And the Terraform plan should explicitly show the security settings of the target pool.


  Scenario:  Preventing Autoscaler from Using Default Network with Public IP Addresses
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_autoscaler resource named "my-autoscaler"
    And the autoscaler's instance template uses the default network
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the autoscaler should NOT create instances with public IP addresses by default.
    And the instances should be configured to use internal IP addresses only, unless explicitly specified.
    And the Terraform plan should clearly indicate the network and IP address configuration of the instances.


  Scenario:  Ensuring Autoscaler Configuration is Version Controlled and Reviewed
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_autoscaler resource
    And the configuration is committed to a version control system (e.g., Git)
    And the configuration changes are reviewed before deployment
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the configuration history should be auditable.
    And the configuration changes should be reviewed by at least one other engineer.
    And the Terraform plan should be reviewed before deployment.


```

API called successfully! (Response is not JSON)
```gherkin
Feature: Secure Google Compute Instance Template Configuration

  Scenario: Preventing Publicly Accessible Instances
    Given a Google Compute Instance Template resource "default" is defined using Terraform
    And the network interface's access config is configured
    When the Terraform plan is applied
    Then the instance template's network interface should NOT have a public IP address assigned
    And the instance template's network interface should NOT have an access config with "natIP" set


  Scenario: Enforcing Secure Boot
    Given a Google Compute Instance Template resource "default" is defined using Terraform
    And the "confidential_instance_config" is not specified
    When the Terraform plan is applied
    Then the instance template should have secure boot enabled.


  Scenario: Preventing Metadata Access from the Instance
    Given a Google Compute Instance Template resource "default" is defined using Terraform
    And the metadata settings are configured
    When the Terraform plan is applied
    Then the instance template should have metadata access restricted to only the project.


  Scenario:  Restricting Instance Metadata Access to Specific Services
    Given a Google Compute Instance Template resource "default" is defined using Terraform
    And the metadata settings are configured to allow access from specific services
    When the Terraform plan is applied
    Then the instance template should only allow metadata access from the specified services.
    And the instance template should deny metadata access from all other services.


  Scenario:  Using a Managed Service Account with appropriate permissions
    Given a Google Compute Instance Template resource "default" is defined using Terraform
    And a service account is specified for the instance
    When the Terraform plan is applied
    Then the instance template should use a service account with the principle of least privilege.
    And the service account should only have permissions necessary for the instance's functionality.


  Scenario:  Ensuring Disk Encryption
    Given a Google Compute Instance Template resource "default" is defined using Terraform
    And the disk configuration is specified
    When the Terraform plan is applied
    Then all attached disks in the instance template should be encrypted using Google managed encryption keys.


  Scenario:  Validating Firewall Rules
    Given a Google Compute Instance Template resource "default" is defined using Terraform
    And the network interface is associated with a firewall rule
    When the Terraform plan is applied
    Then the firewall rules associated with the network interface should only allow necessary traffic.
    And the firewall rules should explicitly deny all other traffic.


  Scenario:  Checking for outdated OS images
    Given a Google Compute Instance Template resource "default" is defined using Terraform
    And a specific OS image is specified
    When the Terraform plan is applied
    Then the instance template should use a supported and up-to-date OS image.
    And a warning should be triggered if the image is nearing end-of-life or unsupported.


  Scenario:  Using appropriate machine type for resource utilization
    Given a Google Compute Instance Template resource "default" is defined using Terraform
    And a machine type is specified
    When the Terraform plan is applied
    Then the instance template should use a machine type appropriate for the workload.
    And the machine type should be optimized for cost and performance.


  Scenario:  Preventing unauthorized access to instance metadata
    Given a Google Compute Instance Template resource "default" is defined using Terraform
    And the metadata options are configured
    When the Terraform plan is applied
    Then the instance template should not expose sensitive information via metadata.
    And the instance template should have metadata access restricted to authorized users and services.

```

API called successfully! (Response is not JSON)
```gherkin
Feature: Secure Google Compute Instance Group Manager Configuration

  Scenario: Preventing Unintentional Public IP Assignment
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_instance_group_manager resource named "my-igm"
    And the instance template specifies a network interface with no specified network or subnetwork
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the created instance group manager should NOT have instances with public IP addresses assigned automatically.
    And the Terraform plan should explicitly show that no public IP is assigned.


  Scenario: Enforcing HTTPS for Instance Group Manager Health Checks
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_instance_group_manager resource named "my-igm"
    And a health check is defined with a HTTP protocol
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the created instance group manager's health check should be updated to use HTTPS protocol.
    And a warning or error should be raised if the health check protocol is not HTTPS.


  Scenario: Preventing Unrestricted Instance Group Manager Access
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_instance_group_manager resource named "my-igm"
    And the instance group manager is not associated with any specific firewall rules
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the created instance group manager should be associated with a firewall rule that restricts access only from authorized networks or IP addresses.
    And the Terraform plan should explicitly show the applied firewall rules.


  Scenario: Ensuring Instance Group Manager Uses Managed Instance Groups
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_instance_group_manager resource named "my-igm"
    And the `base_instance_name` is defined but `list_managed_instances_results` is not specified.
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the created instance group manager should use managed instance groups.
    And the Terraform plan should show that `list_managed_instances_results` is set to `PAGELESS`.


  Scenario: Preventing Vulnerable Instance Templates
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_instance_group_manager resource named "my-igm"
    And the instance template uses a deprecated operating system or software version
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the Terraform plan should fail or issue a warning indicating the use of a vulnerable instance template.
    And recommendations for updating to a secure OS/software version should be provided.


  Scenario:  Restricting Instance Group Manager Creation to Specific Projects
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_instance_group_manager resource named "my-igm"
    And the project ID is not explicitly defined in the configuration
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the Terraform plan should fail or issue a warning unless the project ID is explicitly defined and restricted to a specific, approved project.


  Scenario:  Autohealing Configuration Validation
    Given a Terraform configuration for a google_compute_instance_group_manager resource named "my-igm"
    And autohealing is enabled without specifying `initial_delay_sec`
    When the Terraform configuration is applied
    Then the Terraform plan should either automatically set a reasonable `initial_delay_sec` value or issue a warning recommending a specific value to prevent immediate restarts.

```

API called successfully! (Response is not JSON)
```gherkin
Scenario: Preventing unauthorized access via project-level SSH keys

  Given a Google Compute Engine instance is created with project-level SSH keys enabled
  When a user attempts to access the instance using a project-level SSH key
  Then access is denied unless the user has appropriate IAM permissions explicitly granted at the instance level.


Scenario: Ensuring least privilege access to Compute Engine instances

  Given multiple Compute Engine instances exist within a project, each with different security requirements
  When a user attempts to access an instance
  Then access is granted only if the user possesses the minimum necessary IAM roles and permissions specifically assigned to that instance.


Scenario: Secure management of SSH keys for Compute Engine instances

  Given a user's access to a Compute Engine instance is revoked
  When the user attempts to access the instance using their previously associated SSH key
  Then access is denied, and the SSH key is removed from the instance's metadata.

```

API called successfully! (Response is not JSON)
```gherkin
Scenario: Preventing unauthorized access via project-wide SSH keys

  Given a Google Compute Engine project with multiple VM instances and users with varying access needs
  When project-wide SSH keys are enabled for all VM instances
  Then access to all VM instances should be denied, and only users with explicitly granted instance-level permissions via OS Login should be able to connect.


Scenario: Ensuring least privilege access to VM instances

  Given a Google Compute Engine project with VM instances requiring different levels of access
  When a new user is added to the project
  Then the user should only be granted access to the specific VM instances and with the minimum necessary permissions.


Scenario: Secure management of SSH keys for VM instances

  Given a Google Compute Engine project with VM instances using SSH keys for authentication
  When a user leaves the project
  Then their associated SSH keys should be automatically removed from all VM instances, preventing further access.


Scenario: Detecting and responding to compromised SSH keys

  Given a Google Compute Engine project with VM instances using SSH keys for authentication
  When a project-level SSH key is compromised
  Then an alert should be triggered, and access using the compromised key should be immediately revoked.  All affected VM instances should be investigated for potential compromise.
```

API called successfully! (Response is not JSON)
```gherkin
Scenario: Preventing unauthorized access via project-wide SSH keys

  Given a Google Compute Engine project with multiple VM instances and users with varying access needs
  When project-wide SSH keys are enabled for all VM instances
  Then access to all VM instances should be denied, and only users with explicitly granted instance-level permissions via OS Login should be able to connect.


Scenario: Ensuring least privilege access to VM instances

  Given a Google Compute Engine project with VM instances requiring different levels of access
  When a new user is added to the project
  Then the user should only be granted access to the specific VM instances and with only the necessary permissions, adhering to the principle of least privilege.


Scenario: Secure management of SSH keys for VM instances

  Given a Google Compute Engine project with VM instances using SSH keys for access
  When a user leaves the project
  Then their associated SSH keys should be automatically removed from the metadata of all VM instances, preventing further access.


Scenario: Detecting and responding to compromised SSH keys

  Given a Google Compute Engine project with VM instances using SSH keys for access
  When a project-level SSH key is compromised
  Then an alert should be triggered, and access using the compromised key should be immediately revoked.  All affected VM instances should be investigated and remediated.
```